100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

21st June 1919

Scuttling of the German fleet in Scapa Flow: Admiral Ludwig von Reuter scuttles the interned German fleet in Scapa Flow, Scotland. Nine German sailors are killed.

Ship Losses:

SMS B109 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands, United Kingdom. She was raised in March 1926 and scrapped.
SMS B110 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in December 1925 and scrapped.
SMS B111 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in March 1926 and scrapped.
SMS B112 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in February 1926 and scrapped.
SMS Baden (Imperial German Navy) The Bayern-class battleship was beached in Scapa Flow. She was refloated in July. Subsequently repaired and entered Royal Navy service.
SMS Bayern (Imperial German Navy) The Bayern-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1934 and scrapped.
SMS Bremse (Imperial German Navy) The Brummer-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 29 November 1930 and scrapped.
SMS Brummer (Imperial German Navy) The Brummer-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Cöln (Imperial German Navy) The Cöln-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Dresden (Imperial German Navy) The Cöln-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Derfflinger (Imperial German Navy) The Derfflinger-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1939 and anchored in a capsized state off Rysa Little until 1946, when she was scrapped.
SMS Emden (Imperial German Navy) The Königsberg-class cruiser was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy in 1920.
SMS Frankfurt (Imperial German Navy) The Wiesbaden-class cruiser was beached in Scapa Flow. She was refloated in July 1920 and subsequently passed to the United States Navy.
SMS Friedrich der Grosse (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1936 and scrapped.
SMS G38 (Imperial German Navy) The G37-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1936 and scrapped.
SMS G39 (Imperial German Navy) The G37-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 3 July 1925 and scrapped.
SMS G40 (Imperial German Navy) The G37-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1925 and scrapped.
SMS G86 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G89 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G91 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G92 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G101 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1926 and scrapped.
SMS G102 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the United States Navy.
SMS G103 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1925 and scrapped.
SMS G104 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1926 and scrapped.
SMS H145 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in March 1925 and scrapped.
SMS Hindenburg (Imperial German Navy) The Derfflinger-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 29 July 1930 and scrapped.
SMS Grosser Kurfürst (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 29 April 1938 and scrapped.
SMS Kaiser (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1929 and scrapped the next year.
SMS Kaiserin (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 14 May 1936 and scrapped.
SMS Karlsruhe (Imperial German Navy) The Königsberg-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS König (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS König Albert (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 31 July 1935 and scrapped.
SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Markgraf (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Moltke (Imperial German Navy) The Moltke-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1927 and scrapped two years later.
SMS Nürnberg (Imperial German Navy) The Königsberg-class cruiser was beached in Scapa Flow. She was refloated in July 1919 and subsequently sunk as a target in 1922.
SMS Prinzregent Luitpold (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 9 July 1931 and scrapped.
SMS S32 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in June 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S36 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S49 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in December 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S50 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in October 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S51 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS S52 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in October 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S53 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S54 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was partially salvaged.
SMS S55 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S56 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in June 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S60 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and transferred to the Imperial Japanese Navy as a war reparation, but scrapped in England in 1920.
SMS S65 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in May 1922 and scrapped.
SMS S131 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S132 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the United States Navy.
SMS S136 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S137 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS S138 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in May 1925 and scrapped.
SMS Seydlitz (Imperial German Navy) The Seydlitz-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 2 November 1928 and scrapped.
SMS V43 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the United States Navy.
SMS V44 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V45 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1924 and scrapped.
SMS V46 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy.
SMS V70 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1924 and scrapped.
SMS V73 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V78 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1925 and scrapped.
SMS V80 (Imperial German Navy) The V67-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and transferred to the Imperial Japanese Navy as a war reparation, but scrapped in England in 1920.
SMS V81 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated but sunk whilst under tow to be scrapped.
SMS V82 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V83 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1923 and scrapped.
SMS V86 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in July 1925 and scrapped.
SMS V89 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in December 1922 and scrapped.
SMS V91 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1924 and scrapped.
SMS V100 (Imperial German Navy) The V99-class destroyer was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy.
SMS V125 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V126 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy.
SMS V127 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Imperial Japanese Navy.
SMS V128 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V129 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1925 and scrapped.
SMS Von der Tann (Imperial German Navy) The battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 7 December 1930, scrapping started in 1931 and was completed in 1934.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five with a large number of experts


1. The Council has before them a Note from the German Delegation, dated June 20th, 1919.

On the previous day, M Clemenceau, with his colleagues’ approval, had instructed the various Commissions to prepare draft replies on the various points raised in the German Note.


2. M Klotz hands in a draft reply which has been approved by all the experts on the Reparations Commission.

This draft reply is read and approved, subject to some minor alterations.


3. M Klotz then hands in a draft reply in regard to Financial Matters.

This reply is read by the Interpreter in English and approved without alteration.


4. M Clementel hand in a draft reply which has been prepared by the Economic Commission.

A translation of this is read by the Interpreter.

In the course of the discussion on this letter, a point is raised in regard to the powers of the Council of the League of Nations as affecting the period of some of the provisions of the Treaty, namely, as to whether the operation of these parts of the Treaty would continue until put an end to by a decision of the Council of the League of Nations, or as to whether they would cease unless the Council of the League of Nations decided to terminate them. This point is referred back to the Economic Commission to redraft its letter.

(M Clementel and other Economic Experts then withdraw to redraft this passage in their letter.)


5. At this point, the question is first raised as to the general character of the reply to be given to the German note.

Mr Balfour points out that the Germans in their Character of letter make two complaints. The first was that there are two treaties, one which has been handed to them originally and a second one which accompanied the reply to the German counter-proposals, and which have been amended in manuscript by the Drafting Committee but also include certain alterations in the print. Their second point is as to whether M Clemenceau’s letter commenting on their counter-proposals is binding on the Allies. This appears to be a question of international law, which should be referred to the lawyers members of the Drafting Committee who were in the adjoining room. The question on which their opinion is required is as to whether this note had the same binding effect as a protocol attached to the Treaty.

(President Wilson then leaves the room to consult the Drafting Committee.)

President Wilson, on his return, says that the opinion of the Drafting Committee is that M Clemenceau’s letter as an interpretation of the Treaty is binding in the sense that it cannot be controverted in an arbitral court. In explaining how the Treaty is to be carried out, it expresses the limitation of the powers to be exercised and this constitutes an undertaking binding, as he understands it, in honor but not in law. Mr Hurst had suggested that it would be very easy to prepare a protocol to be attached to the Treaty, summarizing the points which should be binding in a legal sense.

M Clemenceau suggests that the text of the letter and memorandum in reply to the German counter-proposals should be added as a protocol to the Treaty.

President Wilson suggests that it would be a sufficient answer to the Germans to inform them that an answer would be given in the shape of a protocol attached to the Treaty.

Mr Balfour says that he was advised by Mr Hurst that it would be a bad precedent to put the whole of the letters and memoranda, prepared in reply to the German counter-proposals, in the Treaty of Peace. This would be very liable to raise all sorts of difficulties of interpretation, since the letters are not couched in legal language. It would be better to summarize the substantive results of the letters and memoranda in the form of a protocol.

(There is prolonged discussion on this question, which is reverted to and taken up again at frequent intervals. A considerable number of experts, including the Drafting Committee, are invited to express their views. Eventually, the Drafting Committee are instructed to prepare the following documents:

1) A reply to the German Note based on the material prepared by the various Commissions.

2) A protocol for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace containing assurances to the Germans on the various points raised in their letter; these assurances to be extracted as far as possible from the actual text of the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace.)


6. In the course of the discussion referred to above, a draft reply to the Germans on the subject of Heligoland is approved.


7. In the course of the discussion referred to above, a draft reply presented by Viscount Chinda on the subject of Shantung is approved.

(The meeting is adjourned to enable the Drafting Committee to prepare the documents.)


8. In the course of the discussion referred to above President Wilson reads the Memorandum from Mr Lansing, dated June 20th.

He draws attention to Mr Lansing’s comment that the list of individuals to be handed over to justice cannot be properly completed within the period of one month from the coming into force of the Treaty. He fears, however, that if a mistake has been made, it is too late to correct it.

(This view is generally accepted.)

(The Council then adjourns to President Wilson’s Library.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:30

Meeting of the Council of Five with members of the Committee on New States


1. The Council has before them a letter from M Berthelot, dated June 19th, addressed to Sir Maurice Hankey containing the remarks of the Commission on New States on Mr Paderewski’s letter of June 15th, 1919.2

(After President Wilson reads a summary of the letter, it is approved.

The Commission on New States is authorized, in consultation with the Drafting Committee, to embody the changes proposed in their letter in a final text of a Treaty with Poland. The Commission is also instructed to prepare for the consideration of the Council, the draft of a letter forwarding the text of the Treaty to the Polish Delegation.)

(At Mr Headlam-Morley’s request, the Commission is also authorized to consider the nature of alterations required in the draft Treaty with Poland in order to provide that in all except the primary schools Jewish children should be instructed in the Polish, and not in the Yiddish language, thereby avoiding the risk of encouraging the use of Yiddish as one of the national languages for a part of the population of Poland.)


2. The Council has before them a letter from M Berthelot, the Chairman of the Commission on New States, suggesting that the points referred to the Commission at the instance of Baron Sonnino on June 17th are outside the competence of the Commission, and should be referred to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs with their legal and technical experts, which have considered the political clauses relating to Italy in the Austrian Treaty.

(The proposal of the Commission on New States is agreed to and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to acquaint the Secretary-General.)


3. Sir Maurice Hankey draws attention to a letter from M Berthelot, dated June 16th. 1919, dealing with the following Tariffs for questions:

1) Clauses of a technical nature regarding the scale of tariffs for traffic towards the Adriatic intended for insertion Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

2) Suggestions from the Italian Delegation with regard to the restitution of works of art carried off during the war, and removed to territory belonging to the New States.

3) Concerning Financial Clauses relating to Poland proposed by the French Delegation.

(The Council postpones the discussion of this letter.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 15:45

Meeting of the Council of Five the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 18:00


Meeting of the Council of Five with the Drafting Committee

[Jimbuna]

22nd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Herr Bauer forms German Ministry.

Denikin's army 24 miles from Kharkov.

The Weimar Assembly bows to 237 votes to 138 and approves the Treaty of Versailles. It rejects however the articles on the responsibility and the criminals of war.

Canadian mounted police attack demonstrating strikers in Winnipeg, resulting in two deaths and injuring dozens.


An Italian sentinel on watch on the Rhine river.


Ship Losses:

Pericles (Russian Navy White Movement) The motor sailer was shelled and sunk at Henichesk by Soviet Armored Trains Nº. 4 and Nº. 85. Three crewmen and her commanding officer were killed.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, June 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 19:15

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. The Council has before it the following Notes from the German Delegation dated June 22nd: No. 68 and No. 70, which were brought to the Meeting by Colonel Henri direct from Versailles and which end with the following declaration:

“The Government of the German Republic accordingly gives the declaration of its consent as required by the Note of June 16th, 1919, in the following form:

‘The Government of the German Republic is ready to sign the Treaty of Peace without, however, recognizing thereby that the German people was the author of the war and without undertaking any responsibility for delivering persons in accordance with Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty of Peace’”.

After Colonel Henri and M Mantoux had read a rough translation of the last-named Note, Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson express the view that an immediate answer should be sent, refusing any alteration in the Treaty.

President Wilson then reads the following draft reply:

“The Allied and Associated Powers have considered the Note of the German Delegation of even date, and, in view of the shortness of the time remaining, feel it their duty to reply at once.

Of the time within which the German Government must make their final decision as to the signature of the Treaty, less than 24 hours remain.

The Allied and Associated Governments have given the fullest consideration to all of the representations hitherto made by the German Government with regard to the Treaty, have replied with complete frankness, and have made such concessions as they thought it just to make; and the present Note of the German Delegation presents no arguments or considerations not already examined.

The Allied and Associated Powers therefore feel constrained to say that the time for discussion has passed. They can accept or acknowledge no exception or reservation, and must require of the German representatives an unequivocal decision as to their purpose to sign and accept as a whole, or not to sign and accept, the Treaty as finally formulated.”

M Clemenceau suggests to add the following words:

“After the signature, the Allied and Associated Powers must hold Germany responsible for the execution of every stipulation of the Treaty.”

President Wilson says it has been suggested to him to substitute the word “qualification” for “exception” in his draft.

(This is agreed to.)

(It is agreed to summon a Meeting of the full Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at 21:00 and submit the draft reply as amended above, for its consideration.)


2. It is agreed that Mr. Balfour should be asked to draft a letter to the German Delegation, calling attention to the sinking of the German ships in the Orkneys, which, whether or not it was a technical breach of the Armistice, was unquestionably a breach of faith for which the German Government must be held responsible. Warning should be given that the Allied and Associated Powers are considering the matter, and reserve their right to take such action as they think necessary.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask Mr Balfour to take this matter up.)

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, June 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 21:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


Baron Sonnino accepts the draft reply.

Baron Makino, after reading both documents, accepts the draft reply, which is signed by M Clemenceau and transmitted.

(The letter is then signed by M Clemenceau, and dispatched by Colonel Henri to Versailles.)

(It is agreed to publish the letter and the reply in the morning newspapers of Monday, June 23rd.)


2. Mr Balfour says that he has prepared a draft letter to the Germans, but had sent it to Mr Hurst to check certain points of law and fact.

(It is agreed to postpone consideration of this matter until the following morning.)

[Jimbuna]

23rd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: Report of Coal Commission published.

Germany announces readiness to sign Peace Treaty.

Allied advance on N. Dvina River (Archangel front).

Chancellor of Germany Gustav Bauer agrees to accept the Versailles Treaty after receiving an ultimatum from the Allies that Germany must sign or else war will be resumed.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 09:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. The Council has before them Note No. 85 from the German Peace Delegation dated June 23rd, 1919, which has been distributed to the Heads of Government by the Secretary-General between 06:00 and 07:00 a.m.


[The President of the German Delegation (Von Haniel) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)

Translation From German]

"German Peace Delegation,
Versailles, June 23, 1919.
No. 85

Mr President: The Minister for Foreign Affairs instructs me to beg the Allied and Associated Governments to prolong for 48 hours the time limit for answering Your Excellency’s note communicated yesterday evening, and likewise the time limit for answering the note of June 16, 1919.

It was only on Saturday, after great difficulties, that a new Cabinet was formed which, unlike its predecessor, could come to an agreement to declare its willingness to sign the Treaty as regards nearly all its provisions. The National Assembly has expressed its confidence in this Cabinet by a large majority of votes. The answer only arrived here just before midnight, as the direct wire from Versailles to Weimar was out of order. The Government must come into contact anew with the National Assembly, in order to take the grievous decision which is still required of it in such a manner as it can only be taken in accordance with democratic principles and with the internal situation in Germany.

Accept [etc.]

Von Haniel"


Mr Lloyd George says that after carefully considering the matter he feels that the sinking of the German ships in the Orkneys weighed principally with him against granting the German request for an extension of the armistice for 48 hours. There is no doubt that the sinking of these ships was a breach of faith. If bridges were blown up, and loss of life caused, and military operations hampered by these or similar measures, the public would say that this was the reason for which time had been granted. Consequently, he was inclined to reply with a refusal, mentioning the sinking of the German ships.

President Wilson says that if he was assured that he was dealing with honorable men, or even with ordinary men, he would be willing to give not 48, but 24, hours. However, he shares Mr Lloyd George’s suspicions to the full, and does not trust the Germans. He would like to know, however, whether it is correct that the direct telephonic line between Versailles and the German Government was broken. If they could not communicate with their Government until the evening, it might make a difference.

M Clemenceau says they could obtain immediate communication by telephone.

President Wilson says that he has just been reading the German authorization given to Von Haniel. He observes that he was given full powers to hand over the reply of the Imperial Government to the Note of the President of the Peace Conference of the 16th inst. to afford explanations, to receive counter-explanations, and to conduct negotiations, but he had no powers to sign.

M Clemenceau says that so far as he is concerned, he is in favour of refusing the German request.

President Wilson says that in that case he will not say anything about the sinking of ships at the Orkneys. He would rather not mention a matter about which the full circumstances are not yet known.

Mr Lloyd George says there is no doubt about the sinking of the ships, and that they had been sunk by the Germans themselves. A possible excuse was that the German Government was so disorganized, that individuals were acting on their own initiative without higher authority. This, however, is a reason against granting an extension of time.

President Wilson says that the case for the bad faith of the Germans is so overwhelming that there was no necessity to cite specific instances. It is a fact, however, that the German Government had been formed to sign the Treaty.

Baron Makino points out that the National Assembly had passed a vote of confidence in the new Imperial Ministry by 236 votes to 89, with 68 abstentions, and had made no reserves.

Mr Lloyd George says he has just received Mr Balfour’s view, which is in favour of refusal. He takes the view that we can trust no German officer, and that in the case of the ships in the Orkneys, they had conspired together to break the armistice.

President Wilson points out that the German Admiral is reported to have said that he was ordered to sink the ships on the termination of the armistice.

Mr Lloyd George said that what influenced Mr Balfour was that the Germans cannot be trusted.

President Wilson says that nevertheless he thinks there is no need to make specific mention of the sinking of the ships.

Mr Lloyd George considers that it is only important from a political point of view.

Baron Makino says that the principal object was to get the Germans to sign. He suggests that possibly it might make it more difficult for the Germans to sign if we insisted on their giving their answer this very evening.

M Clemenceau says that the great object and the greatest difficulty was to make the Germans honor their signature.

Baron Sonnino suggests that the military authorities ought to be consulted.

Mr Lloyd George says he has already consulted the British Military Authorities, who had no doubt at all that it would be a great mistake to give any extension of time. He recalls what had been stated at the Conference of Generals on the previous Friday that the soldiers had already been sleeping in the open air for five nights, and were exposed to considerable hardships.

M Clemenceau thinks that there is no doubt about military opinion.

Mr Lloyd George urges the importance of politeness in the reply. He points out that history is apt to judge these matters by the actual terms of the letter. He recalls how Bismarck’s communications had been scrutinized from this point of view.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed to send the reply as below.)


Reply to German Note of June 23rd, 1919

(Approved by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on June 23rd, 1919)

"Monsieur le President: The Allied and Associated Governments beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of June 23. After full consideration of your request they regret that it is not possible to extend the time already granted to your Excellency to make known your decision relative to the signature of the Treaty without any reservation.

G. Clemenceau"

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. Mr Lloyd George says that he fully approves of Mr Balfour’s draft letter, subject to two slight alterations in the following sense:
1) To show that, when referring to Ottomans, the letter refers only to Ottoman Turks, and
2) To ensure that we were not committed in any way to removing the Turks from Constantinople. Mr Montagu had obtained the impression that the letter did commit us to this.

Mr Balfour says that the letter is only intended to give a hint of this possibility.

President Wilson agrees that such a hint might be useful.

(Mr Balfour is authorized to make the necessary modifications to meet Mr Lloyd George’s views, after which the letter will be communicated to M Clemenceau for dispatch.)


2. Mr Balfour says that on the previous evening he had been asked to draft for the consideration of the Council a letter to the German Delegation dealing with the question of the of the sinking of the German Ships. He had actually prepared a draft but had come to the conclusion, after examining the facts, that it was not worth considering at this point. He was advised that the sinking of the ships by the Germans was not in the narrow technical sense a breach of the letter of the Armistice. The breach was rather one against general military law than the Armistice. We now know that this action was a deliberate act of the German Admiral, who had been under the impression that the Armistice expired at noon on Saturday, and he thought, on the expiration of the Armistice, he had a right to commit an act of war.

(At this point Admiral Hope, Admiral Ronarc’h, Admiral Grassi, M Fromageot, M Weiss, Mr Hurst and M Loucheur are introduced.)

President Wilson asks Admiral Hope to describe exactly what had occurred, in order to establish the facts.

Admiral Hope states that at noon on Saturday the German ships had hoisted the German flag and the crews had commenced to abandon ship. They had not been permitted to have many boats and many of the crews consequently jumped overboard in lifebelts. British guard boats were at once ordered to the scene and directed the German boats to stop. Some of them had not done so and had been fired on. The German Admiral left his flagship in a trawler and reported that the sea-cocks had been opened. He also reported that he was under the impression that the Armistice had ended at noon and therefore he was not breaking its terms.

In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he says that it is not, he believes, correct that new crews had been substituted for the original crews. Some men had been sent back to Germany and the total numbers had been reduced, but, so far as he is aware, no new men had been brought in. Attempts had been made to tow the ships to the shore and three light cruisers and, he believed, eighteen destroyers had been beached. One battleship, the Baden, one of the latest German Dreadnoughts (the flagship), as well as four destroyers, still remain afloat. Some of the beached ships should be recoverable.

M Clemenceau suggested that, having heard the facts from Admiral Hope, the international lawyers should be heard next.

Mr Balfour says that there is apparently nothing specific in the Armistice against the sinking of these ships, but he understands it is in contradiction to the general principles governing armistices.

M Fromageot, asked for his opinion, reads the following extract from Article XXIII of the Terms of Armistice:

“Les navires de guerre de surface allemands que seront désignés par les Alliés et les Etats-Unis seront immédiatement désarmés puis internés dans des ports neutres, ou, à leur défaut, dans les ports alliés désignés par les Alliés et les Etats-Unis.

Ils y demeureront sous la surveillance des Alliés et des Etats-Unis—des détachements de gardes étant seuls laissés à bord.”

("The German warships of surface that will be indicated by the Allies and the United States will be immediately disarmed then committed in neutral harbors, or, in their defect, in the allied harbors indicated by the Allies and the United States.

They will reside under the supervision of the Allies and from Etats-Unis-des detachments of guards there alone left aboard.")

From the use of the word “demeureront”, he draws the meaning that nothing is to be changed. Consequently, the sinking of the ships implies an infraction of the Armistice. It was also states that only guard and maintenance parties are to be left on board. These parties are intended to maintain the ships and not to sink them.

Mr Hurst says that he has very little to add to what M Fromageot had stated. Two points, however, occur to him. In the official version of the Armistice, which he had in his hand, it was stated that the French text is the official one, the English and German texts being translations. On this point, the French text was much clearer. The fact that the German Admiral thought that he was entitled to sink the ships because the Armistice had expired had, in fact, no justification. The Armistice would not, in fact, terminate with the signature of the Peace nor before the ratification. Hence, his view was that there was no justification for the Admiral’s action.

M Clemenceau says that this is very important.

Baron Sonnino says that evidently the German Admiral’s opinion that he was entitled to do it because he thought the Armistice had expired favors our thesis that he was not entitled to do it during the Armistice.

Mr Balfour pointed out that the German Admiral may have thought that signature to the Armistice had been refused, in which case he would be correct in assuming that hostilities had recommenced.

M Clemenceau says that it is not an affair of ours what the Admiral had thought. We only have to consider the facts.

Mr Balfour says the next question is as to whether, apart from the damages we might demand from the German Government, the German Admiral could be tried, for example, by court-martial.

M Clemenceau asks under whose orders the German Admiral had been. Was he under the British Admiralty.

Mr Lloyd George replies that he was not; he was merely under the surveillance of the British Admiral.

Mr Hurst says that there are principles laid down in the Regulations under the Laws and Customs of War on Land which are equally applicable to naval war, from which he quotes the following:

“Article 40. Any serious violation of the Armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right to denounce it, and even, in case of urgency, to re-commence hostilities at once.

“Article 41. A violation of the Armistice by individuals acting on their own initiative only confers the right of demanding the punishment of the offenders and, if necessary, indemnity for the losses sustained.”

M Weiss says that Article 3 of the Laws and Customs of War on Land would apply to this case, namely:

“A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to make compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”

There is no doubt that, under this provision, a Government is responsible for the actions of its agents and officers. The responsibility of the German Government, therefore, cannot be doubted. In reply to the question as to the Court under which the German Admiral should be tried, he says it is a subject for negotiation.

Mr Balfour suggests that the Articles quoted are not quite consistent. Article 41 of the Regulations suggests that the individual is responsible, whereas Article 3 said that the Government is responsible. M Weiss uses the argument that because the German Admiral had committed this act, the German Government are responsible.

M Clemenceau says that there appears to him to be no contradiction between the two texts. The Admiral might be personally responsible, but the damages for which reparation or indemnity might be claimed will not be levied on his private property but on the German Government. Therefore, each of the articles has its own effect. If the personal responsibility is the greater, Article 41 would apply. If compensation were the more important, Article 3 would apply. What he proposes is that the international lawyers should be asked to present a text, establishing the theory of jurisprudence on which action was to be taken, but the political decision as to the punishment of the Admiral or reparation from the German Government would rest with the Heads of Governments.

Mr Balfour suggests, since it is no use asking for reparation from the Germans in the form of money, as we have already demanded in the Treaty all the money that they could furnish, the Admirals should consider whether reparation should be demanded in the way of ships.

Admiral Hope says that the Germans have only been left a few old battleships and light cruisers.

(It is agreed that, before the 16:00 meeting, the following reports should be furnished:

1) By the International Lawyers, who should prepare a text stating the theory of jurisprudence on which action could be taken.

2) By the Admirals stating whether reparation can be furnished by the surrender of German ships.)


3. Mr Balfour says that he has also been asked to prepare a draft letter to the German Delegation on the subject of their contravention of the Terms of Armistice in the Baltic Provinces. He understands, however, that the demand to the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces had been made so recently that the Allies had not yet a case against the Germans.

Mr Hurst then reads a summary of the demands made to the Germans. On June 10th, General Gough had given orders to General von der Goltz for certain withdrawals. On June 14th Helsingfors intercepted the following message:

“General von der Goltz takes orders only from his German superiors and rejects General Gough’s orders to local forces.”

Meanwhile, on June 13th, the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had decided that Marshal Foch should order the Germans:

a) To stop all future advance Northwards towards Estonia;

b) To evacuate Libau and Windau at once and to complete the evacuation of all territory which before the war formed part of Russia, with the least possible delay, in accordance with Article 12 of the Armistice Terms.
This decision was not communicated to General Nudant at Spa until June 18th. Consequently, the action was only four days old and the Germans could not yet be accused of a breach of the Armistice.

President Wilson says that it ought to be borne in mind that the Germans had altered the gauge of the railways in the Baltic Provinces from the Russian to the German gauge and had put in their rolling stock. One consequence of the evacuation of the German Army will be the withdrawal of this rolling stock, which will affect the food distribution and inflict great privations on the civil population. Mr Hoover, who informed him of this, added that the Germans claimed this rolling stock as their own.

Mr Balfour suggests that part of the rolling stock might be taken as compensation for the ships.

M Clemenceau suggests that the Baltic Provinces, who would benefit, ought to pay for the rolling stock.

President Wilson says that the Allies have no means of compelling the Germans to leave the rolling stock. Consequently, it must be remembered that entire withdrawal means the starvation of the people in the Baltic Provinces.

(Mr Hudson enters at this point.)

Mr Balfour says he will ask General Gough and such other sources of information that are open to him for information on this point.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to ascertain the views of the Letts and Lithuanians. It is possible that they would prefer to risk the privations rather than not get rid of the Germans. He understands that their representatives were in Paris.

President Wilson says he was informed by Mr Hudson that a provision in the Treaty of Peace compels the Germans to leave half the rolling stock in the Baltic Provinces. He suggested that the question should be referred to the Baltic Commission in Paris.

(This is accepted. It is agreed to invite the Baltic Commission to report to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the effect which the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany will have on the food supplies of these regions, taking into consideration the fact that the Germans have altered the gauge of the railways from the Russian to the German gauge and would withdraw a part of their rolling stock. The Commission should be authorized to consult the representatives of the Baltic Provinces in Paris.

Mr Hudson undertakes to communicate this decision at once to the Baltic Commission.)

(The Allied Admirals and the International Lawyers withdraw at this point.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. Mr Lloyd George says that the British Government are of opinion that the question of surveillance requires looking into. He does not condemn those who had been responsible, but he feels that the whole matter required investigation.

He would be glad if the Allied Admiralties would express their view as to the interpretation to be put on the term “surveillance” in Article 23 of the Armistice Convention of November 11th, 1918. Supposing, for example, the German surface ships had been interned in French or American Ports, instead of in British ports, he would like to know what precautions the French or American Naval Authorities would have considered themselves at liberty to take in order to carry out as effectively as they were entitled under the terms of the Armistice the surveillance of the German ships.

President Wilson says that in the case of merchant ships, the United States Government had put guards on board.

(Mr Lloyd George is asked to formulate his proposal in the shape of a letter.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:10

Meeting of the Council of Five

(Mr Headlam-Morley and Mr Hudson are present during this discussion)


1. The Council has before them the draft, prepared by the Committee on New States, of the Covering Letter to be addressed to Mr Paderewski in transmitting to him the Treaty to be signed by Poland.

Mr Lloyd George raises the question of the language to be employed in the Jewish schools in Poland. He thinks that Mr Paderewski’s criticisms in this respect have force. In the United States of America or in Great Britain, for example, the religious idiosyncrasies of particular sects are given some latitude, but are fitted into the educational system of the country. It is a question, however, whether the Jews ought to be allowed separate schools in Poland.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that under the stipulations of the Treaty, the schools for Jews in the Polish State are to be administered by Committees of Jews.

Mr Lloyd George asks if that gives them more power than under the system in force in the United Kingdom, where Roman Catholics and Jews supervise their schools, but the general system and curriculum are a part of the education of the country and under the State.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the system in the Treaty had been deliberately arranged so that the education should remain under the Polish State, though the management of the schools would be under persons of the Jewish faith. This point was explained in the covering letter.

Mr Hudson says that the principles adopted in the Treaty are very elastic so as to leave the schools under the general control of the State.

Mr Lloyd George asks who would arrange the curriculum.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the State would be in a position to lay it down.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not Mr Paderewski’s reading of the Treaty.

Mr Hudson suggests that the draft letter might be amplified to make it quite clear to Mr Paderewski.

Mr Headlam-Morley says he had suggested that the word “persons” should be substituted for “Committees” in regard to the schools, the object being that people are apt to be frightened by the use of the word “Committee”. His colleagues, however, had not agreed in this. In their latest draft, the Commission had cut out all reference to a Central Polish Committee, and had substituted the word “Committees”.

Mr Balfour points out that in the United Kingdom a Roman Catholic school was a local Roman Catholic school. No such provision was made here. Under this Treaty there might be a great Central Jewish Committee in Warsaw.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that alterations had been inserted to meet this.

Mr Balfour suggests that in Article 10 the word “local” should be added before “Committee”.

(This is agreed to.)

Mr Lloyd George asks if it should not be made clear that Yiddish should not be taught. There was no objection to Hebrew, which is a recognised language, but he does not think that Yiddish ought to be taught.

President Wilson points out that Yiddish is a spoken language in many parts of the world, including the United States. The Polish Government ought not to be in a different position towards it from other countries.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Commission was informed that in the case of very small children, no other language but Yiddish could be used. They spoke Yiddish in their homes, and, when they first came to the school, they knew no other language. It ought not to be used, however, when the children were older.

Mr Lloyd George asks what is done in New York? President Wilson says that teachers are appointed, who understand Yiddish, and they give their instruction in Yiddish.

Mr Lloyd George says that there is all the difference between giving instruction in Yiddish and teaching the Yiddish language. Every effort ought to be made to merge the Jews of Poland in Polish nationality, just as the Jews in Great Britain or France become merged in British or French nationality. He is told there is an active movement to keep the Jews not merely as a separate religion, but as a separate race.

President Wilson points out that in this case we were not dealing with Great Britain or France or the United States, where the Jewish population know that they are governed on the same principles as the other subjects of the State. If the Polish State would adopt the same principles, it would help matters.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that in Poland there is an extremely aggressive Jewish national movement.

Mr Lloyd George reads the following resolution, which had been adopted on Saturday:

“The Commission was also authorized to consider the nature of alterations required in the draft Treaty with Poland, in order to provide that in all except the primary schools, Jewish children should be instructed in the Polish and not in the Yiddish language, thereby avoiding the risk of encouraging the use of Yiddish as one of the national languages for a part of the population of Poland.”

He thinks that this goes rather too far, as it suggests that the children will be taught Yiddish in the primary schools.

President Wilson reads the following extract from Article 9 of the draft Polish Treaty:

“Poland will provide in the public educational establishments in towns and districts, in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents, reasonable facilities for ensuring that instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals in their own language.”

He proposes to add after the word “public” the word “primary”.

Mr Headlam-Morley points out that this will enable the Germans to be instructed in the German language. The majority of the Committee, he said, thought that the decision on Saturday applied only to Yiddish children. Germans in the transferred districts could be taught in the German language, but they will have no Committee as the Jews would have. In the case of the Jews, Yiddish might be used in the primary schools as a medium of instruction, but not in secondary schools. The majority of the Committee thinks that it is not fair to ask the Polish Government to devote funds for secondary instruction in the Yiddish language. The American Delegation, however, had dissents from this view.

President Wilson reads the following extract from a memorandum giving the view of the American Delegation:

“2. In pursuance of his suggestion to the Supreme Council on Saturday, Mr. Headlam-Morley wants to add to Article 10, concerning the Jews’ control of their own schools, a statement that

‘Nothing in this article shall prevent the Polish Government from making obligatory the use of Polish as the ordinary medium of instruction in the higher schools.’

This addition goes beyond my understanding of his suggestion on Saturday. It is strongly opposed by the American Jews here. I have opposed it for the following reasons:

(a) It would encourage the Poles to forbid Yiddish instruction in Jewish superior schools, thereby greatly diminishing the value of Article 10.

(b) Since the Jewish schools are to be “subject to the general control of the State”, the Polish Government is not forbidden by the articles as they stand to regulate the languages to be used in them.

(c) The articles as they stand leave the Polish Government free to require that all college and university instruction should be in Polish.

(d) The unity of the Polish State, so far as languages in schools are concerned, is already sufficiently protected by the provision that the teaching of Polish may be made obligatory.”

It is not a question, he says, of whether children should be taught Polish, but whether it should be used as the sole medium of instruction in all the primary schools.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the view of the majority of the Commission is that as the children came from homes where Yiddish only was spoken, it must be the medium of instruction in the first instance.

Baron Sonnino asks why the teaching of Yiddish should be prohibited.

Mr Headlam-Morley said it is not prohibited. The only question is how much the Polish Government is to be forced to do in the way of providing facilities for the use of Yiddish in the schools.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is not in favour of imposing as an international obligation on the Polish Government the teaching of Yiddish. He will only assent to its use as a medium of instruction in primary schools.

Baron Sonnino asks whether, supposing Poland prohibits the teaching of Yiddish, would not this be inflicting the hardship which it was desired to avoid? The Jews would then either have to teach Yiddish at home, or maintain special schools for it.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Jewish movement in Poland is not with the object of promoting a religious movement, but a separate Jewish nationalism. A Jewish friend of his, who has just returned from Poland, told him that there is an increasing use of Yiddish in the streets.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed:

1) With regard to the use of languages other than Polish, the Polish Government should be given a free hand in all schools except primary schools. But, in those cases where there is a considerable minority, as provided in Article 9 and 10 of the draft Treaty with Poland, of children of Polish citizens speaking a language other than Polish, facilities should be given for them to receive instruction in the primary schools through the medium of their own language. The Commission on New States is authorized, in conjunction with the Drafting Committee, to make the necessary modifications in the draft Treaty with Poland.

2) The draft letter to the Polish Delegation submitted by the Committee is approved, subject to a re-drafting of the passage dealing with schools, in accordance with the above decision.)


2. Mr Balfour urges that the term “persons of Jewish faith” should be used instead of Jews in the Treaty with Poland. He is strongly in favor of only giving privileges to Jews on the ground that they are of Jewish Faith and not because they were of Jewish Nationality.

Baron Sonnino points out that if a Jew becomes a Christian, he would then not receive the protection.

(Mr Headlam-Morley and Mr Hudson withdraw.)

(M Tardieu, Captain Johnson, Mr. Leeper, Colonel Pariani and Captain de St. Quentin were introduced.)


3. M Tardieu explains a difficulty that has arisen in the Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs in regard to the reference that had been given to it on June 21st. In the Treaty with Austria, certain frontiers had been drawn subject to a reservation that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to define the plebiscite area in the Klagenfurt district. The frontiers given to Austria in the Treaty included a small section of the district now proposed for the Klagenfurt plebiscite. The Italian Delegation urged that the frontiers granted to Austria should be maintained, and that the portion affected should be excluded from the plebiscite district. The majority of the Commission, however, maintained that the right to draw the plebiscite area justified the Allied and Associated Powers in including the whole area as now proposed.

Baron Sonnino urges that Austria has provisionally been given a certain line, with a possible expectation of obtaining something more. It is not fair to Austria to alter this line. The implication to the Austrians is that for the moment they must content themselves with that line with a possibility of getting something more.

M Tardieu points out that the ultimate result might be a considerable improvement in the situation from Austria’s point of view.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that no change should be made in the plebiscite area as already drawn.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. Mr Lloyd George says that Dr Benes wishes to bring the Czechoslovaks home to Czechoslovakia through Archangel. Mr Churchill had spoken to him on the subject. The suggestion is that the Czechoslovaks might be used to open the communications between Kolchak and Archangel, with a view to their withdrawal. At present, they are used to guard a portion of the Siberian railway, so that the result would be that the United States and Japanese troops would have to take over a part of the communications now held by the Czechoslovaks. He does not ask for an immediate decision, but requests President Wilson and Baron Makino to examine the question. Mr Churchill is ready to discuss the question with them at any time.


2. Mr Lloyd George raises for consideration the following proposals made by Sir George Riddell in connection with the ceremony of signing the Treaty of Peace at Versailles:

1) In the Hall there are to be two groups of seats for (a) the Press, and (b) the visitors respectively. Sir George Riddell asks that the front row of such group (both Press and Visitors) might be reserved for the Press.

2) He asks that the ceremony might take place at 11:00, in order to give time for the transmission of full reports for publication in the newspapers of the following morning.

3) He asks that the various sections allotted to the Press might be kept separate according to nationality. Otherwise, he apprehends a scrambling for seats.

(It is agreed that the Council should meet the principal Press Representative in Paris of each of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on Tuesday, June 24th, at 14:30 in the Hall at Versailles, where the Treaty of Peace is to be signed.)