100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

9th June 1919

Canadian troops of the 85th Battalion, Nova Scotia Highlanders are welcomed home after returning from the war.


Men of the 11th Cavalry performing stunts at Arlington, Virginia.


First Flag Day at Capitol June 9, 1919, flag was largest in world at 90'x165'


Ship Losses:

HMS L55 (Royal Navy) British campaign in the Baltic: The L-class submarine was sunk by the Bolshevik Orfey-class minelayer-destroyers Gavril and Azard in the Gulf of Finland off Kronstadt. The Soviet Union refloated her in 1928, repaired her, and placed her in service as L55, later renamed Bezbozhnik ( Soviet Navy).

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


M Clemenceau announces that a reply has been received from Budapest, acknowledging receipt of the telegram which had been dispatched on 7th June, 1919, in regard to the Hungarians’ attack against the Czechoslovaks.

President Wilson says that the military representatives had been summoned by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order to discuss the question of the military measures to be taken with regard to Hungary, in accordance with the proposals contained in a joint note No. 43, submitted by the Military Representatives, Versailles.

He had heard contrary statements in regard to the Hungarian advance into Czechoslovakia. He would, therefore, like to hear from one of the Military Experts what are the actual facts of the case and he will ask General Wilson to give a short summary of the present military situation.

General Wilson states that the first move forward had been made by the Czechoslovaks who had overstepped the boundary. This act had raised a strong national spirit in Hungary, with the result that the Hungarians had attacked the Czechoslovaks, and the chances now were that the Hungarians would beat the Czechoslovaks.

President Wilson inquires whether the Hungarians are making a very vigorous attack against the Czechoslovaks.

General Wilson replies that the information available is not sufficient to enable him to give a definite reply to that question.

Mr Lloyd George say that he has received very important information supplied by a British subject who had just returned from Budapest. This witness had stated that the whole blame lay with the Romanians. At the time of the Armistice the General Commanding in Chief the Armies of the East, General Franchet d’Esperey, had fixed a boundary line between Romania and Hungary. That boundary line had been crossed by the Romanians in defiance of General Franchet d’Esperey’s orders, who had then proceeded to fix a second boundary line considerably in advance of the first. Now, the second boundary line had also been crossed by the Romanians. At that time, Bela Kun was done for, and the people outside the capital were determined to get rid of him. But the moment the Romanians began their last advance into Hungary, many of the aristocratic officers of the old Hungarian Army had rushed to Bela Kun to be enrolled to fight against the Romanians to stem the invasion, with the result that at the present moment a strong national movement for the defense of the country had been started in Hungary. At the same time, the Czechoslovaks had also advanced with the object of occupying the only coal-bearing area remaining within the boundaries of the new State of Hungary. The result had been a national Hungarian rising against the Czechoslovaks.

It will be seen, therefore, that the fault lie entirely with the Romanians who were the first to invade the new State of Hungary; and the attack of the Romanians had been followed by the advance of the Czechoslovaks in the direction of the coal basin of Pecs.

The statement made by his informant, who had come straight from Budapest, fully bears out what General Bliss had stated in the Memorandum attached to the joint note submitted by the Military Representatives, Versailles.

M Clemenceau points out that no reply has yet been given by the Military Representatives to President Wilson’s question in regard to the military situation in those regions.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has received the following two telegrams which would answer M Clemenceau’s question:

The first telegram is dated Prague 5th June, 1919, and had been received in Paris on 8th June. It states that General Pellé had, at President Masaryk’s request, been appointed Commander in Chief of the Czechoslovak army and that martial law had been proclaimed at Pressburg.

The second telegram, dated Prague 7th June, 1919, states that Wobsi (?) has been captured by the Magyars and that the situation is extremely grave. The Czechoslovak troops are quite dispirited and a great shortage of munitions exists. Pressburg is threatened, where the only powder factory of Czechoslovakia is situated.

Mr Lloyd George, continuing, says that his informant had also stated that the Slovaks had become Bolshevik and that the whole of Czechoslovakia has almost become Bolshevik.

(General Cavallero points out on a map the boundaries of Hungary, the Hungarian territory occupied by the Romanians and the territory at present occupied by the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.)

General Belin explained that in their advance into Czechoslovakia the Hungarians had driven a wedge between the left wing of the Czechoslovak army and the right wing of the Romanian army, so that continuity between the two armies had been broken. As a result, a road had been laid open for a possible advance of the Hungarians on Pressburg, the most important Czechoslovak center.

Mr Lloyd George asks for information in regard to the invasion of Hungary by the Romanians.

General Belin replies that the Romanians have stopped their advance on the line of demarcation which had been laid down by General Franchet d’Esperey after the Armistice line had been passed.

Mr.\ Lloyd George emphasized the fact that the Romanians had advanced well into Hungary beyond the first Armistice line.

President Wilson agrees that the Romanians had, in consequence, occupied a not insignificant part of Hungarian territory.

Mr Lloyd George, continuing, says that in addition the Czechs have also invaded Hungary and are advancing on the coal mines of Pecs. In his opinion, it is evident that the Romanians and the Czechoslovaks are wholly to blame for what had occurred and in considering this matter, it is the duty of the Council to be fair, even to their enemies.

President Wilson agrees. He adds that under the circumstances it is sometimes very difficult to be fair to their friends. He suggests that the military advisers should withdraw and that the question should be further considered by the Council of Four in private.

Mr Lloyd George inquired whether the Council is in possession of all the requisite information in regard to the supply of munitions and other war material to Romania and Czechoslovakia.

General Cavallero reports that General Segre, the chief of the Armistice Commission at Vienna, has been asked to dispatch to the Czechoslovak army war material to be taken from the stocks and supplies of the old Austro-Hungarian army. General Segre had willingly agreed to this proposal and the military representatives in the Joint Note they submitted to the Supreme War Council, had recommended that the Italian Armistice Commission at Vienna should be charged with the carrying out of the work in question.

Mr Lloyd George inquires what supplies are now being given by the Allied and Associated Governments to the Romanian armies. He points out that Romania has defied the Allied Commander in Chief, General Franchet d’Esperey, and twice the Romanians have refused to obey his orders. This clearly proves that the Paris writ is not running. Orders are sent by the Supreme Council to the Romanians, who merely snap their fingers at them. Consequently, in his opinion, it will be necessary to stop the dispatch of all further supplies until a complete understanding is reached. He understands that a great deal of material is supplied by Great Britain and that will now be stopped, and he suggests that France should do the same. The whole of the trouble in Central Europe arises from the fact that their friends refused to obey the orders issued by the Supreme Council. He thinks it will be necessary to take strong measures with their friends. In this case, all the trouble has arisen because Romania had advanced in defiance of the orders given. Consequently, all supplies to Romania should be stopped until a complete understanding has been reached as to what ought to be done.

President Wilson expresses the view that the Romanians should be made to retire to the original Armistice line. He inquires whether they have advanced since General Smuts’ visit.

Mr Lloyd George replies in the affirmative.

M Clemenceau says that the Romanians have stopped their advance, as a result of the last instructions issued by the Supreme Council.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be more correct to say that they have been stopped by the Hungarian forces.

M Clemenceau points out that their military experts, in Joint Note No. 43, have recommended that the Romanians should advance.

General Sackville-West explained that this recommendation is merely based on the terms of reference to the Military Representatives which are as follows:

“The Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers has charged the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles to examine the military action to be taken by the Allied armies to put an end to Hungarian attacks against Czechoslovakia.”

General Cavallero asks permission to read the following telegram, giving the information received by the Italian General Headquarters:

“As a result of the advance of the Romanian Army, which, on the 25th. April, was about to reach … and to proceed in a northwesterly direction towards the Theiss, the Czechoslovak Minister of Defense on 27th April ordered the Czechoslovak troops to cross the present line of demarcation in order to occupy the whole of the territory which had been evacuated by the Hungarian troops in front of the Czechs. The Hungarian troops had been withdrawn from this territory in order to resist the further advance of the Romanians. The Czechoslovak advance was made by General Hennocque’s troops.”

M Clemenceau inquires why the Hungarians have evacuated the territory facing the Czechoslovaks.

General Cavallero replies that the Hungarians have been compelled to withdraw their troops in order to stop the Romanian advance. The Czechoslovaks in their advance have threatened the whole of the region lying to the south of the mineral bearing mountains, where the only remaining coal mines in the new State of Hungary are to be found.

M Clemenceau inquires whether Mr Bratiano, Dr Benes and Dr Kramarcz should not be summoned before any decision is taken.

President Wilson thinks that this will not be necessary. He, personally, thinks it would be dangerous to play with ammunition dumps.

Mr Lloyd George agrees. In his opinion, it is imperative that measures should be taken to enforce the orders issued by the Supreme Council. In the past, the small Balkan States had defied every order issued from Paris and, having got themselves into trouble, invariably appealed to Paris to extricate them from their difficulties. He agrees with President Wilson that the question should be settled by the Council of Four without consulting the small Powers concerned.

(It is agreed that the question should be further discussed by the Council of Four.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. Mr Lloyd George says that he has received a report from Mr. Headlam-Morley to the effect that the Committee which was working out the details of the plebiscite for Upper Silesia has arrived at an impasse on the question of the time within which the plebiscite should be taken after the signature of peace. Consequently, he had asked that this Committee might attend to receive further instructions. Since then, however, he had seen Mr. Headlam-Morley and had suggested to him that the Committee should work out the conditions of the plebiscite, leaving the period within which it should be held blank to be filled in by the Council. Eastern Frontier of Germany.

President Wilson says that the conditions of the plebiscite will, to some extent, depend upon the time.

Mr Lloyd George says that he had suggested that the Committee should work it out on alternative hypotheses. He had told Mr Headlam-Morley that it was not the business of the Committee to discuss policy but merely to work out the details, leaving the policy to the Council. In reply to President Wilson, he says that there are certain other difficulties, for example, some members of the Committee wish the clergy to be removed from the area during the time preceding the plebiscite, which is obviously impossible. He is inclined to leave all these details to the Commission to be set up by the League of Nations for the purpose of conducting the plebiscite.

(The above views are accepted, and, at the request of the Council, President Wilson retires to the next room to meet the Committee and give them verbally the Council’s instructions.)


2. S Orlando says he has information that Klagenfurt has now been occupied by the Yugoslavs.


3. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that M Clemenceau had that morning handed him a fresh proposal on the part of the Delegation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in regard to the Klagenfurt question. He had at once sent it to be translated.


4. Mr Lloyd George reports that he has received a letter from the Estonian Delegation, asking that action might be taken to bring to an end the German activities which were affecting their operations against Petrograd.

(It is agreed that the letter should be communicated to the Military Representatives at Versailles, for their consideration. Sir Maurice Hankey undertakes to hand it to Major Caccia, the British Secretary.)


5. M Clemenceau says that it is a good thing that the telegram had been sent to the Hungarian Government insisting on their desisting from attacks on the Czechoslovaks. He now has information that the invitation to the Hungarian Government to send delegates to Paris to make peace has at last been received and he expects to have a definite reply on the following day.

President Wilson suggests that the representatives of the Czechoslovak and Romanian Governments in Paris should be sent for by the Council, who, without asking their advice, should say: “If you do not observe the conditions on which a final settlement is alone possible and which we have communicated to you” - which, in the case of the Romanians would be the armistice line - ”we will withdraw every sort of support.”

Mr Lloyd George suggests that there ought to be someone on the spot. It might be General Franchet d’Esperey, or possibly some other person might be found to summon all parties and make them agree on the lines on which fighting should cease. He has very little doubt that the Hungarians will withdraw from Czechoslovakia if the Romanians could be made to withdraw from Hungary.

President Wilson asks if a position has not been reached where the Romanians ought to be allowed to take no further part in the settlement. If they are allowed to advance, they will never evacuate the territory they have occupied.

Mr Lloyd George hopes that this is no reflection on the Military Representatives. They had only been asked to report on the situation from a military point of view, and General Sackville-West had told him he had not felt at liberty to discuss the political consequences of their advice.

President Wilson says that no such reflections were intended. General Bliss says the military advice was good, but draws attention to the political risks.

M Clemenceau says the political risks have already been taken when the telegram was sent to the Hungarian Government.

Mr Lloyd George says that, by the following day, M Clemenceau and he himself could ascertain how much war material was being sent to Romania. General Sir Henry Wilson had informed him that a good deal of material was on its way and he had asked him to stop its delivery. He suggested that a report should also be obtained from the Supreme Economic Council.

(It is agreed:

1) That Mr Lloyd George should ascertain the amount of British war material on its way to Romania which could be stopped.

2) That M Clemenceau should obtain the same information as regards French war material. (He instructs M Mantoux to initiate the necessary inquiries.)

3) That Sir Maurice Hankey should obtain the same information from the Supreme Economic Council.)


6. President Wilson reads a letter he has received from the Commission on Reparation, explaining the differences of opinion that had arisen.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to circulate this document immediately.)

Mr Lloyd George says that there is a good deal to be said, in his opinion, for putting Germany in a position to restart her industries again. Unless she is given raw material and the necessary credits, it would be impossible for her to pay reparation. But, on the question of fixing the amount, he is not in agreement with the United States experts. He has turned the matter over in his mind again and again, in order to try and meet their views. The conclusion he has come to is that if figures are given now they will frighten rather than re-assure the Germans. Any figure that would not frighten them would be below the figure with which he and M Clemenceau could face their peoples in the present state of public opinion. He does not know how Italy feels toward it but he has no doubt about Great Britain. Mr Bonar Law had been in Paris during the last day or two and was better in touch with British public opinion than he was himself. Mr Bonar Law was also inclined to take the same view as the United States delegates, but the moment any possible figure was mentioned he began to shrink from it. The statement of a figure at the present time would also raise inconvenient questions between the Allies. France could not accept any figure at the present time which did not provide a very large sum for restoration. His own opinion is that the present French estimate is a good deal higher than the actual cost would be. He thinks that France could take the risk of a lower figure, but of course they had not yet been able to make any detailed survey. In three or four months a preliminary survey would have been made, and it would be easier for France to state a figure. Another point is that he does not see how any member of the Council could apply his mind to the considerations involved in fixing a figure. They are faced with an infinity of subjects; for example, within the last day or two they had been considering the making of an armistice between the Hungarians and Czechs and between the Yugoslavs and Austrians in the Klagenfurt region and Polish questions. The topics are innumerable. To ask them now to fix a figure is like asking a man in the maelstrom of Niagara to fix the price of a horse. It is impossible, in these circumstances, for him to work out a figure which was fair to the British, French and Germans. He cannot honestly say that it is possible for him to give his mind properly to this at the present moment and he requires more time. Only this morning he had received information to the effect that the Germans are saying just the same thing. They really do not know what they can pay and would prefer to have more time to consider it. He would have thought that the proposal to allow three or, as Mr Loucheur urged, four months for the Germans to make an offer of a figure would be preferable. This would enable an examination to be made of the conditions and a survey to be carried out and for the estimates and methods to be worked out in detail. He hoped, therefore, that four months would be allowed in which the experts of all the Governments concerned, including the Germans, would be able to meet. The matter cannot be settled in an hour or two’s talk with German experts at Versailles, but if time were allowed it should be possible. M Loucheur, who is a particularly able business man, said frankly that he did not know what would be a fair sum. He was, however, with the United States experts in their desire to give a guarantee to Germany that she should get raw materials.

President Wilson says his position is that he is perfectly willing to stand by the Treaty provided that it were explained to the Germans, but he had understood that the British and French Governments were desirous of making some concessions as a possible inducement to the Germans to sign. If we must make concessions then he is in favour of perfectly definite concessions. He is not very interested in the details because personally he is prepared to sign the Treaty provided it is understood by the Germans. If, however, concessions are to be made the difficulties must not be allowed to stand in the way. He admits the full force of what Mr Lloyd George had said, namely that no-one knew enough to enable the bill to be drawn up, or the capacity of Germany to pay, to be estimated. Consequently, he is prepared to admit that any sum fixed now would be quite arbitrary and we should not know whether it covers the claims or whether it is within Germany’s capacity to pay. He understands, however, that Germany is supposed to want a fixed sum. From his point of view the sole consideration is as to whether it would provide a serviceable concession or not. He was warned, however, by his Economic experts that if Peace is not signed very soon most serious results would follow throughout the world, involving not only the enemy but all States. Commerce cannot resume until the present Treaty is signed and settled. After that it is necessary to steady finance and the only way to do this is by establishing some scheme of credit. He wishes to say most solemnly that if enough liquid assets ire not left to Germany together with a gold basis, Germany will not be able to start her trade again, or to make reparations. His own country is ready to provide large sums for the purpose of reestablishing credit but Congress will not vote a dollar under existing circumstances and he cannot ask the United States bankers to give credit if Germany has no assets. Bankers have not got the taxpayers behind them as Congress has and consequently they must know what Germany’s assets were. The United States War Finance Corporation is prohibited by law from granting credit unless it is covered by assets. Hence, if commerce is to begin again, steps must be taken to reestablish credit and unless some credit can be supplied for Germany’s use, the Allies will have to do without reparation.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the question between establishing an immediate fixed sum for Germany to pay, and allowing four months within which the sum was to be fixed, could be discussed between experts on both sides. For example, before long Germany will want raw cotton, but until the Treaty is signed it is impossible to discuss the conditions with her.

President Wilson says that he has not the material wherewith to justify any particular sum.

Mr Lloyd George says that neither has he.

President Wilson says that the only argument in favour of fixing a sum is to provide a basis for credit. Supposing, for example, the sum is fixed at twenty-five billion dollars, the financial world could then form a judgment. If it is thought that Germany could pay this sum, many would be willing to lend to her on the strength of the bonds to be issued under the reparation scheme in the Treaty. Otherwise, money would not be lent. To find some way of making the bond issue the basis for credit is the whole question.

M Clemenceau says he agrees in this last statement.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it is impossible to fix a sum before Peace is signed.

President Wilson then reads a suggested reply on the subject of reparation which had been prepared by the United States Delegation. He undertakes to have it reproduced at once and to circulate it to the Council.

Mr Lloyd George says he likes “the crust and the seasoning but not the meat”. He does not think it is necessary to go as far as is proposed. According to his information this is not necessary. He would like President Wilson to see the man who had given him this information.

President Wilson says that the difficulty is that the information is so conflicting.

Mr Lloyd George says it is necessary to act on some information.

President Wilson says he does not agree in this. At the meeting of the United States Delegation it had been proposed that all the Commissions should be instructed to consider the concessions that could be made to Germany. He had replied that our objects should be to show the reasonableness of the Treaty and to make it workable. That is what he has in view in the present discussion.

Mr Lloyd George says that, as a former lawyer, before a litigation he would always try and find out what concession it was necessary to make in order to secure an agreement. This is his present attitude, and according to his information it is not necessary to make so large a concession as is proposed in the letter of the United States Delegation.

President Wilson agrees that for the moment it would be desirable to leave out fixing the sum to be paid.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that this is important. But he thinks it was unnecessary to make the concessions in regard to shipping. He is prepared to meet the Germans in regard to the gold assets.

(The question is adjourned until the following day.)


7. S Orlando says that his reply is ready and he can discuss the matter at once.

President Wilson suggests that S Orlando should forward his reply in writing in order that the Council might consider it.

S Orlando agrees to do this.


8. M Clemenceau said that a repetition of the telegram containing Admiral Kolchak’s reply haw been asked for.

(It is agreed that nothing should be published until the repetition had been received, as there are various important points still obscure, particularly the passage in which reference was made to the regime in force in Russia in February 1917. It is not clear as to whether the possibility of a return to this regime is or is not contemplated.)

[Jimbuna]

10th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Austrian delegates protest against Peace Terms.

Agitation in China against Shantung decision of Peace Conference.

Senator Knox's resolution (asking separation of League of Nations Covenant from Peace Treaty).

Graduation ceremony at West Point with Lieutenant General Robert Lee Bullard giving an address.


Mieczysław Garsztka, a Polish flying ace with 6 victories in the German air force during the Great War, dies in a plane crash while fighting in the Polish-Ukrainian War.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. M Clemenceau says he has circulated the Hungarian reply to the invitation to come to Paris. He suggests that the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Romania should be asked to attend the afternoon meeting.

(This is agreed to. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to summon M Kramarcz, M Benes, Mr Bratiano and Mr Misu)


2. M Clemenceau says he thinks S Orlando’s reply to the latest proposals made to him on the subject of the Italian claims ought to be discussed without delay.

Mr Lloyd George says that at present he can make no contribution to the subject.

President Wilson says that is his position.

M Clemenceau said that he has a proposition to make, but thinks he had first better discuss it with Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson.

(M Clemenceau takes Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson aside and communicates his proposal to them.)


3. The Council has before them a Project for Reply to German Counter-proposals dealing with Reparation.

Mr Lloyd George points to the harm done by the Press, whose indiscretions, all of which went to Berlin, gave an entirely false impression in regard to the discussions of the Council. The newspapers gave the impression that the terms of the Treaty of Peace were being torn to pieces. As a matter of fact, only four alterations have so far been proposed.

He says that his own proposals are now ready. He then reads the following extract from a memorandum prepared by Lord Sumner:

“Immediately after the Treaty is signed, Germany may present forthwith and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and examine such evidence, estimates, and arguments in writing, as she may think fit to present. Such documents need not be final, but may be presented subject to corrections and additions.

At any time within four months of the signature of the Treaty, Germany shall be at liberty to submit, and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and consider, such proposals as Germany may choose to make. In particular, proposals will be acceptable on the following subjects and for the following purposes. Germany may offer a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability, or in settlement of her liability under particular categories. Germany may offer to undertake to repair and reconstruct part or the whole of any damaged district, or certain classes of damage in each country or in all the countries which have suffered. Germany may offer labor, materials or technical assistance for use in such work, even though she does not undertake to do the work herself. Without making further specifications, it may be said in a word that Germany is at liberty to make any suggestion or offer of a practical and reasonable character for the purposes of simplifying the assessment of the damage, eliminating any question or questions from the scope of the detailed inquiry, promoting the performance of the work and accelerating the definition of the ultimate amount to be paid. One condition and one condition only is imposed upon the tender of these proposals. They must be unambiguous, they must be precise and clear, and they must be made in earnest. The Allied and Associated Powers have to remark that in the observations submitted the German Delegation has made no definite offer at all but only vague expressions of willingness to do something undefined, and that the one suggestion, namely, as to the payment of £5,000,000,000, which appears to be expressed in concrete terms, is so hedged about with conditions and qualifications as to appear to be intended to provoke controversy and not to promote peace.

Within two months thereafter the Allied and Associated Powers will, so far as may be possible, return their answer to the above proposals. It is impossible to declare in advance that they will be accepted, and if accepted, they will be subject to proper conditions, which can be discussed and arranged. The Allied and Associated Powers, however, declare that such proposals will be seriously and fairly considered; no one could be better pleased than they, no one could profit more than they, if, in the result, a fair, a speedy and a practical settlement were arrived at. The questions are bare questions of fact, namely, the amount of the liabilities, and they are susceptible of being treated in this way. Beyond this, the Powers cannot be asked to go.

Even if no settlement were arrived at, it must be evident that the early production of the German evidence would greatly abbreviate the inquiry, and accelerate the decisions. The information at present at hand comes from one side only. A great part of the damage done has been done by German hands in faithful execution of German plans. The German Authorities have had long occupation of a large part of the damaged areas and have been over the ground, forwards and backwards, within the last twelve or fifteen months. Their information must be extensive and exact. The Allied and Associated Powers have as yet had no access to this mass of material. The mere comparison of the evidence forthcoming on the one side and the other must greatly narrow the field of dispute and may eliminate dispute altogether. It is obvious that, if the class of damages done in the devastated areas can be dealt with in this fashion, the liability under the other categories can be quickly established, for it depends on statistics and particulars of a far simpler character. By giving a satisfactory covenant to execute the work of rebuilding themselves, the Germans could at once dispose of the only difficult or long subject of inquiry.”

M Clemenceau says that as a matter of principle, he accepts this proposal.

Mr Lloyd George says he will accept any arguments, but he thinks these had been admirably stated in the document prepared by the United States Delegation.

President Wilson says that the extracts from Lord Sumner’s paper that Mr Lloyd George had read only provide a substitute for the portion of the United States paper proposing a fixed sum. Is the remainder of the United States answer acceptable, he asks?

Mr Lloyd George says that he prefers the first four pages of the United States draft.

President Wilson then reads his draft slowly, in order that it might be considered in detail. On the first page, the following alterations are agreed to:

Line 1. Instead of “consistent to” put “consistent with”.

At the end of the first paragraph, on Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion, it is agreed to insert the actual words from Mr. Lansing’s Note of November 5th, 1918, defining the intention of the word “Reparation”.

2nd Paragraph. Line 4, instead of “more difficult” put “the more difficult”.

The last sentence of the second paragraph is rearranged to read as follows:

“For the purpose of clarification, however, and in order that there may be no possible ground for misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated Governments submit the following observations”.

3rd Paragraph. For “the Reparation Commission” put “a Reparation Commission.” In the following line, for “the Reparation Commission,” put “this Reparation Commission.”

Page 2. On Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion, it is agreed that as far as possible, where particular Articles of the Peace Treaty were referred to, words explanatory of the contents of the Article should be introduced.

1st Paragraph on Page 2. For the words “after May 1st, 1921”, put “when once the amount of the liability of Germany is fixed.”

After the first paragraph of page 2, it is agreed to insert the following extract from Lord Sumner’s memorandum:

“The observations of the German Delegation present a view of this Commission so distorted and so inexact, that it is impossible to believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for interfering with German Sovereignty. It has no forces, which it commands; it has no executive powers within the territory of Germany; it cannot, as suggested, direct or control the educational or other systems of the country. Its business is to fix what is to be paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to report to the Powers, whose Delegation it is, in case Germany makes default. If Germany raises the money required in her own way, the Commission cannot order that it shall be raised in some other way, if Germany offers payment in kind, the Commission may accept such payment, but, except as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot require such a payment. The observations appear to miss the point that the Commission is directed to study the German system of taxation equally for the protection of the German people as for the protection of their own. Such study is not inquisitorial, for the German system of taxation is not an object of curiosity to other Powers, nor is a knowledge of it an end in itself. If any plea of poverty, which the German Government may advance, is to be properly considered, such a study is necessary. The Commission must test whether a sincere application is being given to the principle, accepted in the observations, “that the German taxation system should impose in general on the taxpayer at least as great a burden as those prevailing in the most heavily burdened of the States represented on the Reparation Commission.” If the German resources are to be properly weighed, the first subject of inquiry, and perhaps the first ground for relief, will be the German fiscal burden.”

2nd Paragraph on Page 2. Delete the first two lines, and insert the subject matter of the remainder of the paragraph in the above, extract from Lord Sumner’s document.

Page 3. At the end of the first paragraph,5 insert the extract from Lord Sumner’s memorandum read by Mr Lloyd George at the beginning of the discussion, and already quoted above.

At Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion, certain additions are made to the above extracts, and are accepted.

(These are drafting additions, and will be found in the second draft of the memorandum to be reproduced in the Appendix of a later meeting.)

Page 3. Omit the whole, after the first paragraph.

Page 4. Omit paragraph 1.7

Page 4. Paragraph 2. There is a somewhat prolonged discussion in regard to the proposal that specific instructions should be prepared, directing the Commission to permit the retention by Germany for two years of ships designated by the Commission, representing 30% of the tonnage of the total amount of ships.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the United States of America, Brazil and Portugal, had all received ships considerably in excess of their losses in the war. France had lost in the war, perhaps a million tons of shipping, and would only receive about 40,000 tons with a proportion of the remainder. Great Britain had lost nearly 8 million tons, and would not receive more than one to one and a half million tons. Consequently, Great Britain would lose, net, to the extent of 6½ million tons, a great proportion of which had been lost not in carrying her own material, but supplies of all kinds for France and Italy, and some in carrying for America. The voyages to France and Italy had been particularly dangerous. He is not fighting for British trade, but what he wishes to insist on was that if 30% of Germany’s shipping must be allowed to her, the arrangement must be made on the dead level, and every nation must contribute its share. If this is the case, he is ready to discuss an allocation of 10%, 20% or even 30%. The British people, however, will not understand, if all the loss falls on France and Great Britain. He points out that the United States had acquired a net gain of three or four hundred thousand tons of shipping, (and this is some of the best shipping that Germany had possessed), owing to the fact that this shipping had taken refuge in its ports for fear of capture by the British Navy. If the German shipping had not taken refuge in the ports of the United States, Brazil and Portugal, Great Britain and France would have captured the greater part of it.

President Wilson points out that this shipping is the only reparation that the United States will receive after all their efforts in the war.

Mr Lloyd George says that for the next few years, tonnage is worth a great deal more than money. Those who were able first to establish themselves in overseas trades, would gain enormous advantages.

President Wilson points out that unless Germany receives a certain amount of raw material and retained a certain amount of liquid assets, there will be no reparation to be received.

Mr Lloyd George entirely agrees. As long as the arrangement is made on the dead level, he does not object. Nevertheless, it would have been easier for him to justify to the British Parliament a claim by the United States for pensions than for these ships. He hopes that no arrangement will be concluded at the expense of France and Great Britain. He has always put France first in speaking of the matter in Great Britain, and he tales the same line now.

M Clemenceau says that he is quite prepared to assist Germany as an arrangement between the Allies, but not to give it the appearance of a concession wrung from the Allied and Associated Powers by the enemy. France has very few ships, quite insufficient for her needs, and it is impossible for him to agree to give up ships to Germany. He realizes, however, that it would be to France’s interest to give Germany some facilities.

Mr Lloyd George says he is willing to consider the German needs fairly, and when the time comes, he thought it will be a business proposition to our own people. Having in view, however, the great shortage of shipping, which is entirely due to the abominable system of piracy by Germany, the sinking of ships and leaving their crews far out at sea in open boats, etc., he cannot agree to this proposal unless it is carried out on the dead level for all nations.

M Clemenceau says that the question is as to whether a sum is to be fixed to be paid, or whether Mr Lloyd George’s proposal should be adopted. He, himself, prefers Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal. The United States proposal would have the effect of changing the whole system of reparation which was only reached after very long discussions and immense difficulties. The various proposals in the United States paper would have the effect of an abandonment of the whole system of Reparations, which had been so laboriously worked out. We have stated that we should make Germany pay for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and by the air. Supposing they accepted a fixed figure, would these damages be repaid? We do not know. As Mr Lloyd George had said in the course of the discussion, it is France who had suffered most. Though her losses on land had been very great, they had also been heavy at sea. He must say frankly that he does not believe in abandoning the scheme that had been drawn up. He probably knows the Germans better than any of his colleagues. He has known them very well since 1871. We have brought the proposals made to Germany before the whole world. To abandon them merely because the Germans have objections is a thing he cannot assent to. It had been proposed to make the Treaty more acceptable to Germany by letting her have ships and gold, by abolishing conscription, by financial advantages, and by admission to the League of Nations. To do this would be to turn the whole world upside down. It would be not the conquerors but the conquered who came out best. For days and days he had followed the discussions, with the intention of agreeing with the majority. He cannot, however, agree to something that would turn the world upside down. He is prepared to accept Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal. He is convinced that this or that concession would not make the Germans sign. There is much to be said against the Germans, but they are a people with great qualities even if they have great faults, and at present, they are very anxious to put their country on its legs again. Of course, if Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar, Poland etc. are abandoned, we could have peace tomorrow. When Great Britain had abandoned her policy of splendid isolation and thrown herself into the struggle, she had taken all risks. She must continue to do so to the end. After expending so many men and so much money, and making such prodigious efforts, it is necessary to have peace. The same applies to the United States of America. Peace has become the most essential thing for the whole world. If the Germans are confronted with a strong peace, supported by a firm attitude, then peace will be assured, but otherwise we should lose the confidence of our own people, while the Germans will be strengthened and we should not get peace. He knows the Germans well, and if a concession is made, they always ask for more. If they are promised admission to the League of Nations, they will only demand ships, and if they are promised ships, they will demand gold. Moreover, when we made these offers to Germany, we pledged ourselves. Germany, however, took no pledges. If Germany had said, “If you will give up this or that, we will accept”, the matter might be worthy of consideration, but Germany had done nothing of the kind. He is willing to accept modifications, but he was not willing to compromise the peace and the victory, which is not British, nor French, nor Italian, nor American, but a peace secured by all.

President Wilson says that the United States has never proposed any concessions to Germany. They have only made certain proposals in a spirit of cooperation. If these are not acceptable to his colleagues, there is no difficulty in withdrawing them. The United States Delegation, however, has taken up a consistent line from the first in this matter.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is in complete agreement with the spirit of the United States document, which, in his opinion, had got hold of the right idea. We do not desire to crush Germany, nor to make it impossible for her to resume her industrial life. He thinks that some general proposal should be made to the effect that an opportunity will be offered to Germany to obtain raw material, shipping facilities, etc., and during the meeting, he had invited Lord Sumner to draft such a proposal. His view is that what they require is not a detailed proposal, but some general assurance.

M Clemenceau said it is to our own interest to give that.

Mr Lloyd George admitted that his proposal is open to comment, as being vague, but he does not think the Germans will make this point.

President Wilson says that the only difference between them is that the United States Delegation’s proposals are more specific.

Mr Lloyd George says that the difficulty of specific promises is that it would be very difficult to draw up a complete list. If shipping and credit facilities and certain raw materials are mentioned, the Germans will think that anything omitted from the list had been left out deliberately. Germany needs so many things, for example, cotton, rubber, wool, tungsten, and all kinds of raw materials, most of which were controlled by the Allied and Associated Powers. His view, therefore, is that it would be better merely to make a general statement. He then reads the following draft prepared by Lord Sumner:

“The Powers will, however, make a declaration on another point as follows:

The resumption of German industry involves access for German manufacturers to the necessary raw materials and provision for their transport to German factories from overseas.

The resumption of German industry is an interest of the Allied and Associated Powers, as well as an interest of Germany. They recognize this fact and therefore declare that they will not withdraw from Germany the commercial intercourse and assistance, without which this resumption cannot take place, but that subject to conditions, and within limits which cannot be laid down in advance, they are prepared to afford to Germany facilities in these directions for the common good.”

This is accepted with the substitution of the word “withhold” for “withdraw.”

(It is agreed that paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 (that is to say the whole of page 4 and whole of page 5 except the last paragraph) should be omitted).


4. There is some discussion as to the advisability of including in the memorandum a passage dealing with the cost of the Army of Occupation.

Mr Lloyd George favors the proposal on the ground that the Germans are very apprehensive lest a very large sum should have to be paid for this charge. A bill for 50 million pounds per annum for example, would be very heavy on a country which is already burdened with Reparation.

M Clemenceau is opposed to the proposal on the ground that the question does not really affect Germany. In any case she has to pay everything that she can, and it was immaterial to her whether it is expended on the cost of the Army of Occupation or paid out as Reparation. He makes it clear, however, that he is not in favor of a large charge for the cost of the Army of Occupation. He wishes the Army to be as small as possible, in order that more assets might be available for Reparation.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four with Representatives from Czechoslovakia and Romania


(M Clemenceau arrives half an hour after the beginning of the Meeting, having been detained in the Chamber.)


1. President Wilson says that the Council has been much concerned with the military operations continuing in and about Hungary. The part of it which has attracted the principal attention is the movement of the Magyars against Czechoslovakia. The information of the Council, which might possibly not be wholly correct, is to the effect that this is due to the movement of the Czechoslovaks, threatening the principal coal mines of Hungary. Behind them there are understood to be other causes that have contributed largely to the situation. Some time past General Franchet d’Esperey had drawn a line beyond which the Romanian forces were not to pass. Nevertheless the Romanian forces had passed the line. Then a second line had been drawn, and again they had passed beyond it, thus declining to obey the orders of the Allied Commander-in-Chief under whom their army had been placed. It was this second advance which had caused the downfall of Karolyi who, more than any other Hungarian, was supposed to be friendly to the Entente. The fall of Karolyi had been followed by the establishment of the Bela Kun Government, which was understood to be not acceptable to the more substantial classes of the population of Hungary. However, the information of the Council was that when it was believed the Czechoslovaks were advancing, even the better classes rallied to the support of Bela Kun. Thus it came about that the Romanian forces had brought the Bela Kun Government into existence, and the Czechoslovak forces had prolonged its existence. The interest of the Council was to stop this fighting, not only in the general cause of peace, but more particularly in order to bring about a settlement. The Council’s wish was to draw a boundary line, thus making a good beginning, after which it would be hoped to keep things steady by means of the common authority of the nations. The Council were deeply concerned to remove the causes of the present trouble, and to produce a situation when there would be no more difficulties in the East, and Peace could be maintained and a settlement made in Paris.

Mr Bratiano said he thought that the Council had not been very well informed as to the role of the Romanian Army, and the provocation that had been given by the Hungarians. The true situation was as follows. When the Armistice was proclaimed General Franchet d’Esperey, whom he had seen several times, had told him that he knew almost nothing of the military and political situation of the Romanian Army, and of the relations between the Army and the State. General Franchet d’Esperey had drawn an Armistice Line quite arbitrarily, which left in the hands of the Hungarians the greater part of the most Romanian population in Hungary. Behind the Romanian front order had been immediately established, and foreign populations, like the German speaking people known as Saxons, for example, had not only shown passivity, but had made movements for union with Romania. Then it was that Karolyi’s Government started in Hungary the Bolshevist propaganda. He had in his possession proclamations making an appeal for Bolshevik movements in Transylvania, and behind the Romanian front. It was then that he had asked for a new line, and this had been agreed to and drawn in conjunction with the French High Command. The Romanian Army then advanced and occupied the line drawn up at Versailles. After this there had been a struggle, and in the course of the fighting the Romanian Army had advanced to the only decent military line of defense, viz"|: the line of the River Theiss. He had definite proof that the Bolshevik propaganda just referred to had been paid for by Karolyi’s Government, and he had in his possession documents prepared by the Government and printed in Pest. Then it was after securing proof of this Bolshevist propaganda by Karolyi’s Government that he had proposed, in line, as he thought, with the general policy of the Entente, to advance on Budapest. He was, however, told not to advance, and the Army had been stopped on the Theiss. A short time ago M Pichon had told him that the Council were apprehensive lest the Romanian Army should advance on Budapest. He had replied that if the Allies preferred to leave the Bolshevist movement to ferment freely in Budapest, and perhaps to perish in the process, he had nothing to say, and the Romanian troops remained where they were. The Bolshevist movement in Hungary had been organised just as much by Karolyi as by Bela Kun. He also thought that the Council had received incorrect information as to the attitude of the Hungarian population. The Army had occupied some territory that was purely Hungarian, including the district of Debreczen. The Mayor and Bishop of that place had come forward to thank the Romanian Commanding Officer for the good order that had been kept. Also, when the King of Romania visited these districts, he received many deputations from Hungarian bodies thanking him for the protection that had been given and the good order kept. He would permit himself to insist that the Hungarians had been left in such uncertainty as to their position that they had somehow received the impression that instead of being a conquered people, they were Allies. Once they realized that they were a conquered race, peace would follow. They were not in a position to resist and if strong language were used they could do nothing but submit. Any other course would only result in much greater difficulties. He would add that quite recently the non-Bolshevik elements of Hungary had sent emissaries to Romania, inviting them to advance on Budapest, but they had refused these invitations.

Mr Lloyd George says he understands that the Commissions set up by the Peace Conference had given their advice as to the boundaries between Hungary and Romania.

Dr Benes says that is the case between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Mr Bratiano said that the only line that had ever been communicated to him was the Versailles Armistice Line.

Dr Benes says that the Commissions had given their recommendations as to the final frontier line between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but after that the matter had gone before the Central Territorial Commission and finally to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr Lloyd George asked if Mr Bratiano had never received any intimation as to his frontiers.

Mr Misu (Romania) says he had heard nothing officially. Many people talked, but the matter was supposed to be secret.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether they had made any demand to the Secretary-General.

Dr Benes says that the Czechoslovaks had done so, but that the line was supposed to be secret.

Mr Bratiano says he had only read it in the newspapers.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether Romania has claimed Debreczen.

Mr Bratiano says he has not. The Romanian Army was on the Theiss for military reasons.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Army on the Theiss is half-way between the proposed eventual frontier and Budapest. This is the way to make Bolshevism.

Mr Bratiano says that Mr Lloyd George misunderstands the matter. The Romanians had been attacked on the Versailles line and they had advanced to the Theiss solely for military reasons. He explains the whole of these incidents on a map. The evidence in regard to the Bolshevist activities of the Karolyi Government was very definite. Radkowski, who was now Commandant of Kieff, had been at the head of these activities.

Mr Lloyd George says it will take a great deal to convince him that Karolyi had encouraged the Bolshevik movement.

Mr Bratiano regrets that he cannot convince Mr Lloyd George. This is a matter on which probably his information was better than that of Mr Lloyd George.

The movement had been begun before the time of Karolyi by the Germans. There had been a regular Bolshevik organisation established in Mackensen’s time. The whole machinery of the movement was quite familiar to the Romanians. Part of the plan had been to connect the Bolsheviks of Hungary with the Bolsheviks of Russia, across Romania as part of the German war machine. Of this he had substantial proofs.

President Wilson says he has no doubt intrigues of this kind had been started by Germany. Unquestionably Germany had tried to make the situation in Eastern Europe impossible for the Allies. It is, however, one thing to stir up trouble by means of propaganda and another to do it by aggression. The Allies must see that they do not contribute to it by giving anyone just ground to dread them. As an example, he mentions that in the United States there is an organisation known as the Industrial Workers of the World which was largely an anarchistic organisation of laborers but one that was opposed to agreements with anyone. When opportunity offered they took action by means of sabotage. The policy of the United States Government had been to check this by ensuring, as far as possible, that no grievances should exist among the army of working people. He would not say that there were no grievances but where these grievances had been removed the activities of the Industrial Workers of the World had been checked. The right thing, therefore, must be done. Whatever the reasons might be, it was certain that under the terms of the armistice the Romanian troops had no right on the Theiss. So long as they remained there they were helping to create Bolshevism in Hungary even more than propaganda would. This situation was one of provocation to Hungary. He was surprised at what had been told him as to the Romanian and Czechoslovak Delegations knowing nothing of the proposed boundaries for them. They certainly ought to be informed, and he could only presume that the reason was that only the initial processes had been passed through. The first question was to settle boundaries and have some understanding in regard to them which could be observed. When the boundaries were settled, he thought the Bolshevist support would be weakened. As a result of this afternoon’s meeting, he hoped that they would come to an understanding as to what was right in respect to the positions the armies should occupy and as to the action that the armies should take. With all respect, he would say that the Romanian troops had no right in Hungary, and if he himself had the misfortune to be Hungarian he would be up in arms against them, and so would anyone.

Mr Lloyd George adds that when the Czechoslovaks crossed the frontier. Bela Kun, who was then tottering had rallied to him officers of the old army and the anti-Bolshevik forces.

Dr Kramarcz said he was much surprised when he heard that the Czechoslovaks were accused of provoking the fighting. There had been great discussions in his country as to whether an advance should be made into Hungary or not. Some people said it was necessary to adopt an aggressive attitude in order to effect a junction with the Romanian army and crush Bolshevism. There had, however, been strong opposition from the democratic elements and the socialists, and the offensive had been stopped. He has no idea whether Czechoslovak armies have crossed the line of demarcation. He has no knowledge of any aggressive movement. He knows nothing as to whether any advance had been made. The cause of the fights is the Bolshevik movement against them. He knows that General Piccione, on resigning his command, had undertaken to ask the Italian Government to send arms and ammunition for the Czechoslovak forces. When he heard that the Czechoslovaks were accused of being the cause of this fighting he directed his mind to the Magyar side. There they had an army as well organised as one of the great armies. It contained hundreds of thousands of men and a very good armament, including what Mackensen had left behind. It contained German elements and also, he believed, a few Russian Bolshevik elements. It had not been raised on the spur of the moment. He had no detailed information in his possession, but he certainly had no knowledge of any offensive. In regard to the Bolshevist propensities of Karolyi, he entirely supported what Mr Bratiano had said. They actually knew the name of the man who had exercised control over it. If the conquest of Hungary had been intended, the Czechoslovak army must have been prepared. This, however, was not the case and they had adopted a purely defensive attitude. They had been greatly tempted to advance. The bourgeoisie in Hungary had clamored for them to advance and crush Bolshevism. The Czechoslovaks, however, had been bound to recognize things as they were, and had desisted from any advance. The Hungarians had amassed a great army and had the ammunition of the Austrian Army and of Mackensen to support them. They had attacked the Czechoslovaks, who were, and still are, much weakened. The Czechoslovaks, therefore, expected the Allied and Associated Powers to order the Hungarian army to stop, and if they did not do so, to send them help. In his country, there was great enthusiasm for the defense. Even the socialists were marching like the greatest patriots. If they only had arms there were plenty of men at their disposal. They had no desire to cross the line of demarcation. He is not sure that the danger would not increase, but he had read in the papers that Vienna was also threatened by Bolshevism. On the Western front Czechoslovakia was threatened from Bavaria by 40,000 men. Consequently they are in a very difficult situation, and their communications with their Allies are very seriously threatened. He asks, therefore, that the Allies would assist with arms and ammunition. He would give a pledge never to use the arms for any offensive purpose, but only for defense against the Bolshevik advance. He thinks a compromise with the Magyars is unbearable in view of the atrocities they had perpetrated in Czechoslovakia.

President Wilson says he ought to mention that word had been sent to Hungary two days ago to stop all offensive action. A satisfactory reply had been received, and they had undertaken to stop if not attacked themselves.

Dr Benes asks to add a few words to what Dr Kramarcz had said. He can give a historical account of the line of demarcation between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and show that Czechoslovakia had always been loyal and always on the defensive. The line of demarcation had been drawn last November after the armistice. It had been so drawn, however, as to leave no line of communications with the East of Slovakia which was separated from the rest of the country by mountains. Consequently, they had asked for an alteration of the line to enable them to have direct communication. This is a very modest demand, because their territorial claims go far South of it. Then the Territorial Commission recommended a frontier South of the first line of demarcation, and when they knew that the final frontier would be drawn further to the South, they had asked for the original line of demarcation to be moved, and had made an application to the Conference and to Marshal Foch and the High Command for its amelioration. After three or four appeals Marshal Foch had agreed to the change. The final frontier extended South of the new line of demarcation.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether the new line of demarcation had ever been communicated to the Hungarian Government.

Dr Benes says he does not know, but it had been communicated to the Czechoslovaks. The application for the new line had been supported by Mr Hoover, who required it for his relief work. The new line had been drawn about four weeks ago, and on this line the Czechoslovak forces had remained. Then the Government had begun its preparations for financial reforms and for elections and had distributed its forces on the frontiers towards Germany, partly because they knew that Poland was threatened by the Germans, and partly because Marshal Foch had wished them to be ready either to enter Bavaria, or at any rate to meet a possible attack from that quarter. The result had been a distribution of the forces which had enabled the Magyars to see that Czechoslovakia had no forces on her frontier. Throughout they had remained loyal.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether their forces had not advanced towards the coal mines?

Dr Benes says that some four weeks ago, when the new line was drawn, he believed the Czechoslovak troops had transgressed and advanced towards the coal district. Immediately afterwards M Pichon had spoken to him, and he had told M. Mazaryk, who had at once ordered a retirement, which had been carried out.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that when the Czechoslovak troops advanced towards the coal district they had been attacked by the Magyars and fell back.

Dr Benes said he has no information about this.

Mr Lloyd George says that this was the Council’s information. When the Czechoslovaks had crossed the frontier and directed themselves towards the only coal district in Hungary, the Magyars had turned upon them and had driven them out.

Dr Benes says he supposed some mistake had been made. The extension of the Line of Demarcation had not been in the direction of the coal mines. The Magyar attack had been further to the Eastward, with the object of dividing Slovakia into two. He explains the situation on a map.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Kassa, towards which Dr Benes says the first attack had been made by the Magyars, is behind the Romanian lines.

Mr Bratiano begs the Council to remember that Romania is in a state of war with Hungary. Her army has occupied certain territory for purely military purposes. He hopes that the territory so occupied would not be mixed up with the territory claimed. The only reason for its occupation had been for security. Its occupation does not indicate any more desire on Romania’s part to retain the territory than the occupation of territory in Germany by the Armies of the Allied and Associated Powers indicated an intention to hold that territory. If the Romanian army had to withdraw from this territory it would put it in a very insecure position.

M Clemenceau says he has received a despatch from General Pellé who commanded the Czechoslovak Army, declaring that the Czechoslovaks were overwhelmed, and had no guns and no gunners. Hence, he is in a state of great embarrassment. The Romanians had twice crossed the lines drawn by General Franchet d’Esperey, and this had produced the present difficulties. How long did the Romanians propose to occupy these lines?

Mr Bratiano says they will quit them immediately on the signature of peace.

M Clemenceau says the object of the Council is to stop fighting. Would the Romanians stop if the Hungarians do?

Mr Bratiano says the Romanian Army had stopped already.

(At this point President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George, M Clemenceau and S Orlando withdraw to an adjoining room for a consultation.)

On their return, President Wilson explains that he and his colleagues had wished to confer for a few minutes in order to consider what ought to be done. They had come to the conclusion that an Armistice line and merely temporary arrangements were thoroughly unsatisfactory. Consequently, they had decided to invite the Council of Foreign Ministers to confer with the Czechoslovak and Romanian delegations on the following morning on the subject of the permanent boundaries between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Romania. When these permanent boundaries are fixed, which would be done at once, it is proposed to communicate them to the Hungarian Government, from whom they had received a radio-telegram favorable to the cessation of fighting and to peace negotiations. The Hungarian Government would be told that any movement across this line would mean a cessation of the peace negotiations. The suggestion was that the Romanian and Czechoslovak Governments should also agree to respect these boundaries, and call their armies behind them. The observance of this would determine the attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers in the matter of further assistance.

Dr Benes says that this is exactly what he had asked for in a letter he had addressed to M Clemenceau a few days ago.

Mr Bratiano says he has no observations to make.

M Clemenceau says that as soon as the Foreign Ministers have agreed on the boundaries, the reply would be sent to Budapest.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to arrange with the Secretary-General for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the following morning as early as possible, to which Dr Kramarcz, Dr Benes, Mr Bratiano and Mr Misu should be invited.)


2. M Clemenceau apologizes for not being able to give his opinion on the draft reply to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on the subject of Reparation which had been circulated by Sir Maurice Hankey.

At the moment of his conference with M Loucheur on the subject he had been summoned to the French Chamber, but he undertakes to give his views on the following day; but on the first reading he likes it.

S Orlando said that S Crespi approved it.

(It is agreed that the draft should not be remitted to experts, but that each member of the Council should discuss the matter with his own experts.)

[Jimbuna]

11th June 1919

Welcome home parade for returning U.S. soldiers at Terre Haute, Indiana.


Crowds at Trafalgar Square during a promotion of the Victory Loan Campaign, which will fund government expenses in the postwar.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of Foreign Ministers

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:45

Meeting of the Council of Four

[Jimbuna]

12th June 1919

Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and his family at Washington D.C.


Not to be outdone by American rival Ruth Law, French aviator Raymonde de Laroche regained her top standing by breaking the women's altitude record again, flying to a height of 5,150 m (16,900 ft).

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, June 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of Foreign Ministers


M Pichon says that in a letter dated 11th June, 1919, the Supreme Council had referred certain definite questions to the Foreign Ministers, having reference to the meeting held yesterday. The first question is drawn up in the following terms:

“First, they think that some inquiry should be made as to why the frontiers between Romania and Hungary, which were approved at a Meeting of the Council of Ten on May 12th, were never communicated to the representatives of Romania, or presumably the other States concerned.”

M Pichon, continuing, says the answer to that question would be that the precedent applicable to all similar cases had been followed in regard to Romania. For instance, the boundaries of Austria had been communicated to the parties concerned only on the day preceding the presentation of the Peace Treaty to Austria. The Council of Foreign Ministers had, therefore, been justified in supposing that the same procedure would, under normal conditions, have been followed in the case of Hungary.

Mr Lansing thinks that the Foreign Ministers should go further and point out that even in the case of Germany, the frontiers fixed had not been communicated in advance to any of the parties concerned, except Belgium. Furthermore, the communication to the Belgian Government had been made by the Council of Four and not by the Foreign Ministers. It would appear, therefore, that the practice had become well established that the frontiers approved by the Supreme Council should not be communicated in advance to the parties concerned, except under instructions from the Council of Four.

M Tardieu asks the Council to consider what procedure would have been followed, in the ordinary course of events, in regard to the communication of the boundaries of Hungary, had not the present military operations occurred, which had made it desirable as an exceptional measure for some definite boundaries to be fixed. It is evident that the Hungarian Delegation would have been summoned to Paris, and the day before their arrival, the territorial clauses of the Treaty would have been communicated to the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers at a Plenary secret meeting. Consequently, the question of principle had not in any way been altered, and it was only for special reasons that the Foreign Ministers had been instructed on this occasion to communicate the boundaries of Hungary with Czechoslovakia and Romania to the Czechoslovak and Romanian Delegates.

(At this stage, Lord Hardinge enters, and M Pichon gives a summary of the statements recorded above.)

Baron Sonnino says that in the reply to the Supreme Council, a rider should be added to the effect that in future, as soon as definite decisions were reached in regard to frontiers, these should forthwith be communicated to the parties concerned.

Lord Hardinge doubts whether it would always be advisable forthwith to communicate the decisions taken in regard to frontiers - for instance, in certain cases only one part of the frontiers might have been fixed while other parts still remained undetermined. He had in mind the case of Romania, where the boundaries of Bessarabia and Dobruja still remain unsettled. The same remark would probably also apply to Greece, when those frontiers come under discussion.

Mr Lansing accepts Baron Sonnino’s recommendation that agreed frontiers should be communicated to the parties concerned with as little delay as possible. He thinks, however, that the Council of Four should be responsible for determining the opportune moment for communicating the same to the interested parties, thus avoiding the danger of producing complications such as Lord Hardinge had contemplated.

Lord Hardinge expresses the view that Mr Lansing’s suggestions would cover the cases quoted by him.

(It is agreed to inform the Supreme Council that the established practice, heretofore approved by that Council, has been followed in the case of Romania and Czechoslovakia, namely, that the boundaries of States should not, as a rule, be communicated in advance to the parties concerned, except under special instructions from the Supreme Council.

The Foreign Ministers also express the opinion that, in future, the boundaries of States should be communicated to the parties concerned as soon as possible after a decision had been reached, on instructions to be issued by the Supreme Council.)

M Pichon said that the second question read as follows:

(b) Frontiers with Romania: Views of Mr Bratiano “The Council would also like to be informed as to whether Mr Bratiano gave any indication as to whether the proposed frontiers were acceptable or not, and whether of he offered any criticism on the subject.”

M Pichon, continuing, says that Mr Bratiano had raised certain objections. In the first place, he had definitely stated his inability to accept two portions of the proposed boundary line, namely, the portion between Csap and Nagykaroli and the portion between Nagyvarad and Szeged.

M Tardieu says that Mr Bratiano had asked that the two bits of railway line in question should be included in Romania. In addition to that, however, he had also invoked strategic reasons in support of his contention that the whole of the boundary line between Nagykaroli and Nagyvarad and onward would be unacceptable, as it runs within two or three kilometres of an important railway line, As a result, he understands Mr Bratiano to dispute the whole of the boundary line. Mr Bratiano, on behalf of the Romanian Government, had not definitely rejected the boundaries proposed, but he had asked to refer the whole question to Bucharest for examination and report.

Mr Lansing accepts the statement made by M Tardieu. He thinks, however, that the Foreign Ministers should, in addition, express an opinion to the effect that the boundaries proposed should be accepted without alteration.

(It is agreed to inform the Supreme Council, in regard to the boundaries of Hungary with Romania, that Mr Bratiano had expressed his inability to accept the frontiers proposed, or to discuss the same without first consulting his Government, for which purpose a period of 10 to 12 days would be required.

Further, the Foreign Ministers expressed the opinion that the boundaries, as approved by the Foreign Ministers and the Supreme Council, should be adhered to without alteration.)

(c) M Pichon says that the third question referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Council of Four had reference to the alterations in the frontiers of Hungary with Czechoslovakia, namely:

“The Council would be glad to receive, as early as possible, the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers as to the alterations in the frontier asked for by the Czechoslovak Delegation.”

M Cambon said that the Czechoslovaks had, in principle accepted the proposed boundaries of Hungary with Czechoslovakia. Dr. Kramarcz had, however, asked for two slight modifications to be made.

The first modification related to a small strip of territory situated on the southern bank of the Danube, over against Pressburg. The area in question, known as Edor, constituted a suburb of Pressburg and the Magyars had been firing from there across the Danube into Pressburg. The Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs were, however, unanimously agreed that the Danube formed an excellent boundary and that no reasons existed for any alterations to be made to the boundary proposed.

(It is agreed that no alterations should be made in the proposed boundaries of Czechoslovakia in the region of Pressburg.)

M Cambon, continuing, says that the second request made by the Czechoslovakia Delegation related to the railway line running between Kalonda and Komoron, which, in accordance with the decision reached by the Commission, will remain in the hands of the Hungarians including the railway junction at Ipolysk. Should the demands of the Czechoslovak Delegates be accorded, a large number of Magyars will have to be included in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand the railway line running from Ipolysk to Korpona serves an important stretch of Czechoslovak territory which is practically inaccessible except from the South, and the fact that the Junction of this railway line (Ipolysk) has been allotted to Hungary will undoubtedly cause very grave inconveniences to the Czechoslovaks.

Under these conditions he would, as President of the Commission, strongly recommend that the proposed boundary line in the immediate vicinity of Ipolysk be slightly altered in order to place the railway junction inside the boundaries of Czechoslovakia.

Baron Sonnino understands that the boundary line accepted by the Commission has been the result of a compromise.

M Cambon agrees. He says that for that very reason the Commission had recommended that the boundary between Kalonda and Csad as a whole should not be altered. He had merely suggested that a very slight modification should be made at the Railway junction, such a modification being really essential in order to obtain full use of the Korpona railway line which merely served Czechoslovak territory. No material alteration in the agreed boundary line was intended.

Baron Sonnino understands M Cambon’s proposals to be that a small corner of territory round the railway junction of Ipolysk should be transferred to Czechoslovakia. In this connection he invites attention to the following recommendation of the Committee on Czechoslovak affairs:

“The railway which follows the valley of the Ipoly between Losoncz and Csata, as well as the junctions of this line with the lines situated to the north and south, shall be administered under the ultimate supervision of the Allied and Associated Governments in such a manner as to assure to the neighboring interested States the free use of these lines during the period required for the construction in Czechoslovak territory of the sections linking up a continuous line of railway on the right bank of the Ipoly.

The conditions of this supervision and the period during which the free use of the line shall be guaranteed equally to the nations interested shall be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments.”

He wishes to inquire whether that recommendation still holds good?

M Cambon replies that the stipulation in question will still remain.

(It is agreed that the boundaries of Czechoslovakia in the vicinity of the railway junction of Ipolysk should be so altered as to include the railway junction itself in Czechoslovak territory.

The Committee on Czechoslovak questions were asked to meet without delay and to submit definite proposals to this effect.)

(d) M Pichon says that the last of the four questions referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Supreme Council reads as follows:

“Finally, they would also like to receive the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the proposals of General Pellé. The Council of Foreign Ministers are, of course, at liberty to obtain any Military or other expert advice they desire.”

At the meeting held yesterday, the Council of Foreign Ministers had expressed the view that it would be undesirable from a political standpoint, to fix a military line of demarcation divergent from the frontier laid down by the Supreme Council, and accepted by the Czechoslovak Delegation. At the same time the Foreign Ministers had admitted that military reasons might exist which would necessitate the delimitation of a temporary line as suggested by General Pellé. He, personally, does not think that it will be necessary to take military advice, especially as the matter under reference appears to be extremely urgent. He thinks the Foreign Ministers could forthwith agree to the opinion expressed yesterday, namely, that the Hungarians should be asked to withdraw their troops forthwith to the permanent boundary line.

Mr Lansing inquired whether the Hungarians had crossed the permanent boundary line.

M Pichon replies that the Hungarian forces are now a long way, about 40 miles, north of the permanent boundary line, and their advance continues. He adds that General Pellé’s line will be situated further in Hungarian territory than the proposed permanent line.

M Tardieu adds that the line proposed by General Pellé possesses the further inconvenience that it coincides with the boundary originally claimed by the Czechoslovaks. He thinks that fact makes it imperative to avoid accepting General Pellé’s proposal.

Baron Sonnino agrees. He understands that the boundary to be laid down will apply to both parties concerned. That is to say, the Hungarian forces will be ordered to retire to the permanent boundary line, and the Czechoslovaks will be similarly prevented from crossing that line.

(It is agreed to recommend that the permanent boundaries of Hungary with Czechoslovakia, as approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Supreme Council, should forthwith be laid down, and that the Hungarian forces should be required forthwith to withdraw their troops within their own territory, as thus defined.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, June 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four, plus Japan


1. Instructions to the Drafting Committee concerning the Eastern Frontiers of Germany are approved and initialed by the four Heads of States.

It is also agreed that the plebiscite should be held under the auspices of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and not under the League of Nations.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify this decision to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.)


2. It is agreed to discuss the question of the Military Situation on Hungary in the afternoon, when a further report will be available from the Foreign Ministers.


3. The Council has before them a draft, prepared by Mr Philip Kerr and submitted by Mr Lloyd George, of a reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter covering the German counter proposals.

In the course of the discussion a number of alterations are made in the draft. The great majority of these are purely drafting and verbal alterations. The following alone raises questions of principle:

The Saar Valley:
M Clemenceau produced a fresh draft, as he wishes to avoid raising again the question of the boundaries of 1814. This has already been the cause of some agitation in France and he does not wish to include anything which will raise it again.

(M Clemenceau’s draft is accepted.)

Memel:
Mr Lloyd George points out that this paragraph had been left blank, because the point had not yet been decided and he had not been able to give Mr Kerr any instructions.

Baltic Provinces:
An addition proposed by Mr Kerr, calling attention to the high handed German action in the Baltic Provinces, is not accepted as it is not considered relevant.

Reparation:
Under this heading, it is pointed out that the draft as originally worded contains an admission that the Allied and Associated Powers were not claiming the utmost to which they were entitled.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau both think that this will raise political difficulties in their respective countries.

President Wilson points out, however, that the object of the letter was rather to show the Germans the intentions of the Allied and Associated Powers than for home consumption.

(It is agreed to substitute some such phrase as the following:

“They confined the payments payable by Germany to certain specific categories clearly justified by the terms of the Armistice.”)

Another sentence added under the heading, Reparation, was the following:

“and to make proposals thereafter within four months of the signing of the Treaty for a settlement of the claims under each of the categories.”

League of Nations:
(The following draft, based on a proposal made to Mr Lloyd George by Mr Bonar Law, was approved as an addition:

“The German revolution was postponed until the last moments of the war, and there is as yet no guarantee that it represents a permanent and fundamental change.”)

President Wilson only consents to the use of the word “fundamental” under pressure, as he considers that, strictly speaking, it does not convey what it was meant to say. He prefers some such term as “more than formal.” Under strong pressure from Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau, however, he gives his assent.

Last page of the Memorandum:
(It is agreed that the period allowed to the Germans within which to give their final answer should be five instead of seven days.

M Clemenceau explains that five days was all that the Germans desired.)


4. Baron Makino says he is willing to have the dispatch of the Allied and Associated Powers published, together with Admiral Kolchak’s reply. He suggests, however, that some indication should be given to the press that Admiral Kolchak’s reply is considered satisfactory.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that a reply in this sense should be sent to Admiral Kolchak, which could be published.

(Mr Philip Kerr is instructed to draft a reply, but no final decision is taken as to publication.)


5. There is a short discussion in regard to a second document, prepared by Mr Philip Kerr and presented by Mr Lloyd George, dealing with the Responsibility of Germany for the War and the Legal Basis of the Peace Negotiations. This document, like Mr Kerr’s previous document, had been circulated by Mr Lloyd George on the previous day.

M Clemenceau says he would like to reserve this paper for the present. The Germans had issued a White Book, in which they accused the French of having violated the frontier very many times. He thinks that this document should rebut the statements in the White Book. He likes the document well enough as a magazine article, but does not consider it so vigorous as the other. He thinks the tendency would be for it to weaken the first document.

President Wilson says that he is well satisfied with the document so far as it goes. He feels a little, however, that it might be unwise to go into the historical argument without making it more complete. The document had conveyed a slight feeling of inadequacy. It would not prove satisfactory to the future historian. If, however, it were only intended to reassure our own people that the Germans were not believed, this moderate statement is, perhaps, sufficient. He does not feel quite happy, however, about an argument that is incomplete.

M Clemenceau says it cannot be made complete unless it is expanded into a large volume. In France, at any rate, there is no necessity for such a document, as the facts are perfectly well understood.

Mr Lloyd George says that the same is true in Great Britain, but he does not like to leave the German note without some reply.

President Wilson suggests that, since all that is required is to let the Germans know that we deny their allegations, the document might be considered adequate. Moreover, perhaps something is to be said for it on the ground of its quietness. As a general traverse of the German argument, it is sufficient. He proposes that it should be accepted, subject to the possibility of change before being sent in.

Mr Lloyd George supports this view. If the Germans decline to sign and an advance by the Army was necessary, it might be necessary to stir up public opinion again to a certain extent.

M Clemenceau asks for it to be reserved for the present, while he obtains a translation of the German White Book. He asks Sir Maurice Hankey to put himself in communication with the Secretary-General on this matter.


6. The Council has before them the reply to the German proposals on the subject of the League of Nations proposed by Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, M Leon Bourgeois and their associates.

President Wilson reads this document.

(It is agreed to substitute for the first paragraph a fresh paragraph proposed by President Wilson, adding at the end the following sentence:

“Provided these necessary conditions are assured, they see no reason why Germany should not become a member of the League in the early future.”

The second and third paragraphs are approved without alteration.

The last paragraph is approved, except the last 5 lines, for which is substituted the following:

“It goes without saying that the realization of this program will depend in large part on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of its own engagements.”

(The Document as appended is approved.)


7. The Committee has before them the Report of the Commission on the Left Bank of the Rhine. As, however, the English copy of the Report did not reach Mr Lloyd George before the meeting, the Report is not discussed in detail.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to raise the whole question both as to the period of occupation and the numbers of troops. The question of the régime to be adopted would follow from this. If the occupation is for a prolonged period the conditions should be gentle. If for a short period, the conditions by Germany on France in 1871 would be very suitable. He would like to ask the Military Authorities the question as to whether they would prefer a short period with stringent conditions or a long period with weak conditions.

M Clemenceau is unwilling to consult the military. He hopes that his colleagues will not ask him to make any change in the existing agreement.

President Wilson asks if M Clemenceau would be willing to give an undertaking to reconsider the question within a short period.

M Clemenceau says that among the Allies he is willing to say that he would be prepared to reconsider it after the lapse of a certain time, provided the Germans gave satisfactory guarantees and assurances that they will carry out the Treaty. He is, however, not willing to say this to Germany.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to consider this proposal. His difficulty is to get the occupation clauses accepted by Parliament. They would say ”Why do you want both occupation and guarantee”. He is in a real difficulty here. To show how strong the feelings of his colleagues are he reads a memorandum by Mr Barnes on the subject which he subsequently hands to M Clemenceau. He instructs Sir Maurice Hankey to check the statement which Mr Barnes had attributed to Marshal Foch. He asks whether M Clemenceau would allow him to make a statement to Parliament about the understanding between the Allies. This, of course, would be after the signature of Peace but would indicate to the Germans the intention.

M Clemenceau, after leaving the room to consult M Loucheur, said that he and M Loucheur have come to the conclusion that it is a question of drafting. Both he and M Loucheur are of one mind that it would be impossible to concede to the Germans a reduction in the period of occupation. He is prepared, however, to do his best in the delicate matter of drafting a statement which could be used by Mr Lloyd George in Parliament.

Mr Lloyd George says that a prolonged occupation is not really necessary for the protection of France. It was insisted on mainly for political reasons. If the occupation is to be for a prolonged period it should be made as harmless as possible. He wishes to utter a warning (and he intends to make a formal protest on the subject) that a prolonged occupation would be a great peril to France and a prolonged peril to the Peace of Europe.

M Clemenceau says he cannot accept that point of view. It is necessary that the German people should see a Foreign Army on German soil as a guarantee for the payment of the indemnity. He himself can remember the German occupation in 1871 and what a relief it had been when the Germans left. They had not moved a man until the last penny was paid. An occupation is necessary as a reminder to the Germans that they owe money which they should pay.

In regard to the French army, he feels sure that it will obey all orders while in the occupied territories and the French Government does not mean to interfere in any way with the people. While he cannot accept and must altogether repudiate Mr Lloyd George’s point of view, he is prepared to agree on his conclusions. He will go so far as to say that if the proposals of the Commission are approved by his Colleagues, he will accept them, though he himself, however, thinks personally that a shorter formula might be devised. He is ready to examine the question with his Colleagues.

(The discussion on this subject is adjourned.)


8. President Wilson reads the draft reply to the German Note prepared by the appropriate Commission on the subject of the territory of the Saar Basin. The Note is approved, subject to the following alterations:

6th paragraph, 10th line: for “law” put “order”.

Delete the following words:

“By no means followed that it is an Arbitrary Government nor (as the German Note suggests) that it is the French Government which will be in power. The Commission …”

The sentence would then read as follows:

“It is true that the Governmental Commission to which belongs the Supreme Authority will not be directly responsible to a Parliamentary Assembly, but it will be responsible to the League of Nations and not to the French Government. The arrangement made will afford ample safeguards against any abuse of the Power entrusted to it; the Commission will besides etc.”

Add at the end of the Note, the following sentence:

“The German Note constantly overlooks the fact that the whole arrangement is temporary, and that at the end of 15 years the inhabitants will have a full and free right to choose the sovereignty under which they are to live.”

(The Note as amended is approved.)