Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[Dargo]

Russia’s new offensive will test the morale of Putin’s mobilized masses
As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, speculation is mounting that Moscow will soon launch a major new offensive. Indeed, some commentators believe this offensive may already have begun, with reports emerging in recent days of Russian troops attempting to advance at numerous points along a frontline stretching hundreds of kilometers across southern and eastern Ukraine.

This widely anticipated offensive is an attempt by Moscow to regain the initiative following months of battlefield defeats and humiliating retreats in Ukraine that have undermined Russia’s reputation as a military superpower. Vladimir Putin is now desperate to demonstrate that his invasion is back on track and has reportedly massed huge reserves for a new push to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses. However, after a year of catastrophic losses that has left many of Russia’s most prestigious military units seriously depleted, doubts remain over the ability of untested replacement troops to carry out large-scale offensive operations.

Initial indications are not encouraging for the Kremlin, to say the least. Thousands of Russian soldiers including elite marines and special forces troops are believed to have been killed in late January and early February during a badly bungled attempt to storm the town of Vuhledar in eastern Ukraine. The failed attack sparked widespread dismay and anger among pro-Kremlin military bloggers, with many accusing Russian army chiefs of incompetence. The disaster contributed to what British military intelligence said was likely to be “the highest rate of Russian casualties since the first week of the invasion.” One of the key reasons behind the sharp recent rise in casualties is Russia’s growing reliance on mobilized personnel with limited military training. In September 2022, Vladimir Putin responded to escalating losses in Ukraine by launching Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Most of the approximately 300,000 men who were mobilized last year have now been deployed to Ukraine. The arrival of these additional numbers helped Russia to blunt Ukraine’s advances during the winter months, but it is unclear whether mobilized troops will prove as effective in an offensive capacity.

Many mobilized Russians appear to be less than enthusiastic about their new role as the shock troops of Putin’s faltering invasion. Since the first week of February, a growing number of video appeals have been published on social media featuring groups of mobilized soldiers complaining about everything from a lack of basic military equipment to the suicidal orders of their superiors. In one fairly typical video, the wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers from Tatarstan claim their men are being used as “cannon fodder” in Ukraine.

With hundreds of thousands of mobilized Russians expected to take part in Putin’s big offensive, this emerging trend could pose a significant threat to the Kremlin. If current casualty rates are any indication, the coming attack could result in unprecedented loss of life and spark a complete collapse in morale among already demoralized mobilized troops. This would make life very difficult for the Russian army in Ukraine, which would likely find itself confronted by a breakdown in discipline that would severely limit its ability to stage offensive operations. Nor is there any guarantee that the problems would stop there. Russia’s own experience in 1917 is a reminder of the unpredictable consequences that can follow when an army in wartime stops taking orders. It is still premature to speak of mutinous mobilized soldiers, of course. Nevertheless, maintaining military discipline may be the biggest single challenge currently facing the Putin regime. At present, the Russian dictator appears in little danger domestically, with independent polling by the Levada Center continuing to identify strong Russian public support for the war in Ukraine. While some question the validity of this data, there is no escaping the near complete absence of any genuine anti-war activity in today’s Russia. One year since the invasion began, most opponents have chosen to remain silent or have left Russia altogether.

Likewise, Putin also seems to have weathered the economic storm brought on by Western sanctions. The Russian economy has been hard-hit by measures imposed over the past year, but the damage has been significantly less than anticipated and is certainly far from fatal. This may change if the country’s economic outlook continues to worsen, but at this stage there is no indication that shrinking incomes or the departure of Western brands from Russian stores will fuel protests anytime soon.

The relative stability on Putin’s home front contrasts sharply with the precarious position of his army in Ukraine. Putin had initially anticipated a quick and triumphant campaign that would confirm Russia’s Great Power status and extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Instead, he finds himself embroiled in the biggest European conflict since World War II with his battered army in increasing disarray and his hopes of military success dwindling.

In order to rescue victory from the jaws of defeat, Putin must now rely on the overwhelming numbers provided by mass mobilization. This is a tried and tested Russian tactic, but it also carries considerable risks. Sending thousands of untrained men to fight against battle-hardened and highly motivated Ukrainian troops could result in the kind of carnage that breaks armies. If that happens, Putin may find that saving his invasion is the least of his worries.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blog...ilized-masses/

[mapuc]

Hmm I believe Him Mr Denys Davydov, a lot more than I believe what the other side comes with.



Markus

[tonschk]

West Will Kneel...': Chechen Warlord and Putin Ally Ramzan Kadyrov predicts end of War

[ET2SN]

Believe it or not, every day the Russian military stays in Ukraine makes them weaker.

I'm sure you considered this but its how NATO wins the next war without having to fire a shot.

The West doesn't like wars, its bad for business.

[Skybird]

The U.S. government has awarded a $522 million (486 million euro) defense contract to two corporations that will use the money to produce artillery ammunition for the Ukrainian army. The first munitions from this contract are to be delivered as early as next month, the U.S. Army said. The contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman Systems and Global Military Products. (Die Welt)

-------------------------


And the Germans? Defense Minister Pistorius called on industry not to wait for orders, but to start producing immediately. All risks should be borne by the producers, he said. But the producers have already made many millions in various advance payments in the past year (in part, one hears, ignoring valid legal bases that actually forbid them to do exactly that) - and are still waiting for them to be called off. Political Berlin, however, stubbornly and unmovingly refuses to conclude binding orders and contracts.



What is this crap?


Two days ago I linked to an article that says that its sources in Brussels insisted on that so far almost no orders are being placed by NATO states in general - rejecting official statements by nations and NATO that a wide variety of orders had been placed. Internal insiders at NATO HQ say: no, this has not yet happened. What do you want to believe now? Or is this a problem of the left hand not knowing what the right is doing?

[Skybird]

I hope the link works...?!


https://www.nzz.ch/international/die...&_x_tr_sl=auto


Interactive presentation, thats why I try with the link, and do not post the translated text.

[Skybird]

Frankfurter Allgemeine:
-----------------------------
Following consultations with NATO partners, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius was unable to secure enough Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks for Ukraine to equip a battalion with. In addition to the 14 tanks promised by the Bundeswehr, only Portugal was willing to provide three tanks. A Ukrainian battalion includes 31 tanks. "We won't reach battalion strength there," the SPD politician admitted after a lunch in Brussels with the ministers of states that had shown interest in participating. That's also because there aren't as many newer A6 models as older A4s, he said.

Poland, on the other hand, which had taken the lead for an A4 battalion and also wants to provide 14 tanks itself, managed to organize the necessary number of units. Ukrainian Defense Minister Olexiy Resnikov was satisfied "because we all assume that the development will continue," Pistorius said. Not all of the promised tanks could be transported immediately, he said. "But a large part will be able to be in Ukraine by the end of March to the end of April." Asked how the country should deploy half a battalion, Pistorius replied, "You'll have to ask the Ukrainians."
--------------------

So my info status two days ago that the Poles have withdrawn from their committment for Leopard 2A4s and that they only want to deliver updated T-72s, was wrong.

However, these numbers are not such that they make decisive differences. The Ukraine needed 300, hoped for 150, realistically expected were 100, and now not even these will be met - the US Abrams in 10-14 months already counted.

At least the windblowers have been sorted out.


Now standing almost alone in the open plain, Germany will not easily get pressed again into deliverign somethign it does not want to deliver: that lesson has been learned.

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by Skybird

The U.S. government has awarded a $522 million (486 million euro) defense contract to two corporations that will use the money to produce artillery ammunition for the Ukrainian army. The first munitions from this contract are to be delivered as early as next month, the U.S. Army said. The contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman Systems and Global Military Products. (Die Welt)

-------------------------


And the Germans? Defense Minister Pistorius called on industry not to wait for orders, but to start producing immediately. All risks should be borne by the producers, he said. But the producers have already made many millions in various advance payments in the past year (in part, one hears, ignoring valid legal bases that actually forbid them to do exactly that) - and are still waiting for them to be called off. Political Berlin, however, stubbornly and unmovingly refuses to conclude binding orders and contracts.



What is this crap?


Two days ago I linked to an article that says that its sources in Brussels insisted on that so far almost no orders are being placed by NATO states in general - rejecting official statements by nations and NATO that a wide variety of orders had been placed. Internal insiders at NATO HQ say: no, this has not yet happened. What do you want to believe now? Or is this a problem of the left hand not knowing what the right is doing?

The delivery time of heavier munitions has increased from 12 to 28 months, NATO allies' reserves are gradually running out. At the front, this heavier ammunition, such as 155 mm shells, is being rushed through. At its peak in July, Russia reportedly fired some 40,000 to 50,000 artillery pieces a day, compared to 5,000 to 6,000 by the Ukrainian army. The Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank, calculated that Russia would then have hit through the entire reserve of the British army in two days.

Slightly more balanced, the Russian army would currently fire 'only' four times more than the Ukrainian army. However, according to The Financial Times, the ammunition shortage among Zelensky's troops is becoming "acute", which could give the Russian offensive significant momentum. Defense manufacturers have already been asked to shift up a gear; French company Nexter Systems, which anticipates significant production of 155 mm grenades, is said to be "already almost at the limit" in terms of production, according to a senior military official. Michal Strnad, owner of Czech Group AS, also argues that European capacity is "grossly inadequate". Scaling up that production, according to many military experts, is the best way to support Ukraine. "That means additional production lines. Not something you realize overnight, because it doesn't just mean extra machinery, raw materials and skilled workers. "Those producers also want guarantees that orders won't dry up again after a year or two."

The US industry has already worked out concrete plans to scale up: currently the industry produces some 15,000 155 mm shells a month, by spring it should be 20,000 and as many as 40,000 by 2025. European companies are also anticipating increasing demand for artillery pieces. The Norwegian conglomerate Nammo, for instance, wants to increase its production tenfold in the long run Dallying could tip the balance towards Russia, according to several international experts. "In a war, of course, not only firepower is what counts". "But ammunition is crucial if you want to go on the offensive." So much more than holding out is out of the question for the next six months. Because the Russians did get the industrial war machine up and running. "In September, Putin fully initiated the shift to a war economy. For months everything has been subordinated to supporting the war effort, by prioritizing the use of raw materials or labor, for example." Meanwhile, Ukraine is rowing with the oars it has. In the autumn, state-owned Ukroboronprom launched production of 152 mm shells, fired by Soviet-era guns. Admittedly, at several smaller sites at home and abroad, so as not to be too easy a target for Russian missiles. Production is corresponding: 1,000 to 2,000 shells a month. Less than half of what the army consumes on a daily basis.

[Rockstar]

Prigozhyn declares Russians shouldn't downplay the enemy by saying Bakhmut is "surrounded", his best guess is encircelemnt will happen in March-April now, although new weapon deliveries will have a significant impact in this estimation.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/st...Ti6fdY2wIvV-JQ


I bet ya those 400 combat vehicles from Chucktown, S.C. delivered to the Port Bremerhaven on their way to Ukraine will have an a significant impact on that timeline.






Igor Girkin on the potential of a large-scale Russian offensive
Posted on 15 February 2023
|
in Russian Accounts
|
by WarTranslated

https://wartranslated.com/igor-girki...ian-offensive/

Below is a full translation of the internationally recognised terrorist I. Girkin’s post on the potential of a large-scale offensive by Russian Armed Forces, discussing three main directions: Belarus, the Russian border in Belgorod/Kursk, and Zaporizhzhia. Girkin predicts zero chances of the defeat of Ukraine even if the offensives are successful anywhere.
The original of the telegram post can be found here.
On the recommendation of Pavel Gubarev (who came to visit for a couple of days “to chat in the kitchen”), I give a short prediction for the development of the operational and strategic situation at the front in the event of an “RF Armed Forces winter campaign general offensive”, which may (or not) start in the coming 2 weeks (it makes no sense to start the offensive later due to emergence of the thaw).

Part 1.

So, the prospects for an offensive on the “Belarusian Front” are assessed as unlikely from the point of view of common sense, but possible precisely because (as the practice has shown) “there are no idiotic decisions that our General Staff could not make.”
From the point of view of common sense, to re-advance on the Kyiv, Chernihiv and (possibly) Volyn regions means extending the front by another thousand kilometers without hope of decisive success.
Firstly, it will not be possible to take the enemy by surprise. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have military units and formations prepared for combat in all the indicated directions. And since they intend to fight “from defense”, they require much less manpower than the RF Armed Forces require for a successful offensive in a heavily rugged wooded and swampy area, where all bridges on numerous rivers and rivers have either been blown up or mined, and directions suitable for tanks have been blocked by mines or other barriers.
Secondly, even if the RF Armed Forces (in any scenario, the small Belarusian army will be entrusted only with covering the borders with Poland and, at most, support of rears within its borders, and protecting these borders in “calm” areas) will be able to carry out deep breakthroughs, in order to protect the communications of the advancing groups (which will have to operate in territories with a hostile population), a lot of troops will be required. And when the front stops, a lot of troops will be required for its continuous cover, at least in the main directions.
Thirdly, according to the most modest calculations, just to create a continuous front (taking the terrain into account) it will take at least 150-200 thousand soldiers and officers, if we start from the border with Poland to the junction of the border with the Russian Federation. To create such a grouping without additional mobilisation (and training/combat coordination of new units and formations after it for at least 3 months), the RF Armed Forces will not be able to do so currently, since the main forces are already constrained by hostilities at the front from the Kinburn Spit to Belgorod region and by covering the border of the Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk regions.
And it will be impossible not to create a continuous front on the borders of the Republic of Belarus: “no one will forgive Minsk the second time”. The new offensive will mean drawing the Republic of Belarus into a full-fledged war with the corresponding actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military structures of Ukraine against objects on its territory.
It must be understood, however, that the creation of the “Belarusian Front” (as well as the intensification of hostilities at the front along the borders of the Russian Federation in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions) will significantly weaken (if not diminish completely) the possibilities for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to carry out offensives on any sector of the front, since this “will eat up all the reserves” and will require huge efforts to create, supply and provide equipment/ammunition for a huge new front. But this process will be mutual and without new mobilisation waves of the Russian Federation, the latter will be able to pull it off to an even lesser extent than the defending “Ukraine”. And “dear Western partners”, for their part, will take measures to prevent respected Kyiv partners from “dying from overexertion.”
Even if you simply do not organise a full-fledged offensive, but do “distracting strikes” (“debout”, in pre-revolutionary military terminology), all the same, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus will then have to inevitably create a continuous front. And it will “eat resources” in accordance with its enormous length. On both sides, of course … And it only makes sense when counting on “exhausting the enemy”.
If the strikes are delivered “seriously”, with strategic goals, then I cautiously predict heavy losses of the RF Armed Forces without strategic results and any deep advance, and the RF Armed Forces in Belarus will not have enough available forces for that. And the losses will again raise the question of the need for further mobilisation measures in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus (and in Ukraine, too).
An additional argument indirectly indicating that the aforementioned “idiotic decision” of the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation is still possible is the activity of Medvedchuk in Belarus with his speeches “reviving” stillborn ideas about an “alternative good-neighborly Ukraine”, which, allegedly, can be created. The presence of Medvedchuk in the convoy of advancing troops with the aim of “leading” something there on the “liberated territory” is quite logical in the framework of the complete copying of failed attempts of this kind outlined a year ago.

Strategic Perspectives, Part 2.

Much more probable and much more meaningful than the creation of an active “Belarusian Front” are the broad offensive operations of the RF Armed Forces from the territory of the border regions of the Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions.
Firstly, such an offensive in any case can make it possible to re-create a “foreground” on the territory of the enemy, which makes it difficult to strike at Russian own territory. Secondly, the troops are anyway concentrated there to protect the territory of the Russian Federation and there is not much difference whether they are actively fighting or not. Thirdly, despite the negative impact of lengthening the front line, strategic successes are theoretically possible in the most “painful” region for Kyiv – Kharkiv. Kharkiv is the second most important city of Ukraine and “the second capital”, a large industrial center, etc. should have been considered by the Russian command as one of the primary goals a year ago. But it was not considered (probably because they expected to “get it for free”, basing their expectations on a fundamentally wrong assessment of the operational situation). Now, when even the most stupid leaders of the Russian Federation seem to have dispelled the illusions about the possibility of recreating a “single fraternal pro-Russian friendly Ukraine”, it is this city and its environs that can logically become a place for an attempt to “turn the tide of the war” while large forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are drawn to battles in the Donbas.
Are the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation capable of inflicting a strong full blow in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions and achieving at least significant operational successes there? I don’t know. But I am firmly convinced that here a major battle in any case (both successful or not) will lead to major losses and will require replenishment of the spent human and material resources, the creation of which is impossible without new mobilisation measures.

Strategic perspectives. Part 3

The third (and last) likely theater of operations for a major offensive by the RF Armed Forces is Zaporizhzhia.
From a theoretical standpoint, the offensive should be carried out there in any case, simultaneously with the strike from Belarus and/or the Russian border area. But it can also have independent significance or become the direction of the main blow (whereas all other actions will be distracting). The recent “toad jump” of units of the RF Armed Forces on a wide front closer to the main positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (as a result of which the troops came into direct combat contact with the enemy in his defensive positions) can be considered as a reduction of the ground before the attack (although there may not be an attack, naturally).
The closes targets of the offensive in this area should be the cities of Orekhov and Hulay-Pole, without which an attack on the city of Zaporizhzhia itself is unlikely due to the possibility of a strike into the flank and rear by the attacking AFU.
Among the “benefits” of this direction is the flat terrain, which can be successfully defended only by concentrating forces in large settlements. Among the disadvantages, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been creating lines of fortified strongholds at the forefront and in-depth throughout the year. And, in order to quickly break through the front, again, a lot of forces are required, concentrated in well-trained and reliably controlled units and formations. And again, I must note that an offensive here, too, will certainly lead to heavy losses in the ranks of the attackers (in manpower and equipment), and a huge consumption of ammunition. However, if successful, local encirclements and the defeat of units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are possible, which will make the enemy worry about the rear of the Donetsk group. Will our generals be able to achieve such a result, we will soon find out (or we will not know if there is no offensive).
General conclusion: at the moment, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation DO NOT HAVE A SUPERIORITY OVER THE APU ANYWHERE, that would guarantee the success of a large-scale strategic offensive. It is possible (theoretically) to create only one “shock fist” in one of the above directions, using the rest as auxiliary ones. (Diverting and restricting attacks can continue, of course, on the Donetsk front).
But, in any case, a full-scale offensive battle will very quickly and inevitably lead to very large losses and the depletion of those resources that have been accumulated as a result of previous mobilisation and other preparatory actions. And, regardless of successes, it will not lead to the complete defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (precisely because of the lack of strategic reserves).
In any case, whether our military leaders decide to launch an offensive or wait for the spring “offensive” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this year, in order to hold the front, both the mobilisation of people and industry and the rear as a whole will inevitably be required. And the longer our military-political leadership (embarrassed by the uncertainty of the consequences of these measures in the socio-political and socio-economic spheres) delays with them, the less chance we will have of a military defeat of Ukraine until the moment when “dear Western partners” decide to enter the war themselves, convinced of the mutual exhaustion of the opponents’ forces.
At the moment, based on the statements of Peskov and other clowns in power, it seems that until a new major defeat happens (whether on the offensive or on the defensive), no one in the Kremlin will do anything, letting everything “take its own course”.

And that course will lead to the downfall of the Russian Federation.

[Catfish]

^ interesting, thanks for the info. Putin's circle lives in its own "reality" lol.

Now Kadyrov reportedly wants to "re"conquer east Germany.

https://todaytimeslive.com/world/217465.html

Bring it on!

[Commander Wallace]

Originally Posted by Catfish

^ interesting, thanks for the info. Putin's circle lives in its own "reality" lol.

Now Kadyrov reportedly wants to "re"conquer east Germany.

https://todaytimeslive.com/world/217465.html

Bring it on!

I think Putrid and his cronies in Russia live in an alternate reality If they believe they can subjugate Germany. Russia would be destroyed as Germany and NATO Would trample Russia. I believe Germany has a historic hatred of Russia and Russia knows that. I don't believe it would take much for Germany and NATO to take action against Russia.

[tonschk]

ENJOY YOUR BUFFON GAY ZELENSKY CLOWN WEARING STILETTOS AND DANCING FOR YOU ENJOY

[Commander Wallace]

Originally Posted by tonschk

ENJOY YOUR BUFFON GAY ZELENSKY CLOWN WEARING STILETTOS AND DANCING FOR YOU ENJOY

How comforting it must be for you that a " buffoon " like Zelensky is leading a rout of a joke your country has become while at least 130,000 Russians are now dead. If Zelensky is a buffoon, what does that make you and your backwards country ? I hope you and your pathetic country laughs all the way to it's grave.


By the way, buffoon is spelled the way I spelled it and not as you did. Learn some grammar, you Ignoramus buffoon or is that baboon ? Both would apply, in your case.

[mapuc]

^ ^Please tell us something we don't know about Zelenskyy.

For your information-He was a comedian and had his own show before he became President of Ukraine.

Markus

[Rockstar]

I wonder what it must be like for Putin sympathizers when they admit getting their arses kicked by a man dancing in stilettos.