Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[Skybird]

Tnhats true, the Ukrianians have been completely reoriented in their doctrine by their current chief of staff (was it him, I always forget these names ...) and they have trained according to NATO standards since 2014, the UK and the uS had trainers there since years - it should have done some good use. Thats why I said it spossibole they cna very well make use of the digital potential in that pzh2000 system - but certain that is not.

And what the One World One Scholz showtrain is singing in its latest showacts on stage I do not care for anymore anyway. Let him suffocate from his own blasé ego. Worse than Merkel - Wowh.

Training the Ukrainians, yes, of course, but the focus currently is not on what will be in half a year, but what makes a difference for them right now, from today to tomorrow.

And I wonder what Russia will do if later on Ukriane successfully attacks occupied Donbass and Luhansk territory and pushes the occupiers back. By definition of the fascists these territories will be "Russia" by then, so the recapturing of Ukrainian territory in their logic is an attack on Russia - which, if they cannot repel it, by their nuclear doctrine "legitimises" them to use nuclear weapons. Thats why I think the Ukraine must get tactical nukes that could reach Russia's real homeland, not just the occupied territories it has annexed. Why would the Ukrainians want to nuke their own country? The fascists need to be deterred from using nukes by having their own cities at risk and the war being brought to their own homes.

[Skybird]

There are reports that Germany will delever the Cobra radar system which can be linked to the PZH2000 and is an efficiency multiplier due to its ability to track every single shot by the enemy. This is relevant - I assume - in context with so-called counter-battery fire.

[Skybird]

................."Who delivered heavy weapons to Melnyk...? "............ "What, why? Thats his diplomatic car!"



Mr. Melnyk is Ukraines ambassador to Germany, and he is known (and feared) for his confronting, undiplomatic attacks against German politicians and the government's course during the Ukraine war.

[nikimcbee]

Originally Posted by Rockstar

Something about the translation I think. Headline says Germany has decided to send the cannons...t

Maybe they are sending Hessians?

[Jimbuna]

The EU unveils proposals for new sanctions on Russia including a total ban on Russian oil imports by the end of the year.

The plans - which need member states' approval - also include sanctions on individuals, including those suspected of war crimes.

The EU also plans to offer additional military support to Moldova, amid fears war could spread to Ukraine's neighbour.

Russia says it is considering its options, while its defence minister warns Nato against sending military aid to Ukraine.

Russian missiles struck three power stations in Lviv late on Tuesday, causing blackouts in the western city, the mayor said.

Ukrainian authorities hope to evacuate hundreds of civilians from the city of Mariupol, which is almost fully under Russian control.

[Jimbuna]

[Skybird]

On gas. The Handelsblatt writes:


There are good reasons to prepare for an import ban on Russian gas, even if the German government and the EU are not planning such an embargo. One reason is that Russia could reduce or stop its gas exports in retaliation for sanctions. Another is to improve its own strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. That is why the early warning stage of the gas emergency plan was already activated on March 30.

It remains to be seen what other levels in the contingency plan will be reached. Stage 2, the alert stage, provides that the distribution of gas will continue to be left to the gas market.

However, if very high gas prices then occur, which could again drastically exceed the already high prices today, political intervention is unavoidable due to the associated (social) political challenges.

One possibility would be to limit the price increase through regulatory market intervention and to ration gas. This would occur at the latest at level 3, the emergency level, at which the Federal Network Agency would become active as the federal load distributor and allocate the gas.

In doing so, it is to ensure supply that is in the public interest, to balance the electricity and gas needs and interests of the Länder, and to ensure supply to the so-called privileged customer group, which enjoys special protection.

These are household customers and basic social services. However, rationing also leads to enormous challenges.

Who gets the gas and who doesn't in the event of a deterioration in the supply situation determines how the burden is shared among all sections of society.

The president of the Federal Network Agency, Klaus Müller, comments, "Unfortunately, it cannot be completely ruled out that we will have to make decisions that have terrible consequences for companies, for jobs, for value chains, for supply chains, for entire regions."

Simulations show the potential dangers of inefficient allocation: for example, while one study estimates the cost of a gas embargo at two to three percent of gross domestic product (GDP) under market-based gas allocation, industrial production would plummet under an allocation that favors households and services.

GDP would decline by an estimated ten percent. Although the figures should be taken with a grain of salt given many uncertainties, they show that mistakes in allocation become very costly.

Gas-consuming companies in a shortage situation must consider whether they can substitute gas with other energy sources, buy in (intermediate) products that would otherwise be produced with gas, or even stop production altogether and resell gas already purchased or put it to other uses.

These decisions are influenced by, among other things, the respective business model, the restructuring potential within the companies, the flexibility among the companies' customers, the existing contracts, and the expected specific supply and demand situation locally and on the (world) markets.

The costs of reducing gas consumption therefore differ seriously between companies.

This is a challenge for the Federal Network Agency if it is to decide on the allocation of gas on the basis of business models. To address this, the Federal Network Agency has set up a crisis team of 65 people and is conducting a survey of industrial gas consumption among the 2500 largest gas consumers.

Such a survey provides important insights into the current consumption situation, but does not do justice to the individual potential for evasion in the companies. The need for information goes far beyond accessible key figures. This is the well-known problem of a planned economy.

There are alternatives to planned allocation that should be considered in addition. One obvious alternative is auctioning.

Auctions establish the balance between demand and the fixed, rationed supply quantity. The contract would be awarded to those companies that have the highest willingness to pay, i.e., those that derive the highest economic benefit from the allocation.

Those that can substitute more easily or whose products can be substituted more easily have a lower willingness to pay and would not be awarded a contract - at least to the extent that they do not perform a critical task for the economy and society that is not reflected by their own willingness to pay.

The revenues from the auction could be returned to the companies for relief.



In order to protect privileged customers, i.e., households in particular, the public sector could additionally participate in the allocation as a bidder and purchase the gas for these customers at auction instead of removing it from the auction beforehand.

This would ensure that importers of gas would not have to worry about having to allocate their gas "below value" to customers, and for this reason would prefer to supply gas to other states.

Demand from privileged customers is also not rigid. Households can often turn down gas heating, at least some of the time, at little cost. The incentives to do so become greater if households can sell the gas they save.

For example, it would be conceivable to allocate to households based on the previous year's consumption, coupled with premiums that a household receives if it consumes less.

This would insulate households from large charges while incentivizing energy savings from which households could benefit.

This and other allocation mechanisms that socially and effectively invite energy savings are superior to simple allocation because they encourage favorable savings opportunities, thereby increasing the supply of gas for much-needed other uses.

There are other possibilities for goal-oriented auction mechanisms. For example, analogous to mechanisms in electricity markets, companies could be required to limit or cease gas consumption by competitive bidding.

Those offering to do so at the lowest cost would be awarded the contract and the accompanying compensation, and would prepare for shutdowns accordingly.

Such contracts are not new. But the group of addressees could be expanded - with conditions adjusted to the rationing situation.

Such shutdown auctions can also be carried out today, for example to fill gas storage facilities for the coming winter.

In all cases, the auction is about identifying those companies that want to purchase or reduce gas and at what price. Auctions can be conducted nationwide, by industry, or by region, and they can include volumes and time periods.

An auction allows prices to be used as an allocation mechanism. They help policymakers and regulators allocate gas quickly and according to value, even in times of greatest scarcity.

Businesses and households can at the same time be shielded from the consequences of the resulting high prices at a comparatively lower cost to the public purse. How well we emerge from any gas crisis will depend crucially on the design of the allocation mechanisms.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)


The authors: Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Cologne. He has been researching the theory and practice of auctions since 1983. Axel Ockenfels is Professor of Economics at the University of Cologne. He focuses on market design, game theory, and behavioral economics. Achim Wambach is President of the Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) and a member of the Monopolies Commission. He conducts research on market design and competition policy.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

[Jimbuna]

Hungary will veto the EU's proposal to ban imports of Russian oil, the country's international relations minister tells the BBC.

Zoltán Kovács says the proposal is "unacceptable" and would "ruin the Hungarian economy".

His comments throw the proposal into doubt as the plans must be approved by all 27 of the EU's member states.

Here's what Kovács told Stephen Sackur from BBC HARDtalk:

Stephen Sackur: Are you telling me when it comes to coherent, cooperative EU action, that you will exercise your veto. Is that what you’re going to do?

Zoltán Kovács: Shortly, yes. But at the end of the day you have to again remember how the European Union works. The proposal is coming from Brussels... that is the administrative, bureaucratic centre of the European Union - not from the member states.

They exactly know that what they are proposing is against Hungarian interests, is against the possibility that is feasible on the ground, and if we do that we are completely going to ruin the Hungarian economy.

[Jimbuna]

[Catfish]

Originally Posted by nikimcbee

Maybe they are sending Hessians?

The attack of the headless politicians horsemen ..

[Catfish]

"The opponents of the letter Z must understand that they will not be spared. Everything is serious here: concentration camps, re-education, sterilization!” - Shakhnazarov on state TV"

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/...02979619311618

Not even trying to hide it anymore.

[Dargo]

'Russians now on site of Azovstal factory'

Russian units have entered the grounds of the Azovstal steel factory in occupied Mariupol this evening. This is according to the chairman of the largest Ukrainian ruling party. According to Kiev, there is currently still contact with the Ukrainian military defending the factory. Earlier today, the mayor of Mariupol reported that contact had broken down.

“Blockades and attempts to destroy our units in the Azovstal area in Mariupol continue. In some areas, with the support of aircraft, the Russian enemy resumed the offensive in order to take control of the plant. There has been no success,” adviser to the Armed Forces of Ukraine Alexander Stupun said in a video update.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Wednesday that Russian Armed Forces were not “storming” the Azovstal plant, and instead described them as suppressing “attempts by militants” to take new firing positions.

[mapuc]

Originally Posted by Dargo

'Russians now on site of Azovstal factory'

Russian units have entered the grounds of the Azovstal steel factory in occupied Mariupol this evening. This is according to the group chairman of the largest Ukrainian ruling party.

According to Kiev, there is currently still contact with the Ukrainian military defending the factory. Earlier today, the mayor of Mariupol reported that contact had broken down.

The lastest I have is this and it's from BBC

Posted at 17:0317:03
Contact lost with fighters in Mariupol steelworks - mayor
Sticking with Mariupol, the city's mayor says heavy fighting is taking place at the Azovstal steelworks, where Ukrainian forces are defending their last pocket of control in the city.

But Vadym Boychenko told Ukrainian television contact has been lost with the fighters inside.

Around 100 civilians have been evacuated from the plant in recent days, but it is thought hundreds of civilians, including more than 30 children, remain inside.

A senior adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has told the BBC “a storm has begun on the part of the Russians” at the steelworks.

But earlier the Kremlin denied that Russia is storming the industrial complex.

"There is no storming," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters, although there are "escalations" when Ukrainians take up firing positions, he said.

I've tried to find information on what you wrote about they have reestablished contact.

Markus

[Dargo]

https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/sta...03362152374274

I (https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch) I am going to go out on a limb here and make a prediction that Putin will not do a full mobilization call on May 9th or anytime in the near future

I could be wrong, and I don’t have as much confidence in this call as I did in my invasion prediction back in December (https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/sta...62460673515527), but…

Here is why I think a mobilization call makes little sense for Putin, 1. Putin doesn’t need to continue major offensives to declare a victory he can sell to a domestic audience.

Putin can claim that he has
- demilitarized UKR (by destroying a lot of equipment and military-industrial infrastructure)
- “denazified” it (destroyed Azov battalion in Mariupol)
- protected “our people” in Donbas and Crimea by enlarging territory and creating a land corridor

Witt full control of Russian domestic propagandist media, selling such a win to a domestic audience would be a piece of cake for Putin. The truth never needs to stand in the way of a good story, the pliable Russian public would be happy to consume. Putin declaring victory does not mean Russian forces would leave or would even stop fighting. Recall that he has declared victory in Syria on multiple occasions and yet operations continue there to this day (https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-m...-idUKKBN1E028G).

But Putin could end major offensive operations (which he can’t sustain past the fight for the Donbas anyway) and switch to defensive tactics to protect most of his gains against Ukrainian counterattacks. Defending Kherson could be tough but if the Russians abandon it, cross the Dnieper and blow the bridges, they could make it really tough for Ukrainians to retake the rest of the Donetsk to Crimea land corridor. Putin could continue to terrorize Ukrainian cities with occasional strikes and enforce the Black Sea blockade, which is strangling the Ukrainian economy, with subs (Ukraine has no ASW), coastal batteries in Crimea and surface ships (but far off the coast to avoid more Moskvas)

2. Declaring full mobilization is very fraught politically for Putin, declaring mobilization also means enlarging current limited war aims and risking suffering a devastating loss he wouldn’t be able to explain away.

Declaring mobilization just to help retake Donbas makes no sense from risk vs benefit trade off and is a de facto admission of defeat after feeding the domestic audience a steady stream of Russian supposed victories there and operation going “according to plan”. So if Putin declares mobilization, it would be to have another go at Kyiv and/or Odesa and establishing a pro-Russian puppet regime there. But he would be foolish to think that Shoigu and Gerasimov could succeed where they had already failed once.

More untrained manpower doesn’t solve bad tactics, logistics and training - in fact, it makes it all much worse - all the things that had doomed Russia’s first assault on Kyiv. And mobilization would take many months. So his current offensive, if it fails, would stall regardless. More importantly, Putin has now seen how difficult it is to control occupied areas even without significant organized resistance (Kherson) and how challenging it is to take cities that resist (Mariupol) and the destruction it would cause (which he would be stuck rebuilding).

He has surely lost faith by now in what FSB has been telling him about Russian agents in Ukraine that could quickly run the occupied country, so even if he were somehow to take Kyiv, establishing a puppet government that would actually run the country would be near impossible now. Finally, the political risks of mobilization are substantial. Putin knows it, and that’s why he has repeatedly declared (falsely) that conscripts don’t fight in Ukraine. His popularity is high now, and he would be risking it, especially if he fails (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe...ne-2022-03-31/).

Russian public currently supports the fake version of the war they are seeing on their TV screens. Most families don’t know anyone who is fighting and dying (many soldiers are from poor villages and ethnic minorities). A huge mobilization would change all that and is very risky. Putin has certainly gambled big on this war, but so far he has not gambled his hold on power, which remains quite secure. Calling for a full mobilization could put that at risk for little benefit. Lastly, he could hope to force concessions from Zelensky even without major new offensives.

If Putin keeps Ukraine from taking back most of occupied territory, continues to terrorize the population with air raids (although depleting missile stockpiles will be an issue) and strangles Ukraine’s export-driven economy with a blockade, he might believe he could get concessions. I am not saying he would necessarily succeed at all of these objectives - war is highly contingent, likes to say - but it would certainly not be crazy for Putin to think that he would. Putin could be right or wrong on Zelensky making any concessions and pushing the West to drop Russian sanctions as part of the deal, but the odds are much better for him with this course of action than mobilization and another huge offensive.

This is why I don’t think it’s likely that Putin declares full mobilization. But he could easily call for more patriotic volunteers, increase contract signup payments, etc. That I don’t rule out at all. Though, it won’t make a substantial difference for the Russian military. If I am proven wrong on this call, it will be most likely because Putin has been completely isolated from reality and has no idea what is truly happening in this war, since no one is telling him the truth. The degree to which this is the case is impossible to currently know.

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by mapuc

The lastest I have is this and it's from BBC



I've tried to find information on what you wrote about they have reestablished contact.

Markus

https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-...cf8c697ef01a0e