Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[Skybird]

Too bad, but as I repeatedly said: the Russians adapted. Successfully. This is no longer that stupid horde that it was one year ago.


https://www-tagesspiegel-de.translat..._x_tr_pto=wapp

[Jimbuna]

[Jimbuna]

[Dargo]

Ex-KGB officer Sergei Yirnov: 'The man who visited Mariupol and Sebastopol in March this year was not Putin'

If Putin is really cornered, he will eventually push the red button. So says former Russian spy and ex-KGB officer Sergei Jirnov in his book L'escalade. 'Megalomaniacal as he is, he will feel that the whole world should go down with him if he loses.' As Sergei Jirnov walks down the stairs from his hotel room in Brussels to pose for our photographer, a chambermaid is just dragging down a heavy suitcase. "That's for room 40," she says. Jirnov is immediately suspicious. "That's my room. And that suitcase is not mine." Whereupon he promptly sprints towards reception to ask for an explanation. In the meantime, we look at the suitcase with a touch of apprehension. Jirnov has just told us that the studio of radio station NRJ was hacked yesterday, during his interview. "Nothing was still working, not in the first and not in the second studio. Even the phone of a friend who was with us was hacked. Suddenly the code to open her phone had disappeared, only reappearing in the evening." After a few minutes, he returns: "Void alarm, the suitcase is for the next guest who booked my room."

As a former Russian spy and ex-KGB officer, Sergei Jirnov (62) has to seriously watch his step, that much is certain. Born in Moscow, he joined the youth wing of the Communist Party at 14, where he immediately took charge. Together with his outstanding school performance, this earned him a recommendation for training at the USSR-Russia Foreign Ministry, where he obtained the Russian state diploma in 1983. A year later, at the same time as Vladimir Putin, he was accepted into the prestigious KGB training at Moscow's Yuri Andropov Institute, where he trained as a secret agent. Here, too, he passes with flying colours. He is allowed to leave for Europe, something only the best agents are destined to do. Putin's career is less glorious: he is sent to Dresden, then still part of East Germany. In Paris, Jirnov infiltrates the renowned École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), something no Russian spy had succeeded in doing until then. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Muscovite calls it quits as a secret agent and goes to work as a journalist and consultant on international relations. When he narrowly survives an attempted poisoning in 2001, he is granted political asylum in France, where he still lives. Over the years, Jirnov emerged as a rabid opponent of Putin and his entourage. In his latest book L'escalade, he warns of nuclear threats from Moscow, as Putin's chances of victory seem to dwindle by the day.

"For me, it is clear that the Russians are behind the Nova Kachovka dam breach. Because they reaped the most benefits from it. Because of the flood, they have secured 300 kilometres of territory along the Dnieper. No military combat is possible there in the coming months because the ground has become too boggy. The explosion at the dam was an act of desperation. It was also in retaliation to events in Belgorod (Russian border region, ed.), where Russian and possibly Ukrainian rebels had invaded. That the flooding might affect the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant is part of the plan. If Russia later destroys the water basin (which serves to cool the nuclear fuel, ed.), and I see it absolutely capable of that, it could cause a nuclear catastrophe."

Ukrainian military expert Oleksander Kovalenko warns that Russia will carry out more attacks that undermine the Ukrainian ecosystem. For example, the ammonia pipeline from Russia to Odessa was blown up twice recently, causing a toxic cloud not far from Kharkiv. Both countries accuse each other. How do you view that?
"It is definitely a possibility. The pipeline ends at the ammonia plant in Odessa, which may be a future target. The more ground Ukrainian forces gain, the greater the likelihood of Russian terror attacks on chemical and nuclear targets. Moscow is beginning to realise that it can no longer win this war. This is a very dangerous situation, because if Putin is really cornered, I fear he will eventually push the nuclear button anyway. "The state of the Russian military is dire and the attacks on Russian military airports last December, plus the recent drone attacks on the Kremlin and other places in Moscow, show that Russia is indeed vulnerable. This makes Putin feel increasingly cornered. Although he does not show this to the outside world. His reactions to the recent drone attacks in Moscow came late and were lukewarm, as if he did not take it all that seriously."

You have been accused of being an alarmist.
"There are always people who think I sound too alarmist. But I see it as a realistic scenario. If Putin deploys tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, I don't think he will target Kiev, I suspect he will proceed in the same way the US did in Japan in 1945. They did not drop an atomic bomb on Tokyo, but took aim at two smaller cities: Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Putin might target Mykolaiv, Kherson or Dnipro, and leave Kiev alone. As a warning that things could always be worse. "Of course he realises that NATO will strike back hard if he pushes the red button. NATO will completely destroy its Black Sea Fleet and other strategic sites, with conventional weapons. That need only take a day and then Putin will be nowhere at all. But he will never accept that defeat. Megalomaniacal as he is, he will think the whole world should go down with him if he loses. He says so literally: when a journalist asked him in 2019 during a debate on nuclear weapons whether he would push the red button, Putin replied that if Russia is wiped out, the world no longer has a right to exist."

If China comes up with weapons, Russia could hold out in Ukraine for some time.
"I am not so convinced about Chinese military support. It is a step too far because the country does not want to further risk its ties with the West. Economically, China does want to support Russia, but I don't see it going further than that for now. The relationship between China and Russia is not at all as good as was predicted. China is also not importing huge amounts of oil and gas from Russia; after the war, that percentage increased only slightly. Nor has China been investing in Russian oil or gas fields since the war. The country is seeking a middle ground between its self-interest and its support for Russia."

Philosopher Noam Chomsky also warns of a Russian nuclear attack. This is precisely why we need to sit down with the Russians more than ever, he says. Although that seems an increasingly unfeasible option. Do you still believe in negotiations?
"Not at all. When the Allies negotiated with Hitler at the time, it was in the belief that Hitler would not follow through with his plans. While he was already preparing for World War II. The same applies to Putin. There is simply no negotiating with him. Things have to go the way he wants, there are no other options. Ukrainian President Zelensky knows this. He will never negotiate with Putin himself. With other deputies of Russia he might, but Zelensky too will not give an inch: every Russian must leave Ukrainian territory."

Remains that sooner or later Putin himself will be deposed. Meanwhile, the actions of Russian-nationalist militias are increasing. How great is their influence?
"Those actions show that Russia has weaknesses and is unable to protect its own citizens, but they don't really make a big difference militarily. They are pinpricks, coming from an unorganised group. Because it is not a coherent movement, the FSB (the current federal security service, ed.) can do little against it. Ilya Ponomarov (who has declared himself leader of the Freedom-from-Russia Legion, ed.) lives in exile in Ukraine and is trying to create an opportunity for himself to return to Russia as a politician, should a change of power occur there. The second grouping, the Russian Volunteer Corps, is a different story. These are soldiers fighting in Ukraine, 80 to 90 per cent of whom are neo-Nazis. There is no difference between them and Prigozhin's Wagner group. I would not be surprised if the two soon join forces and attack the Kremlin."

According to your book, Putin will be toppled from his throne either by the military, the secret services or the oligarchs.
"I pin my hopes on the oligarchs. There are 117 billionaires in Russia and apart from money, they all have their own security agents, as well as the means to depose Putin. That this has not happened so far is because they are afraid. Especially of each other. There is so much distrust that they fail to unite. "But the situation has changed since I wrote the book early this year. The most promising man in Russia right now is Yevgeny Prigozhin. He is the Russian Trump: billionaire, a big mouth, self-centred, narcissistic and with a talent for playing the media. Prigozhin understands that Putin's power is on a downward spiral. Putin hardly reacts to the attacks around Belgorod, he is too busy handing out medals and when he speaks on TV, he does so from his bunker. This is unworthy of a president. Putin uses a double when he goes to the front. There has been much speculation about it, but for me it is clear. The man who visited Mariupol and Sebastopol in March this year was not Putin. In Moscow, the road is blocked off for hours whenever Putin needs to pass, and under extensive escort. And then he would drive around Mariupol just like that? Surely no one believes that? There is no hard evidence, but it is not abnormal for a head of state to use a double. Even Saddam Hussein had one."

Do you really think an ex-con like Prigozhin has a chance of succeeding Putin?
"Why not? Putin is old and it is not certain he will participate in the 2024 presidential elections. He has also been in power for 23 years, people have quietly seen it. Prigozhin is popular in Russia, he is also the only public figure to appear at the front and his criticism of Putin and the Kremlin is cutting. I think he will stand and he will win. Prigozhin is not an actor, pretending to be no better than he is: a criminal who spent nine years in prison, and current leader of an army. He can erase his criminal record, though everyone knows he has one. Prigozhin is a predator, even in that respect he resembles Trump: he is obsessed with power and willing to go far for it. If he is not assassinated, I can see him doing it."

You have met Putin a few times. What impression did he make on you?
"He is not as smart as many think. I don't say that to offend him, I know from experience. Putin is certainly not stupid, but I would call him cunning rather than intelligent. The first time I met him was in 1980, during my third year at university. It was the summer of the Moscow Olympics. Those were boycotted by 65 countries because of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The city was empty, no one was there except the athletes themselves, the police, the KGB and some students like me, who were volunteering for the Games. Because I was good at languages, they put me at the call centre, where I had to answer phones from abroad. Only no one called us. Then one day the phone did ring: I got a Frenchman on the line; he was calling out of pure curiosity, he said. My French was already pretty good at that time, I talked to him for at least two hours. He talked about his country, I talked about mine. Nothing wrong, except that I had forgotten that we were in the middle of the Cold War. Afterwards, I was called to the mat and faced a small man in grey uniform who pulled out his red KGB card and introduced himself as Captain Vladimir Putin. He questioned me for two hours and the impression he left was that of a small man enjoying the power he had at the time. Putin was 28 at the time and working in Leningrad, but he wanted to gain a foothold in Moscow and then work abroad as a spy."

He failed to do so. You call him a failed spy.
"He failed his exam at the Andropov institute because he did not appear mentally stable enough by KGB standards. He failed the psychological tests because he got involved in a street fight in Leningrad when he was harassed by hooligans. He broke his arm and ended up at the police station. Too emotional, was the verdict of the KGB. Whereupon they sent him to a small post in Dresden, in communist East Germany. While he so wanted to go to the West. Conclusion: during the first half of his life, he did not make much of it professionally."

So how did he manage to make it to president of Russia?
"He has been very lucky, partly by being in the right place at the right time. He was launched into politics by Anatoli Sobchak, mayor of St Petersburg at the time. Putin was a student of his and also an errand boy, fetching water and ordering taxis. Thanks to Sobchak, Putin made a career: he became the first deputy mayor of the new St Petersburg, but when Sobchak lost the elections in 1996, Putin lost his job. Meanwhile, thanks to Sobchak's corrupt practices, he did become a millionaire. Among other things, with German money, intended for humanitarian purposes but which partly ended up in Putin's pockets. He had also built up good relations in St Petersburg. Boris Yeltsin appointed him prime minister in late 1999. From then on things only went uphill, and in 2000 he was elected president."

He remained in power all this time. So how did he manage that?
"Because of his cunning and his talent to surround himself with the right people, including by playing them off against each other. He is like the godfather of the mafia: no one can say anything wrong about him. He fancies himself unapproachable, chosen by God to save Russia and the world. Though he seems rather chosen by the devil to bring down the whole lot. What also plays into his popularity is his image as the first "normal" president. After - admittedly striking - figures like Brezhnev, Yeltsin and Gorbachev, Putin sold himself as an ordinary person, a man of the people. That worked. Meanwhile, he did not believe in communism at all, just as he did not believe in the Orthodox Church. He is only interested in money. His fortune is Russia. The vast properties of millionaires are state property, and the state is Putin. So Russia belongs to him, he thinks."

You were in the KGB in the 1980s. What remains of the old KGB ideology today?
"Not much. Except for the archives, offices and certain methods, the current FSB is completely different. The KGB was a branch of the Communist Party, the FSB is only concerned with money. They are armed and have the power to seize someone's property or not. Again, it is similar to the mafia."

https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/ex-kg...etin~baf49c0c/

[Dargo]

Counteroffensive--KA-52s and prepare for more destruction

The problem, as Ive probably banged on about too much, is that the Russians have, for this precise reason made this what looks like the most well defended part of their line, and this reality has meant that the Ukrainians will have to inflict a great deal of destruction on Russian forces before they can move forward. What seems to have happened is that at the start of this phase of the counteroffensive the Ukrainians started testing the strength of Russian lines by pushing forward some of their prepared armored forces. It quickly became clear because of the range of options the defending Russians possessed (mines, airpower, handhelds, artillery, etc) that this was not a tactic that would gain victory quickly.

Since then the Ukrainians have more to a tactic of engage and destroy. Make small advances (though much quicker for instance than the Russians make around Bakhmut), bring Russian forces out to stop them or even counterattack, and use this opportunity to destroy the Russians. They will have to do this for a while, until Russian forces are so weak that a more significant advance can occur.

In that way it is a good thing that the Russians are now committing some of their best remaining systems, such as the KA-52 helicopter, to this fight. If you want to read a little more about the KA-52 you can take a look at this.

https://www.airforce-technology.com/...copter-russia/

These are some of the most powerful weapons in Russia’s arsenal though, like all helicopters they are also very vulnerable to anti-air fire. In this case Russia also possesses only a relatively small number of them (just over 100 it seems, though its very hard to get definite figures).

Now when they appeared, some in the press (as always) dramatically overreacted and stories started appearing about how much damage they had and would inflict.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...copter-problem

Then, guess what, the Ukrainians started shooting down KA-52s. https://twitter.com/GeneralStaffUA/s...852711940?s=20 This morning they claimed two were shot down yesterday. This is in a nutshell what we have seen and will see for a while (and why its probably a good thing that Russia is throwing its most advanced systems into the fight). Without control of the air and unable to make fast advances because of the vulnerability of its own forces going forward, the Ukrainians are going to have to chew through a great deal of Russian equipment and soldiery. The more they can destroy of the best Russian strength now, the better chances for a successful counteroffensive down the road. https://phillipspobrien.substack.com...pdate-33?sd=pf

[Jimbuna]

[Dargo]

Twitter Bubbles and Ukraine’s Counteroffensive

The fog of war is denser on social media than on the battlefields of Ukraine. The provision of modern weapon systems by NATO members, combined with the successful offensive conducted by Kyiv’s forces in Kharkiv in September 2022, and their methodical advance in Kherson later that same year, have inevitably generated high expectations in public opinion.

Since the start of Ukraine’s offensive on June 4, a widespread belief has become apparent — that Ukraine would be able to advance relatively smoothly after days of preparatory strikes against Russian positions, quickly recapture large swathes of territories, and prompt the progressive collapse of the Russian military.

The reality is very different. While in Kharkiv and Kherson districts last year, Ukraine faced overstretched and severely undermanned Russian units, the new counteroffensive must deal with a curtain of fortifications, minefields, and anti-tank ditches aimed at slowing down maneuver units, hindering the use of mechanized formations, and channeling Ukrainian attacking columns into pre-defined kill zones for Russian artillery fire, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and attack helicopters. As a result, Ukrainians must embark on very dangerous operations characterized by high attrition for personnel and equipment.

The complex net of Russian fortifications will slow the operational tempo of the attackers and provide a key advantage to the Kremlin’s forces: time. With Ukrainian units hampered by a layered belt of obstacles, the occupiers can mount and adjust defensive action more effectively, employing close air support and concealed ATGMs to disable armored vehicles, and then wreaking havoc on dismounted infantry with concentrated artillery barrages.

Ukraine’s problems are compounded by the lack of substantial air support along the frontline due to the persistent threat from Russian air defenses. Consistent with the trend seen since the beginning of the invasion, both Ukraine’s fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft must fly low and lob unguided rockets from afar to minimize the risk of detection by ground-based enemy radars, and have difficulty providing close air support to advancing troops, let alone executing in-depth interdiction of potential Russian reinforcements. Consequently, Ukrainian forces will struggle to conduct proper combined arms maneuver operations, with inevitable implications for the counteroffensive.

Furthermore, Russia has had time to adapt and prepare its defenses, relocating its command-and-control structure and readjusting its logistical footprint to cope with Ukraine’s newest long-range strike capabilities. While the quality and number of Russian troops deployed along the frontline are far from uniform, the latter nonetheless have the advantage of defense and can rely upon partial air superiority.

Furthermore, Ukraine must deal with the threat from the constant aerial surveillance provided by Russian drones and the resultant artillery strikes. This requires the integration of mobile short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities at scale, in order to counter enemy unmanned aerial systems (UAS), disrupt Russia’s tactical and operational intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), blind its artillery, and protect maneuver formations. This factor tends to be overlooked, but is critical for Ukraine’s military success.

In other words, Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present, no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy. https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bub...nteroffensive/

[Skybird]

Scheiße.

https://www-fr-de.translate.goog/pol..._x_tr_pto=wapp

(...)
If the 2A4 was actually removed despite an estimated weight of 60 tons, the Russians could now, according to the news magazine, “gain knowledge in two areas. On the one hand, they will study Western technology and thus try to improve their own developments. That will start with the main gun, all the electronics and targeting will be exciting," the report said.

The structure of the armor is also interesting. “They will try to find the tank's weak points. About the armor. The so-called composite armor consists of layers of different materials and offers far better protection than pure steel. The Russians will now examine this material mix extensively in the laboratory. In addition, they will know exactly how well protected the respective areas are."
(...)

That is about lost, abandoned 2A4s, but there are at least three, maybe more destroyed or abandoned 2A6s as well.

[mapuc]

80 to 120 soldiers per day.

Some hours ago our news channel had a reportage from a MASH unit near Bakhmut and they followed a doctor who worked hard to stabilize wounded soldiers before they are sent to ordinary hospital.

There it was said we lose around 80-120 soldiers per day, since the start of the offensive.

I don't know if it's for the Bakhmut Oblast only or for the entire area where they are advancing. Neither did they say if it was KIA and/or WIA.

Markus

[Jimbuna]

[Jimbuna]

[Skybird]

In the past 2-3 days there were a small number of reports idnciating that Ukrianian commandos are operating deeply behind Russian lines, in Russian-held territory. Their main task probably is infiltration&Sabotage, blowing fixed sites up. It was hinted at the possibility that they are suppoprted by reginal partisans.



This could also be the reason for the high losses in helicopters the Russians suffered in recent days, and which to me came a bit unexpected. They hsould have the firing range to fight the front but do so from staying out of range of the frontal and thin air defences of Ukraine. That they nevertheless get targetted and shot down maybe is because they overfly positions of this infiltrating commandos, and thus come under fire far behind the front.



The KA-52 wa s nbot so much planned as a gunship like the Mi-28, but due to its modern (Western) electronics and sensors primarily was meant to serve as a coordindator of forces, sending target data to allied units on the ground or other gunships, more a flying mastermind than a primary attacker. This seems to ahve worked wlel in syria, and agaiunst such a lesser armed enemy there they could afford to attack thenmsleves, too,. withiout taking penalties. It was said the KA-52 was more effective in Syria than was the Mi-28. In Ukriane it seems to be the other way around, with the Mi-28 being the more traditional gunship design. Its weakness seems to be a lack of techncial reliability, though, but the reports say that is something that many KA-52 were hguanted by, too.



I would prefer a slim AH-1 any time. Is there even a helicopter slimmer than this one, seen from its front? Compared to it, the KA-52, from frontal view, is a fat diva.

[mapuc]

ISW: Ukrainian forces may be temporarily pausing counteroffensive operations to reevaluate their tactics for future operations

https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...t-june-18-2023

Markus

[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by Catfish

Funny how the whole world gives advice to VladPutin; i'd say better stop it and let him make his mistakes.

Precisely! As I've noted previously, the longer he's in office misdirecting his "Peter the Grate" Legacy's russian-peasant cannon-fodder war in Ukraine, the US directed proxy-war goes well. The more so as Finland is a member of NATO, with Sweden in waiting; exactly the containment Russia rails against, particularly with NATO member,Turkey, prohibiting Black Sea transit of Russian warships thru the Bosphorus Dardanelles.The Russian/Ukraine fiasco is an extension of the 1914 Balkan situation with Russia's finger in the Serbian pie until the shot at Sarajevo set the global conflict in motion till 1945 (both world wars). Preventing such another 'shot' is a primary consideration particulaly as 'eternal ally' China, also protesting "entitlement and containment" in the Pacific theater, lusting for the computer chip industry of Taiwan awaits its offensive turn in the South China Sea. As with Hitler's assassination being curtailed (operation Foxley) by the Allies due to his greater usefulness mismanaging Operaton Barbarossa from the Wolf's Lair, we cannot afford to lose Vlad the Incompetent too soon!

[Jimbuna]