GER politics thread

[Skybird]

In Germany, the nation-wide CDU and the Bavaria-only CSU form a party union.

[Tichys Einblicke] According to the new electoral law of the left-wing coalition government, every party taking part in the Bundestag elections must achieve at least 5% of the votes nationwide in order to enter the Bundestag. Regardless of the number of direct mandates won.
Above all, this can be seen as a law against the CSU. It only runs in Bavaria and wins almost all direct mandates there. The problem: in the last four federal elections, the CSU achieved results that were only a few percentage points above the five percent threshold.

2009: 42.5 percent of the vote in Bavaria, which corresponds to 6.5 percent at national level
2013: 49.3 percent, which corresponds to 7.4 percent
2017: 38.8 percent, which corresponds to 6.2 percent
2021: 31.7 percent, which corresponds to 5.2 percent

If this trend continues, the CSU's chances of winning seats in the Bundestag will also decrease under the new legal situation created by the traffic light system.

If the new values union only loses a few percentage points to the CSU as a result and the CSU does not achieve such a good result, the CSU could fail to meet the five-percent clause - in the new electoral law of the traffic light system, direct mandates are counted less than before. This would mean a significant loss of seats in the Bundestag for the CSU. A large proportion of Bavarian voters would be left without representation in the Bundestag. Bavaria would only be allowed to pay within the framework of the financial equalization of the federal states, but would hardly have any say.

There would then also be no CDU/CSU parliamentary group and the result for the CDU would be correspondingly smaller: instead of around 30% as currently predicted, only around 24%. However, the CDU, probably to an even greater extent than the CSU, will also cede votes to the Werteunion. A result of 20% or less would then be quite conceivable.

The CDU has a potential of around 50 percentage points. In the 2013 election, the CDU/CSU almost exhausted this potential with 41.5 percentage points. In the last election in 2021, however, at 24.2 percentage points, only just under half. The transformation into another, more left-wing party and the courting of voters to the left of its spectrum had not expanded the voter potential as hoped, but significantly reduced it.

If the not unrealistic scenario described above were to occur, the CSU would no longer exist in the federal government and the CDU would be left with a maximum of 2/5 of its potential. As the CDU rejects coalitions with the AfD, the position of the conservative camp would be considerably weakened, whereas it could still have a majority today - a threat to democracy?

https://www.tichyseinblick.de/daili-...l-von-cdu-csu/


And consider this: the CDU, once a party of conservative values, under Merkel became a party replacing conservative values with pure opportunism, overtaking the SPD on the left lane, and becoming as green as the Greens, for pure opportunism: Merkel wanted to fetch voters of the other two parties by posing as their usually preferred party. Today, the CDU might be the strongest party, but not strong enough to form any government all alone. It needs coalitions, and for that they have only the choice between SPD and Greens, since the FDP shot itself off the charts, and the AfD is not wanted. Which means any way if you vote CDU and hope for a CDU government, you nevertheless get a coalition government with green or red or green-red participation and influence. and if you do not vote CDU, but any of the other, you also get a red-green-x coalition government. No matter what, the left always participates in government. You cannot vote them out.

Now, the - still - boss of the CDU, Friedrich Merz, recently mentioned he is willing to form a coalition with the Greens after the next national elections. And the Greens behave already now as if their dramatic loss in approval ratings were not real, and already indicate they are readying themselves for government again after the next elections, with the CDU. This means that the one party that before any other is responsible for the economic destruction in Germany of the past two years, will get punished in elecitosn, will loose dramatically according to current polls - and nevertheless will get rewarded with being brought back into government again where they can dictate the terms to a CDU that will do just evertyhing just to get to power. And the Greens will demand a price for allowing that.

The left has won, and wins again, and will always win in this doomed country. Socialism has not been defeated after 1989. It blossoms and is more powerful than ever before in the past 150 years. Without it beign enforced from outside, but because the Germans are like they are.

And I dont mean that as a compliment for sure.

I hoped in the past that the consequences from this madness would materialise not before my life "term" is over. But the realist in me meanwhile learned it better. The handwarm brown stuff will fly right into my face like in everybody else's as well - during my remaining lifetime.

Thank you for that, you stupid ####### Germans. If stupidity would be a currency, you would be rich beyond belief. But as things stand, we are just seen as the jesters of the world. Which is just fair - because it is true.

[Skybird]

The nuclear protection - or not - of Germany:

https://www-focus-de.translate.goog/...en&_x_tr_hl=de

Its worth to not that the 2% goal that Germany just reported to fulfill, only gets fulfilled with cheats and creative stretching. Parts of the 100bn special budget get used to boost the regular yearly defence budget, pensions for old NVA officers get counted as active defence spendings, and in parts civilian aid and development aid for countries in Africa and elsewhere get counted as defence spendings as well - the Greens want it so.

If you substract all these cheats, then Germany still does not and also will not reach the 2% goal this year and in coming years. Parts of the SPD and the Green in totality already now said that it would be totally unacceptable for them if even the smallest cut in social spendings - the biggest share of the German yearl state budget - would be made and that money gets rechanneled into the defence budget.

At the peak of the cold war, Germany spent up to 3.7 or 3.8%, btw. . 2% now will not be enough to impress Russia, or to reach the announced goals. And not even every fifth German in polls said he would be willing to defend Germany with a weapon in his hand.



Well, I admit this modern woke left-populist anti-male Islam-friendly gender-ga-ga Germany is soemnthign I would not care to risk my life for, too. Its all too rotten and plem-plem.

[Jimbuna]

The position in the UK is a little similar.

Germany struggles to fix its pension system

Germany's baby boomers are retiring. Those born between 1955 and 1969, when the birthrate was at an all time high, are also living longer. At the same time, the workforce is shrinking. So who will pay the elderly's pensions?

The pension system in Germany, established in 1889, is based on a public retirement insurance scheme in which the pensions of the currently retired are paid using insurance contributions from the currently employed — a system known as the "intergenerational contract."

At the beginning of the 1960s, there were still six actively insured workers for every old-age pensioner. Now that ratio is 2:1, and sinking further still.

A considerable chunk of the federal budget goes into propping up the pension system: €127 billion ($138 billion) will flow into the retirement fund in 2024, that's a third of all government spending. This sum is estimated to almost double by 2050, which is bad news in times of high expenditure in other areas such as defense.
At the same time, pensioners constitute a considerable and growing voter base. So safeguarding the pension system has become a topic for heated debate — and for action.

Germany's three-party center-left coalition government does not want to cut pensions, or increase pension contributions, or raise the age of retirement beyond the planned increase to 67 by 2029.

To solve the problem, Finance Minister Christian Lindner of the neoliberal Free Democrats (FDP) has come up with a plan for the federal government to take out a loan of initially €12 billion and invest it in the stock market.

Specifically, a fund is to be created and administered by an independent public foundation, the so-called "Generation Capital," that will invest in shares on a "return-orientated and globally diversified" basis with the profits first reinvested in the public purse.

"For more than a century, the opportunities offered by the capital market were left lying around. Now we are investing in the future of this society," Lindner said on X, formerly Twitter.

The sum of $12 billion is to be increased by 3% annually in subsequent years. By the mid-2030s, the stocks should be worth at least €200 billion to help support the statutory pension scheme.

The main opposition party, the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) have criticized the plan as ineffective.

Axel Knoerig, deputy chairman of the Committee on Labor and Social Affairs in the Bundestag, told IPPEN.MEDIA that the so-called Pension Package II (Rentenpaket II) would "in no way guarantee long-term pension security." It would "lead to rising contributions in the future and therefore an additional burden for employees," Knoerig said.

While the CDU is not fundamentally opposed to the idea of investing in the capital market to generate additional income through interest, Knoerig pointed out that the current plan would "not generate any significant returns to offset the additional debt burden."

Investing in the stock market is also not without risk, but according the German Finance Ministry, a "safety buffer" will be set up to protect the foundation's assets.

Broadly diversified equity investments generate average of returns of 6 to 8% per year, according to the German Equities Institute (DAI). Finance Minister Lindner says he expects "more than 3 or 4% returns."

The German statutory pension system explained
In Germany, the public pension scheme, also referred to as statutory pension insurance, is mandatory only for employees. The self-employed may pay into the state system or rely entirely on private insurance schemes. Civil servants have their own pension system. These two groups make up around 12% of the working population.

Many left-leaning politicians insist the only way to save the state-run system is by forcing all members of these well-paid groups of people to pay into the state retirement fund.

A contribution of 18.6% of an employee's gross monthly salary goes into the state retirement fund, with the employee and the employer each paying half. The monthly contribution cannot exceed €1.404,30.

The government expects the contribution rate to rise to 20% from 2028, going up to 22.3% by 2035 where it they expect it to remain until 2045.

The current "pension level" — the amount paid to retirees each month — is 48% of the average monthly salary in Germany, a percentage the federal government wants to guarantee in law until 2040 with the "level protection clause."

In 2023, the average old age pension in Germany was €1,550, according to the DRV.

What if the state pension is not enough?
Current figures from German Pension Insurance (DRV) show that 61% of pensioners receive less than €1,200 net per month from their statutory state pension. One in three pensioners receive less than €750 net.

Many women in Germany receive much lower pensions or none at all. That is because they worked in low-paid jobs, and many also spent years at home as a "Hausfrau" or stay-at-home wife, often not returning to work long after having children.

Reentering the labor market after many years is not easy, and for many a pension is not enough to make ends meet. They either work to supplement their pensions or receive state welfare benefits.

Sahra Wagenknecht, a former Left Party politician who has this year founded her own populist party BSW has announced that she intends to campaign on the topic of pension security in upcoming elections.

Her alliance is to be the "voice of German pensioners," she told the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper in March. "Pensions are probably the biggest social problem of our time," said Wagenknecht, adding that the fact that many people receive a low pension despite decades of contributions is a "socio-political scandal."

In addition to the government-run statutory pension insurance system, there are also private company plans and several options for private individual retirement investment plans.

As well as periods in contributory employment, time spent child raising, in education, unemployment or illness also count.

Foreigners who worked and paid contributions in Germany for more than 60 months are entitled to receive a German pension after reaching the official German pensionable age.

More information in English about the German public retirement system can be found here.
https://www.msn.com/en-gb/money/othe...a6b15b3d&ei=23

[Skybird]

Poll from mid-March 2024, 5000 respondents, sampling error 2.5%

https://www-focus-de.translate.goog/...en&_x_tr_hl=de

Quasi a comment on this:

https://www-focus-de.translate.goog/...en&_x_tr_hl=de

If the Bundeswehr had to fight now, it would undoubtedly do so. But unfortunately, after more than three decades of shrinking and cost-cutting, this is only possible to a very limited extent.

In the 1980s, the Bundeswehr had 500,000 soldiers, 7,000 tanks and 1,000 combat aircraft. In the meantime, over 60 percent of the personnel, 90 percent of the tanks and around 80 percent of the aircraft have been reduced. The capacity and portfolio of the navy has also suffered enormously. And the ammunition depots are empty rather than full.

The troops are still struggling to adequately fulfill their tasks in NATO. And the country's own national defense is also in a poor state. That should change very, very quickly. Why else should others come to our aid?

(...)

With the end of the Cold War, the peace dividend after 1990 not only brought with it an enormous reduction in troops, but also a huge investment deficit of around 400 billion euros. The Bundeswehr urgently needs this money in order to be able to fulfill its core tasks.

The special fund will make it possible to offset around a quarter of the historical deficit. There is not yet a significant amount of ammunition. In addition, interest on loans and rising prices are eating away at the 100 billion.

With "tanks" he no doubt means armoured vehicles in generla: MBTs but also IFVs, APCs etc. The Bundeswehr currently has around 300 Leopard-2 tanks of several variants, most of them not in a combat ready state. Operational were around 90 Leopard-2s when 18 of these were given to Ukraine. So, around 72 operational Leopard-2s were left at that time.

Thats not even two tank batallions. A German tank batallion currently has 44 MBTs by doctrine.

I pereosnally would prfeer to not see a massve MBT-heavy rearmament, but a massive investment in ammunition stockpiles, air defences, combat air force, plenty of artillery - and then an overkilll reserve in ATGMs and shoulderpad AT and SAM weapons. I think that meets our reality much better than just getting heavy tanks again. Tanks are targets before anything else. But a militia-style defence from the whole population, with widespread availability of missiles against tanks and air targets? That woudl make any attack costly, very.

Also, obviously, but very unpopular in Germany: mines, mines, mines.

In the medium tiem frame I also propose to get own nuclear weapons - strategic ones. But that is a logistically very cotsly and complicated topic that probably has no chance of realization in this Kindergarden named Germany. Obviously you cannot deter Russia if you rule out the use of nukes against Russia. And I see no logic in dropping our then German nuclear bombs on German or Polish or Baltic soil - they are not our enemy, Russia is.

[Skybird]

Following the poll report from yesterday, FOCUS brought this follow-up today:


https://www-focus-de.translate.goog/...en&_x_tr_hl=de

However, the majority of FOCUS online readers cite a different reason for their refusal to protect their homeland:

What they see as the "anti-German" policies of the traffic light government in Berlin and the "woke" underlying mood in the country, increasingly promoted by the Green-Red coalition, in which attitudes and feelings such as "love of the fatherland" and "national pride" are downright frowned upon.


Where is the love of country? Massive criticism of Robert Habeck

Many commentators do not feel represented by political representatives such as Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck (Greens) - and wonder why they should (also) take up arms for such politicians. They refer to an older quote from Habeck:

"I've always found patriotism to suck. I never knew what to do with Germany and still don't." (original: Vaterlandsliebe fand ich stets zum Kotzen. Ich wusste mit Deutschland noch nie etwas anzufangen und weiß es bis heute nicht.)

Here are some - sometimes slightly abridged - opinions from FOCUS online readers:

"When I walk through German city centers today, I ask myself the question: do you really want to give your life for this 'Germany'? No!!!"

"To fight for your country, you need a certain national pride. The one I had was taken away from me in recent years by the governments in Germany and declared inappropriate."

"I won't lift a weary finger for this woke nomenklatura in Berlin."

"I did my military service for 15 months. Back then, there was still something like national pride. Today, I would defend my family and property with a weapon in my hand, but no longer Germany."

"There are politicians who have nothing to do with Germany. Why should I defend them?"

(...)

"We've been told for a long time that borders can't be protected, haven't we?"

(...)
"If there was something to defend, then of course! But I don't see that at the moment and with our politicians."

"Is it worth defending a country that cares more about funding cycle paths in Peru than providing for its own pensioners?"

"What does it matter who would defend this country if the government capitulates immediately anyway? The state already can't cope with illegal immigrants or clan members."

That aims generally into a direction of arguments where I would sort myself in, too. Germany has had many great quantities in past times, thigns and achieve,ments worth to defend and to br pporud of. But the broken, brain-rotten, history-forgotten thing that Germany is today and is being turned into, is something I do not stand up for, and which I will not lift my small finger for. To serve this present state would be to betray that what once was in all that may have been great and beautiful: by defiling it in order to let the filth of the present live high in relation. I'm done with "modern Germany".

If I would grab a weapon and fight, then not "for (modern) Germany", but for very straight and imminent practical reasons free of any sentimentality. Good Friends. Parents. Own direct survival.

[Skybird]

What is was the basis of Germany's prosperity?

https://www-focus-de.translate.goog/...en&_x_tr_hl=de

Without the simultaneity of our special relationships with America, Russia and China, the economic miracle of the past 40 years would not have happened.

(...)

Why is this important? Because these three partnerships are currently dissolving before our eyes, with no replacement in sight.

The fact is that the previous formula for our prosperity no longer works.

"Forget Germany." It was nice while it lasted. Now its over.

[Skybird]

One of those very rare occasions when a speech is actually worth listening to and doesn't contain any empty words or phrases. The man speaks into our conscience - but so much!

Peter Hahne is now off duty and for many years was a news anchor and presenter of a daily political magazine program on Germany's second TV propaganda channel ZDF. Back then he couldn't speak so freely there.

Chapeau, Herr Hahne!

Use subtitles+translations.

[Skybird]

The AfD's voter pool is a little different from what the media and politicians portray it to be, it seems.



https://www-focus-de.translate.goog/...en&_x_tr_hl=de

[Skybird]

What is to be red here about the Bundeswehr, isunbelievable and shameful. Nobody at NATO should count on it.

https://m-focus-de.translate.goog/po...en&_x_tr_hl=de

[Skybird]

The words of Robert Habeck, the German Minister for Economic Self-Destruction, Deinduistrialization and Increasing Energy Prices, must make the blood run cold with horror in the veins of an intelligent person:


"Bureaucracy is like a burden on us. The good thing is that reducing it doesn't cost any money. It only costs, and this is the point I want to make, entrepreneurial courage. If this is literally meant, why is the bureaucratic burden so high? Well, because bureaucracy-administration is the state, so to speak (...) so you have to understand that bureaucracy arises out of something good. If you just say they're all idiots, you don't understand why. There is something good where the problem is, because the state doesn't make mistakes." - („Die Bürokratie ist wie eine Last auf uns. Das Gute ist, sie abzubauen, kostet kein Geld. Sie kostet nur, und das ist der Punkt, den ich machen will, unternehmerischen Mut. Wenn das buchstäblich so gemeint ist, warum ist die bürokratische Last so hoch? Nun, weil Bürokratie-Verwaltung ja quasi der Staat ist (…) man muss also verstehen, die Bürokratie entsteht aus etwas Gutem heraus. Wenn man nur sagt, das sind alles Idioten, versteht man nicht, warum. Da, wo das Problem ist, ist etwas Gutes, denn der Staat macht ja keine Fehler.“)


Thats the same Robert Habeck who said about companies going bancrupt:

"Companies are not insolvent then, they just stop selling."

[Skybird]

Germany's "army reform" shoots way too short. From the Neue Zürcher Zeitung:



https://www.nzz.ch/der-andere-blick/...urz-ld.1824898



The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine is in its third year. Statements by Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin and his propagandists indicate that the regime in Moscow is preparing for a long and violent conflict with the liberal West. And how does Germany react?



It is - once again - rearranging the command levels and command structures of its armed forces, separating the strategic from the operational and the operational from the tactical level more strictly, once again restructuring the Ministry of Defense and renaming the whole thing "The Bundeswehr of the Turning Point". Boris Pistorius, head of the German defense department, presented the plans on Thursday in Berlin.


After reading the paper, one wonders: Have these people still not heard the shot? When will the federal government finally draw the necessary conclusions from the war in Ukraine for the Bundeswehr? And: How long will it take until then?



In order not to be misunderstood: It is right to combine the two operational commands to plan and lead operations at home and those abroad, as Pistorius plans to do. When it comes to defending Germany and its partners, it doesn't matter whether the soldiers are fighting near Stralsund or Danzig. Command over them must rest in one hand, regardless of the fact that in the event of war it would be transferred to the NATO supreme commander anyway. National defense equals alliance defense.


It is also right to combine logistics and medical care in a support command and to dissolve the previous organizational areas. The armed forces base (logistics and support services such as military police) and the medical service had, typical of the “Bundeswehr Peace Army”, created bloated staffs and duplicate structures since they were set up at the beginning of the 2000s. Many of these soldiers can now return to the force. Experts are needed there.


Pistorius can also be credited for wanting to create the organizational conditions for a possible reintroduction of compulsory military service. For this purpose, the civil defense administration should set up a coordination office.


So far, so understandable. But is that supposed to be all? This is the plan for the “Bundeswehr of the turning point”? This is what Germany's war capability should look like?


People rub their eyes, especially when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Where are the drone battalions, where are the “counter-UAV units” to combat drones? Where are the plans for a Bundeswehr facility to research and use artificial intelligence in the military? Where is the plan for an armed forces think tank that will evaluate and analyze the war in Ukraine? Where are the conclusions from the fighting in the East for the further formation of the German army? These questions are just examples of what is missing from Pistorius' plan.


“By restructuring the Bundeswehr, we are taking joint responsibility for a secure tomorrow in a demanding security policy environment and are organizing defense effectively and results-oriented.” Such PR phrases can be found in the plan for the “Bundeswehr of the Turning Point”; It was leaked weeks before Pistorius' press conference.


In an earlier version, the plan was entitled “Bundeswehr of the Future”, but it did not contain any answers to the really pressing questions. Pistorius must consider whether he has appointed the right people for this important work with his State Secretary Nils Hilmer and the composition of the “steering panel” in which his plan was largely developed.


Because it is the minister who always correctly talks about the German army's fitness for war. The war against an opponent like Russia - as can be seen in Ukraine - is primarily waged on land. And it has to be won there. That's why Germany essentially needs an army that is fit for war, divided into large units that already have the human and material resources at their disposal in peacetime with which they can fight without external support. “Train as you fight” was already the motto during the years of the Afghanistan mission (2002-2021). This premise applies even more today.


But instead of reintegrating the logistics forces and medical troops directly into the Bundeswehr's combat units, everything basically stays the same. Even if the armed forces base and medical service are dissolved as organizational areas, the Ministry of Defense rejected the idea of making the large army units operational on their own and without external support, as was the case during the Cold War. Inspector General Carsten Breuer, Germany's highest-ranking soldier, justified this at the press conference by saying, among other things, that for the the army it would currently not be reasonable to integrate new units.


Breuer surpassed this dubious statement on Wednesday with the remark that the war in Ukraine could not be instrumental in preparing the Bundeswehr for war. What then?


Breuer, who is considered an assertive pragmatist, should know that the national security strategy and defense policy guidelines have described Russia as an enemy and the greatest threat for years. So what should the Bundeswehr primarily prepare for, if not the type of warfare that Russia is practicing in Ukraine (and already indirectly through hybrid warfare against NATO)?


It may be that Pistorius gave his “steering panel” too little time for the reform plan, with just five months. But the new image of war has not only been evident in Ukraine since last November. For more than two years we have seen how Russia is waging war today. Just one example: masses of Ukrainian soldiers suffer severe burn injuries due to the widespread use of flamethrowers on the ground and aerosol bombs from the air. Where can you find the plan for a formation of the German medical troops that is adapted to this war?


It is a groundbreaking reform that will change the structure of the Bundeswehr, says Pistorius. At first glance it may look like this. It would be desirable for the Bundeswehr if responsibilities were actually clearer and the diffusion of responsibility was reduced.


What is more important for Germany's defense capability is what follows this Thursday's announcements. So far, Pistorius has only touched the level directly under his management area. It is to be hoped that any further reform proposals for the Bundeswehr will have more substance. They should be available in the fall. Otherwise it could appear as if Germany is underestimating the military threat posed by Putin's regime.