Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[Dargo]

So, with Russian effort on land and air concentrated on the Donbas, they have barely moved 9 days. This is why the trajectory of Ukraine getting relatively stronger and Russia weaker matters. The chance of the Russians to move forward is decreasing. And the Russian effort to throw everything into the Donbas has actually left their forces on the ground in Mariupol surprisingly weak. Would be worth watching if it's too weak. Pentagon says 2 BTG's, about 2000 Russian soldiers left in Mariupol.

Ukrainians claim that the Russians were able to attack the Mariupol steel works because of an inside job. If the Ukrainians have driven them back, Russians can’t play that card again. Ukrainian commander in Chief Zaluzhnyi now saying, far from the Russians being just stalled in the Donbas, that the Ukrainians are now counterattacking around Izyum. (We already knew about Kharkiv)

It might be worth noting that since the Russians launched the Battle of the Donbas on 18 April, the Ukrainians have probably driven the Russians out of more territory in total (esp around Kharkiv) than the Russians have seized in Ukraine incl the Donbas.

[Skybird]

All Russian Tanks except the latest Armata suffer from the Jack in the box problem. They store "ready" grenades unsecured in the turret so that even a non-critical hit could make the loaded ammunition of the tank blowing up, also any such hit and explosion leave the crew zero chance to escape and survive.

The French have delivered many thermals to Russia that were used to upgrade certain lines of the optics for T-72 and T-90. Still, viewing options from these tanks are not good, and if you want to know how shooting with them is, do some sessions in Steel Beasts Pro in its accurately modelled T-72. I found it not to be funny. The tehcncial errors are so biog that every tank even has different, individual markers in its targetting optics to compensate for production flaws.

The plus of these tanks is their big guns, and missile ammo shot via 125mm barrels. If there is one thing I really hate in SBP, then it must be "Refleks". Precise armour-penetrating shots at 5000m - not nice to be at the receiving end of this.

Still, these tanks are rolling death traps, like BMPs. Their design represent the attitude of the higher ranks towards the lower soldiers. Forward and die - that describes Russian military doctrine best.

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by Skybird

All Russian Tanks except the latest Armata suffer from the Jack in the box problem. They store "ready" grenades unsecured in the turret so that even a non-critical hit could make the loaded ammunition of the tank blowing up, also any such hit and explosion leave the crew zero chance to escape and survive.

The French have delivered many thermals to Russia that were used to upgrade certain lines of the optics for T-72 and T-90. Still, viewing options from these tanks are not good, and if you want to know how shooting with them is, do some sessions in Steel Beasts Pro in its accurately modelled T-72. I found it not to be funny. The tehcncial errors are so biog that every tank even has different, individual markers in its targetting optics to compensate for production flaws.

The plus of these tanks is their big guns, and missile ammo shot via 125mm barrels. If there is one thing I really hate in SBP, then it must be "Refleks". Precise armour-penetrating shots at 5000m - not nice to be at the receiving end of this.

Still, these tanks are rolling death traps, like BMPs. Their design represent the attitude of the higher ranks towards the lower soldiers. Forward and die - that describes Russian military doctrine best.

Russian soldiers rather sit on those BMP's then inside when attacked interior cased so mane scrappers they feared to be inside.

[mapuc]

^ This problem Jack-in-the-box problem has been known my NATO since first Iraqi war in 1991.

(Read it in a Danish article)

And they haven't fixed it in all these year !!!

Markus

[Dargo]

German Chancellor Scholz and U.S. President Biden will not recognize the territories Russia has captured in Ukraine as Russian. They agreed to this in a telephone conversation. Russia wants to hold referendums in conquered areas such as Donetsk and Luhansk in which residents can choose to join Russia.

Biden and Scholz further agreed that Ukraine can permanently count on strong support in self-defense against the Russian attack. They also again urged Russia to immediately stop hostilities and respect its borders.

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by mapuc

^ This problem Jack-in-the-box problem has been known my NATO since first Iraqi war in 1991.

(Read it in a Danish article)

And they haven't fixed it in all these year !!!

Markus

They have not fixed it, this was known when USSR invaded Afghanistan

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by mapuc

^ This problem Jack-in-the-box problem has been known my NATO since first Iraqi war in 1991.

(Read it in a Danish article)

And they haven't fixed it in all these year !!!

Markus

Well, you cannot "fix" it without replacing the complete turret. Western tanks store rounds in a "ready rack" that is physically separated from the turret'S crew interior, there is kind of a hatch, and armoured doors. The ready rack holds a part of the total rounds stored of a tank. When it is emptied, the tank needs to find a secure place and reload the ready-rack from his main ammo storage (usually at the bottom of the tank). The German Leopards for exmaple must swing their barrel to the 5 o-clock position so that the loader can access the floor were the main storage for rounds is, and from there they get packed by hand to the turret's backside ready rack. During this time the tank can scan, but not fire and shoot, and a vulenrable flank-rear quardant of the tank is exposed to the front of the main chassis. Its a vulnerably time. You do not want to do this while being seated in a battle position under fire, you want to find lasting cover first.

Roughly around a quarter of tank's total ammo is stored in the ready rack. The ready rack is isolated from the rest of the turret. Its like an external rucksack, linked to the turret via an armoured window gate. The gate opens and closes for every loading after every shot. There is even free empty space between the rack'S storage and the turret.

Russian tanks do not have this design. Their ammo is placed inside the turret, period. To fix it means to do a new turret. Means: doing a new tank design. They have mechanical loaders, which makes "fixings" even more impossible.

[mapuc]

Originally Posted by Dargo

They have not fixed it, this was known when USSR invaded Afghanistan

I stand corrected it became known when they invaded Afghanistan.

Reading Skybirds answer to my comments made me remember an episode of WWII in colour.

In this episode they were talking about Russian Vs German tanks and manner was the Tiger complicated in it's build.
The Gear box was created by Porsche and demanded training before mastering it. The "wheel"(Forgot what they are called) had to be removed and substitut with something else when travelling on train and when arrived at destination they had to put the "Wheel" back on again.

(there is a possibility I could have remembered wrong)

Markus

[Onkel Neal]

Originally Posted by Ostfriese

For Ukraine and the West (and the rest of the world) this will be mostly a change in wording only.
However, it'll be quite a change for Russia internally, because this would allow the Russian government to order a partial or even a general mobilization. While this definitely will increase the manpower the Russian military has availavle it won't help much in the near future, because it'll take time to train and equip the newly conscripted soldiers.

I don't know enough about Russia to be sure, but I'd guess any kind of mobilization would also result in a shift in public perception, more Russians will understand what really is going on in Ukraine. I'm quite certain that the opinion towards the war among the Russian people is nowhere near as positive as the government and the state media say, and I doubt that a mobilization will come without morale taking a nose-dive.

er).

Man, I hope you're right. I'm thinking a full declaration of war and drafting thousands of non-military boys would ignite a rebellion with the Russian people, big enough to overcome the efforts of state police to put it down.

[Onkel Neal]

Putin’s Russia rose like Hitler’s Germany — and could end the same

The striking similarities between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Adolf Hitler’s Germany are not accidental. Both regimes had — the past tense is intentional — the same historical trajectory because both were the product of imperial collapse and its destabilizing aftermath on the one hand and the emergence of a strong leader promising to make the country great again on the other.

Imperial revival was popular, enhanced elite legitimacy, promised to revive the economy and extirpate humiliating memories of collapse, and seemed to guarantee great-power status. Central to their attempts at re-imperialization was the false claim that their ethnic brethren in the newly independent colonies were being oppressed: the Germans in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland; the Russians in all the post-Soviet states, and especially Ukraine.

Tentative stabs at expansion followed. Hitler grabbed the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland. Putin grabbed Chechnya, parts of Georgia, and parts of Ukraine. Given their imperial mindsets, militaristic ambitions, personality cults and demonization of minorities (Jews and Ukrainians), it was almost inevitable that Hitler and Putin then embarked on major wars. In 1939, Hitler attacked Poland; in 1941, he attacked the USSR. Putin’s war with Ukraine began on Feb. 24, 2022.

Putin’s generals also appear to have known they would not win after their attempt at a blitzkrieg failed to capture Kyiv. It has taken thousands of dead and Russia’s genocide of Ukrainians to align scores of countries — and, in particular, the United States and the United Kingdom — with Ukraine and to provide it with the heavy weaponry it needs to defeat Russia.


Fittingly, Putin reportedly also resides in a bunker. In all likelihood, that’s where he, too, will meet his end.

https://thehill.com/opinion/national...-end-the-same/

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by Onkel Neal

Man, I hope you're right. I'm thinking a full declaration of war and drafting thousands of non-military boys would ignite a rebellion with the Russian people, big enough to overcome the efforts of state police to put it down.

It comes of its own accord, unengineered by anyone, born in the chaos of the collapse of... The tinder is there. What sets it alight is a mystery. The key to success is the refusal by the police and military to restore order and defend the old regime. Decayed regimes inevitably elevate leaders of stunning incompetence, corruption and imbecility that even the elites, in the end, do not want to defend them.

[mapuc]

I fear this coming Russian collapse-No one knows what they may do when it happens.

Of course expert has been wrong before.

Markus

[Skybird]

He who follows Putin could easily be even worse.

[Skybird]

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung explains why Russia apparently is running short on soldiers.

Before the war, the dominant assumption among the Western public, and even among many military experts, was that Russia was vastly superior to Ukraine militarily. This image was based on a series of too little questioned assumptions. One of them was the idea that the world's largest country had many times more human resources at its disposal. On paper, this is true. Russia's active forces number about 900,000, plus 2 million former conscripts who could be called up as reservists.

However, Russia went to war with only 160,000 to 180,000 troops. These were the most operational units of the land forces and airborne troops, supplemented by units of the navy, air force and national guard. However, in the failed battle for Kiev and on other sections of the front, Russia suffered heavy losses. Western estimates put the death toll at 15,000 and the number of wounded, missing and captured at two to three times that figure. This would mean that a quarter to a third of the original invasion force is no longer available.

This is consistent with a British Ministry of Defense estimate that more than a quarter of Russia's 120 deployed tactical battalion groups are no longer fit for combat. The American side sounds a similar note. The Pentagon speaks of 93 battalion groups deployed in Ukraine, by no means all of them fully manned. Tactical battalion groups of about 800 men each are the basic units of the Russian combat forces; they are infantry or tank battalions reinforced with artillery, air defense systems and other means.

The Kremlin's failure to bring much-needed reinforcements to the war zone in the six weeks since it changed strategy exposes fundamental weaknesses. The debacle at Kiev forced a reorientation toward the more modest goal of at least conquering the Donbass region. But even for that, available troops are obviously too scarce. The Russian offensive has made no headway in recent days.

The Moscow leadership is undoubtedly aware of the problem, but it cannot tap reserves at will. This is due to the problematic structure of the armed forces. Unlike the United States, which switched to an all-volunteer army as early as the 1970s, Russia has made only limited progress in professionalizing its military. The country has a mixed system of conscripts and professional soldiers. For the time being, Russia relies on the maintenance of universal conscription to fill the stocks of active units and the reserve.

Conscripted men typically serve for one year, consisting of four to eight months of training and remaining time in their unit. So no sooner have these so-called srotschniki learned how to use their weapons than they are released back into civilian life.

There are two enlistments a year, and in each of the past few years some 260,000 recruits have been called up. This is not a large number given the current 1.2 million men of recruiting age. But even the relatively modest recruitment campaigns are by no means going smoothly. In March and April of this year, at least five acts of sabotage against enlistment offices were reported. Where the perpetrators were caught, they said they had wanted to protest the war or destroy recruiting office databases. Although these are isolated cases, there is nothing to suggest a wave of patriotism that would drive young men en masse into the enlistment offices.

In any case, the srotschniki are at a great disadvantage for the military leadership. According to current rules, they cannot be sent to war zones, not even to fight the alleged Nazis in Ukraine, which, according to the official reading, is merely a "special military operation." Nevertheless, when cases of Russian basic military conscripts in Ukraine came to light this spring, President Putin took action and launched criminal investigations. This shows what a hot potato this is; the Kremlin fears political resentment among the population toward sending inexperienced service members to the front lines.

Putin's invasion army therefore consists almost exclusively of temporary or professional soldiers. They are called kontraktniki in Russia because they have signed a "kontrakt," a contract for temporary employment with the armed forces. As a rule, they are people who have done their basic military service and therefore already have some experience. However, Russia has also started to draft recruits immediately as contract soldiers or to turn them into Kontraktniki with more or less pressure during their service. In this way, such soldiers can also be called up for military service in Ukraine.

The use of professional soldiers helps professionalize the armed forces, but it comes at a price. Unlike a conscript, who has to be satisfied with a pay of the equivalent of about one franc a day, a contractnik receives a decent salary. This varies greatly depending on the type of troop, experience, rank and special services, but already exceeds 300 francs per month for ordinary soldiers. Especially for men from poorer parts of Russia, a military career can therefore be financially attractive.

In times of war, however, the calculation changes. Despite the rosy picture of propaganda, word is spreading of the bloody reality in Ukraine. While the original invasion forces were led to believe that the neighboring country would be defeated after four to five days, potential contract soldiers hardly harbor such illusions anymore. According to unconfirmed reports, the military administration is having great difficulty finding new contract Niki or renewing existing contracts.

This presents the Kremlin with a choice between two evils: It can either continue the offensive with the available forces; however, in that case, according to military expert Konrad Muzyka, the Russians run the risk of failure and falling victim to counterattacks by the increasingly well-equipped Ukrainians. Or Putin may order a partial or even a general mobilization. This would mean that conscripts and reservists could also be called up for the war effort.

Politically, however, this would be risky. Putin would have to drop the fiction of a "special operation" going entirely according to plan and declare a state of war. It would be an admission of failure so far. In addition, there is the uncertainty of whether mobilization would really decisively improve Russian combat power. Military expert Rob Lee points to the poor level of training of the reservists. Unlike in Switzerland with its refresher courses, conscripts in Russia do not have to regularly enlist to refresh their military skills.

Moreover, more personnel is not a sufficient condition for greater combat effectiveness. Basic problems such as failed tactics, weaknesses in command structure, communications and logistics, and the loss of more than 1,800 armored vehicles cannot be compensated for.

The most likely scenario, therefore, is that Putin will limit himself to partial mobilization. This would allow Moscow to call up certain reinforcements without taking excessive political risks. Nevertheless, the situation is becoming more dicey for the Kremlin ruler. Hardliners in Russia are calling for all-out war, while Ukraine senses an opportunity not only to stop the invaders but to push them back. Putin's room for maneuver for a reasonably face-saving solution is getting narrower and narrower.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)


From this article I would conclude that it is in Putin's interest to have referendums quickly that create the alibi to label the occupied territories as "Russian", and any counterattack on them thus could be sold to the Russian public as an attack on Russia that allows conscripts to be sent to the front legally, opening the door for partial or generla mobilization without having to admit that the so-called "special operation" in fact was a war of aggression that went wrong and anything but successful. It also opens the path for using the narration of an attack on Russia to use nuclear weapons, because Putin gave Russia a doctrine in 2020 that says that it uses nukes first if Russia is at risk and in danger.

[mapuc]

Translated from a Danish newspaper

Putin is obsessed with Nazis
Russia often throws the 'Nazi card' when running propaganda against enemies. The reason is Russia's national obsession with victory over Hitler. The latest examples are 'raving mad', says Danish expert

Ukraine is filled with Nazis, Jews are often the worst anti-Semites and Astrid Lindgren herself is now accused of defending Nazism in what looks like an attack on Sweden's plans for NATO membership.

The torrent of Kremlin lies about alleged Nazis will be almost endless these days.

- The Putin regime is using it to steer public opinion and the population towards outright hatred of Ukraine and the West. One has to shake one's head because it is raving mad.

- But it is also very scary because it shows that Moscow has no inhibitions, says Mette Skak, Russia expert and lecturer at Aarhus University.

Before the invasion, Putin said the 'special military operation', as the war is still called in Russia, was to 'de-Nazify' Ukraine.
Russia's invasion of its neighbour is thus legitimised as a defence against Nazism.

- They equate the invasion of Ukraine with the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

- It sounds crazy, but you just have to remember that it's a narrative that has been repeated over and over again in Russia, says Jeanette Serritzlev, Military Analyst at the Defence Academy.

The Great Patriotic War

In Russia, the Second World War is known as 'The Great Patriotic War' and the Soviet Union's victory over Hitler's Nazis is a major part of the Russian self-image and national narrative.

The victory over Nazi Germany is celebrated every year on 9 May, a national holiday, with a huge military parade and festivities across the country.

- The Great Patriotic War is a war that lives in the history of every Russian family. Linking the war in Ukraine to the collective memory of the war against the Nazis speaks to the need for national unity.

- Those who don't support it are seen as bad Russians," says Jeanette Serritzlev.

In the West, we often see the Nazi threat as a closed historical chapter. The Second World War was many years ago. But in Russia, the enemy image lives on.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Markus