Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[Jimbuna]

[Skybird]

A thankfully sober assessment from General Barrons who was head of the Strategic Command of the British armed forces. Sobering, and I think very realistic.

This text from the NZZ did not translate via Google weblink translator. Thats why I post it in full length, a translated link does not work. The link to the German original text is at the bottom.

Ukraine's attempt to retake occupied Russian territory is extremely difficult, says British General Richard Barrons. As long as the Russians do not give up, Ukraine will not succeed in driving them out of the country. This and other forecasts on the progress of the war.
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The Russians invaded Ukraine 15 months ago. They currently occupy nearly one-fifth of the country. Increased fighting on the front lines and the destruction of the dam at Kakhovka seem to signal that Ukraine's counteroffensive has begun. Is that true?

Richard Barrons: A counteroffensive is not a football game that starts with kickoff. It's a long process that is planned, practiced, and then forced once you've tested your opponent's defenses. Ukraine is under a lot of pressure to start the offense. It was always a trade-off: You could have intervened earlier to give the Russians less time to dig in. But then Ukraine would also have had less time to train and arm its own army, and the ground would not have been hard enough. In turn, if Ukraine had waited even longer, the Russians' defenses would have become stronger and stronger.

After all the arms deliveries, is Ukraine now well equipped?

It is. NATO has provided weapons to nine brigades of about 5,000 men each. Three brigades are still equipped with Russian equipment. That makes twelve brigades, or about 50,000 troops. In addition, there are 200,000 Ukrainian soldiers in position at the front. NATO has now trained a lot of personnel. But to some extent there is still the old Russian way of commanding in Ukraine's army.

The pressure now on the army and political leadership to succeed must be enormous.

The offensive is a major undertaking that the Ukrainians naturally want to do well. Militarily, it is quite complicated. The front alone is already very long at 900 kilometers. It took nine months to prepare for the counteroffensive. Despite NATO training, Ukraine is not as good as the American army. But it doesn't have to be. It just has to be better than the Russians. The next few weeks will show whether Ukraine is.

Should the West have provided Ukraine with fighter jets?

Training a good pilot of a Russian MiG-23 aircraft on an F-16 takes about four months. But training multiple pilots, who would then also have to use the instruments and weapons, would take nine months to a year and require high-level maintenance on the ground of the aircraft that Ukraine's personnel cannot currently provide. Every hour an F-16 flies requires 16 hours of maintenance on the ground. That's something for after the war.

How do you have to imagine the counteroffensive?

The Russians have about 300,000 troops in the occupied territories and about 200,000 more people helping with logistics. The Russians, of course, know that Ukraine will not attack along the whole line of the front. Ideally, you advance in a kind of surprise attack where you outnumber the enemy three to one - or better seven to one. With twelve brigades, therefore, you can try to break through at two or three points over a width of about 15 to 30 kilometers. But the situation now is completely different from last summer, when the Russians in Kherson and around Kharkiv were surprised by Ukraine's soldiers and voluntarily retreated in a weakened state. As long as the Russians do not give up, Ukraine will not manage to drive all Russians out of the country. The Russians are better equipped now.

What does that mean in concrete terms?

The Russians have set up three lines of defense in 45 places where a Ukrainian advance would make sense - as in the military textbook: strips up to 25 kilometers deep along the front with tank traps and trenches. In the front two trenches are stationed less well-trained recruits, who are supposed to slow Ukraine's advance, but are sacrificed as cannon fodder. They cannot desert or they will be shot. Only in the third line do the experienced, well-equipped parts of the army fight with appropriate firepower. When Ukraine has advanced far enough into Russian-occupied territory, these forces are to attack and wear down Ukraine's brigades from the flanks with a counteroffensive of their own.

So success is harder for Ukraine to achieve than anticipated?

The Russians have learned a lot from the mistakes of the war so far. So they have built up these defensive lines. They position their ammunition depots, their supplies, their artillery, and their command centers out of range of Western precision weapons. They also have more artillery than Ukraine and are now working with drones, reconnaissance and artificial intelligence. No one knows what the morale of Russian soldiers is. But the Russians assume that the West will eventually give up because the war could last too long and become too expensive. Therefore, the Russians' motto is: Grit your teeth and hang on - eventually the enemy will give up, and we will have secured ten or twenty percent of Ukraine.

What role does the destruction of the dam at Kakhovka play in this? The counteroffensive is more likely to take place to the east in the area of Zaporizhia and Donetsk.

Most likely, this was a planned action to complicate Ukraine's counteroffensive. The Russians are not interested in the fact that 60,000 people had to be resettled, that large areas of land were flooded and that part of their own defense line is now under water. They have now secured a flank there. It is hardly possible for Ukraine to cross the Dnipro from Kherson to reach Crimea. But that was not planned anyway. The environmental damage is terrible, but one must not forget that large parts of the country have already been destroyed and a gigantic reconstruction effort is ahead anyway.

What might be the outcome of this counteroffensive?

The morale of the army in Ukraine is extremely high. Nevertheless, we have to be realistic: Examples from the American Civil War and World War I and World War II have shown that it is extremely difficult to break through the front lines when brave fighters are defending the trenches at the front. Nobody knows how well the Russians will fight. But: Ukraine will not defeat the Russians with their counteroffensive. The war will not end this year. There is no question about it.

So what could the Ukrainians achieve this year?

Realistically, territorial gains that the Ukrainians can hopefully hold to show that - with the help of the West - they are capable of fighting successfully. Ideally, Ukrainian brigades would reach the Sea of Azov and break the Russians' land bridge. It will be a succession of battles. The counteroffensive will drag on until Christmas.

This is sobering.

War is about strategic decisions, about logic, but also about emotions and luck - and the opponent has a voice, too. What is important is that Ukraine manages to regain land, holds that land, defends air superiority, and that the Ukrainian people feel that the sons and daughters they are sending to war are not dying in vain. Otherwise, they will give up. The important thing is that the feeling remains that this war can ultimately be won.

Is that so? Can the war be won?

Ukraine wants to drive the Russians out of its entire territory, as was stipulated at independence in 1991. However, it may end up more complicated. Ukraine will eventually decide that it has regained enough land and that more miles of land gains do not justify the bloodshed and high casualties. Some areas, like Crimea, Russia will not give back, and some areas may not even want to be part of Ukraine. If Ukraine were to take them back, it might amount to occupation against the will of the population there. Let's wait and see. It will take a long time.

What is in store for us in the West in the event of such a long war?

So far, the West has supplied Ukraine with weapons that it still had in its own stocks and could do without. But Ukraine will need new weapons in the fall and next year at the latest. The West must first produce them, which costs about $100 billion a year, possibly for three years.

So far, the U.S. has contributed more than half of that sum. What happens when the Americans are no longer willing to do so?

Then it will be Europe's turn, and that raises the question: Whose war are we actually fighting here? If we think this is just about Ukraine losing territory, and the energy costs and other mortgages are too high for us, then we can stop right there and agree a dodgy ceasefire with the Russians. But no Western leader - with the exception of the Hungarians - is currently of this opinion. After all, the point is to defend the values of the West and liberal democracy against dictatorial and autocratic regimes like China and Russia.

What costs would Europe have to bear in the next few years?

If the Americans want to pay, say, only $15 billion a year to equip Ukraine, the Europeans will face a bill of close to $100 billion a year. We will have to boost our weapons production for one to two years. But Europe can afford it. Europe's economic power is about $16.6 trillion, Russia's is about $1.6 trillion. So Europe has the ability to pay that. It's just a question of will.

You think the Europeans have the political will?

There's no doubt that the British are absolutely behind it and will pay their share of the cost. Germany also always says the right thing. It then takes some time to implement, but I have the impression that Germany has grasped the strategic importance of this war and of supporting Ukraine. And even though Germany is now going into a recession, the country knows that it has to act as the economic engine of Europe.

The question is whether governments in Europe can also convince their citizens of the need for continued military aid.

If Ukraine's counteroffensive this year shows that there is hope of winning in the long run, then we must find the will and the money to continue supporting the war. Under no circumstances must we allow Ukraine to suddenly run out of aid from us in the fall. The next NATO summit in Bratislava in mid-July will be about precisely that.

What about Ukraine joining NATO?

If there ends up being a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine will need security guarantees and will then be integrated into NATO. In return, like any member, it must meet numerous conditions. But then there is nothing to prevent NATO from stationing troops in Ukraine.

Can you imagine a situation in which NATO countries would intervene directly in Ukraine after all?

It's like Bosnia. For a long time people said no, and then we did it after all. As far as Ukraine is concerned, I can only see this happening if the Russians cross the Dnipro River with tanks and advance via Kiev toward Lviv. But we could then also threaten St. Petersburg from Estonia. However, I do not expect such a scenario. The reality is this: No one in Europe wanted this war, no one foresaw that things would develop this way. But this is how things have turned out. So if the war in Ukraine is also about our own security, then we have only one choice: we have to foot the bill, supply the weapons and support Ukraine so that it wins.

[NZZ - Link]

[Jimbuna]

[mapuc]

In some areas they seems to have huge success, while in other areas they seems to be in stalemate and in other areas Russia seems to have pushed them back.

That is what I get from reading the news.

Markus

[Skybird]

Huge success? They are dealing with just the first of three defense lines. The third line is the real obstacle, the first two are just meant to delay them, they are weak. Read the orange part in the essay I posted above.



Only a real breakthrough through the full 25 km deep defense zone is of value, just gaining and giving some terrain back and forth means little. Ifd they cannot even crash just through the first two lines, then they have no real chanc eprobaly to ever get throzugh the third.



I do not say they cannot get there. I just want to counter the imo overly optimistic enthusiasm that some internet sources show. This offensive is extremely difficult, the chances are slightly against Ukraine at this stage at least, a success is not certain, and even a success will not end the war. The risk of catastrophic losses is very high.



I agree with those media who write that the outcome of this offensive will have decisive influence on the ultimate outcome of the war.

[mapuc]

Time will tell.

As I said(wrote) that's what I get from reading the news.

I know that I shall take news coming from Ukraine/Russia with a ton of salt.

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Markus

[Jimbuna]

[Jimbuna]

[Jimbuna]

[Skybird]

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/12/e...-ml/index.html

Losses of Leopards and Bradleys are mounting. That there would be losses was to be expected. But at this rate...?

Russian Air Force and ground attack helicopters are called out for latest losses. The Ukrainian air defence over the front and combat areas is not sufficient.

Klitschko and Melnyk demand multiple times as many Leopard-2 tanks from Germany than were delivered. Either they are desperate or they are delirious. The upcoming Leopard-1 must do.

A few sources indicate that the Ukrainian losses in general are much higher than expected.

I find the situation alarming, as far as one can assess it by simple media reports.

Losses of Western tanks were to be expected. But in that short time so many losses? That does not provide the needed breath over the long time.

The Russians seem to dominate the low air space over the front. And this costs the Ukraine dearly. Then there are an awesome lot of minefields. Half of the Leopard2A6 are already out. Several of the A4s as well. 15 Bradleys.

But when Washington announced in January it would supply to Bradleys to Ukraine, CNN military analyst James “Spider” Marks, a retired general, said the Bradley would need the right mix of other abilities, including air support, long-range artillery and incisive intelligence.

“A single piece of equipment like the Bradleys is wonderful, but it needs to be used in conjunction with all those other enablers,” he said at the time.

That mix does not work too well on side of the Ukraine, it seems. The air component is missing, air defence as well, at least AD is too weak. Plus the mined ground.

[Jimbuna]

Not looking good at all.

[Skybird]

Colonel Reisner is quoted in an interview saying that according to the sources available to him the Ukrainians on their three main axis of attack so far made only very minor progress, advancing only 500-2500 m - if they advance at all.



I read the defence zone of the Russian is on avergae 25 km deep and has three main lines, the last being being the by far toughest. If the Ukrainians continue to advance at this loss-distance ratio then - well: do the math.


Reisner: "So far, the Ukrainians have not advanced beyond the area of the battle outposts. These are the first lines of defense, which are still in front of the main defense lines. Behind the battle outposts, there are other fortifications that have been built by Russian sappers in recent months. These consist of various elements such as minefields, armored trenches and dragon's teeth. These obstacles are difficult to overcome because they require special equipment such as mine-clearing tanks. Ukraine has very little of this. Because the special vehicles are difficult to replace, they represent a worthwhile target for the Russians. The minefields are also difficult to overcome. We see this in the actual videos: As soon as the first vehicle hits a mine, the following ones also come to a halt. They then form an easy target for artillery. But mobile anti-tank guided missile squads and the Russian air force also play a major role."

But he also said: "The fact that the start of the offensive will be associated with high losses is not a big surprise. You have to expect this when attacking against a consolidated defense. But the offensive has only been going on for a few days. It may well be that the Ukrainians suddenly make a breakthrough and gain space. There is still a positive mood among Russian war bloggers because of the defensive successes - but that could change at any time."


According to Reisner the Ukrainians have lost at least three batallions already and that the Western-equipped three "elite brigades" are already fully engaged.

[Catfish]

Russia put the best fighters in the frontlines to prevent the front from breaking (lots of "mobiks" have been running away before), the secondary lines seem to have been filled with less experienced personnel.
My take is Ukraine will gain moment when the first two russian lines are breached. It seems they already are in five different places. Keeping fingers crossed.

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by Catfish

Russia put the best fighters in the frontlines to prevent the front from breaking (lots of "mobiks" have been running away before), the secondary lines seem to have been filled with less experienced personnel.
My take is Ukraine will gain moment when the first two russian lines are breached. It seems they already are in five different places. Keeping fingers crossed.

I fear its right the other way around. The first line is the weakest, just to delay and pick away at the attackers a bit. Recruits, cannon fodder in those trenches. Same for the second line. The experienced troops are saved for the third line, it is here where the Ukrainians will bite into the toughest Russian fighters. And then Ukrainians already will have suffered then.

Thats how the theory works, and thats how they describe the Russians have set up their defense lines. Right to the textbook example.

Possible that the Ukrianains hold back half of their troops and let the first half wearing down the Russians and getting worn down by the first two defence lines, so that fresh Ukranian troops will be available to crush into the third dfence line then. These two lines are meant to delay and disrupt, not necessarily to stop the attacker.

If it is like this indeed on the ground, if this is how the Russian have set it up, then the Ukrainians currently are in the easiest part of their task ahead. The biggest problems they will face at the very end.

There is also the danger that the deeper they penetrate into a breach, the more likely it becomes that the Russians have reserves left and right of that breach encircling them with an pincing manouver and from behind. That could happen when they reach the third defence line.

They must reduce their losses. Simple math.


I do not say all is lost, hell no. But I say things run much more difficult than was anticipated. "Ein Selbstläufer ist diese Offensive nicht."

[Jimbuna]