Here we go again-Ukraine once again pt2

[Skybird]

You guys always give long quotes of what Western politicians have said. Talk is cheap. Most of it is Bla and more Bla and then plenty of Blablabla. Most of the time it means nothing to me.

And even where there would be the will - question remains how there could be a way. Production limitations are real. And Western weapons are often overdesigned super-dooper platforms that were not made for long attrition warfare and cannot be easily replaced or repaired, but are overengineered primadonnas. The Russians have it easier, they never meant their tanks to last long time, and different to all Western states, Russia has switched to full war production and has allies also delivering it stuff. The Western states not trading wiht Russia - are a global minority. We even buy their oil, still so, and other ressoruces. Just via third party traders like India. We buy teir oil, for a lot more money.



Energy production, industry production and critical infrastruture in Ukraine now is in a worse condition than it was last February. Ukraine's overall situation has worstened. It gains small tactical victories, but in the bigger picture of the full war they remain to be mostly meaningless. Russia creeps forward. It creeps, but it goes forward.



I see currently no chance for the liberation of the Eastern oblasts, or Russia fleeing from Crimea. That sounds like science fiction currently.

[Skybird]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/e...ntl/index.html


In the immediate future, the Ukrainian leadership must show unity after what has been a messy changeover. Myhailo Podolyak, an adviser to the office of the President, said that “during a war, political competition, especially at the level of the army, generals, and politicians, doesn’t look so good.”
Instilling a new sense of purpose is all the more important as Ukraine faces a window of vulnerability.
As Matthew Schmidt puts it, Putin “can throw bodies at the enemy, using Russian quantity to overcome Ukrainian quality. It’s a very Stalinist approach to the battlefield, and it’s built into Russian strategic culture.”


I still think Zelenskji made a mistake there, out of political selfishness.

Appointing a general as supreme commander who is influenced by Soviet military doctrine and tends to wear out his own troops in a correspondingly nefarious manner does not seem to me to be a good idea when you yourself are outnumbered and at the same time refuse to take unpopular measures to increase the recruitment rate. And in terms of equipment and material, the change will not solve any of Ukraine's problems. Ukraine is increasingly outmanned, outgunned, and outdroned. The trend worstens, and Ukrainians are exhausted. If it is not being stopped and reversed, breaking point is inevitable and just a question of time - morale and F-16s alone will not stop Russia.

[Dargo]

All Ukraine military are schooled with the soviet doctrine, Valerij Zaloezjny and Oleksandr Syrskyi both in the processes of cooperation with NATO are also schooled in western doctrine of conducting war. Knowing how the enemy thinks and acts is a big advance, both commanders showed this advance on the battleground, Oleksandr Syrskyi clearly put this NATO doctrine in action in the defence of Kyiv.

The Battle of Debaltseve
Oleksandr Syrskyi was one of the chief commanders of the anti-terrorist operation forces during the battle of Debaltseve in the winter of 2015, together with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Viktor Muzhenko they went to the city itself. He led the battles in Vuhlehirsk, the village of Ridkodub and an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Lohvynove. He also coordinated the withdrawal of the Ukrainian military from Debaltseve. Under his leadership, possible routes of crossing the Karapulka River were blown up. Ukrainian forces began to withdraw from Debaltseve in the early morning on 18 February. After loading, the column of about 2,500 men, including tanks and other armoured vehicles, began to proceed away from the city. During the evacuation, full-scale street fighting continues and there was also a small tank battle. The Ukrainian death toll was 267 dead, the Ukraine army could retreat 80% of the Ukrainian troops that had been in the city.

Saying Oleksandr Syrskyi is or does this or that is not based on facts sure soldiers biaach but that they also did against Valerij Zaloezjny the military is given a task by politics the result is not always what was thought of that is life plans can go horrible wrong there is no magical wand.

[Skybird]

Yes, they all were originally trained according to Sovjet doctrine, point is Syrskj got his nickname because troops criticise him for still ticking Sovjet-drill style. Hence his nickname, "General Butcher" - due to his "butchering" of own troops. He is responsible for having depleted most of Ukraine's best commands and special units, critics say and report for questionable operational objectives. The general outcome may give him right, but his own troops fear him for wasting them too carelessly. Zalushnji is seens as the morew realiostic and regarding NATO adaptation: more competent commander. Syrskj also is said to be more obedient to Zelenskyi, while Zalushnji told Zelenskji more often how things really were. And that may not have gone too well with Zelenskji, especially after Zalushnji's desperate essay for The Economist. It was an alarm call by him since Zelenskji did not listen, it was not subordination.

The problems the new commander faces, remain unchanged. If he has scored visible imrovements by the end of the year and they can afford the costs for these, then the change was correct. If not, or there is further worstening, then it was no correct.


Also, the public approval thing. Zelenskj's star is descending with his people, Zalushnji's was still rising and already at a peak. And the man is not dead he is still there, he also has rejected to get moved off the playboard by becoming ambassador to the - distant, far away - UK. He still is a political problem for Zelenskji, if he indeed was a threat to him, he still is so. I cannot read the man's mind and intentions, of course.

[Dargo]

Oleksandr Syrskyi earned him the gruesome nickname of "Butcher" overseeing last year's dogged 9-month defence of Bakhmut it is one of the longest and bloodiest battles of the war so far described as a "meat grinder" and a "vortex" for both the Ukrainian and Russian militaries. Not so surprised he earned that nickname. Same anonymous sources because this all based on anonymous sources forget to mention the defence of Kyiv (and he started planning this way before Russia invaded) that he led with a totally other doctrine, this is more politics than it has anything to do with the military reality on the front. Any commander in a similar situation that has given the task to hold a city nearing kettle does the same, there are in history many generals who faced same situation similar also this was all planned and ordered under the command of the army chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, who many Ukrainians see as a national hero but in reality the team are the heroes.

That Syrskj is said to be more obedient as Zelenskiy could be... but nobody knows for sure if you get more and more task you do not see the same as the politic leader people change.

[mapuc]

It wouldn't matter who's in charge for the UAF if military supplies comes to an end.

Markus

[Jimbuna]

Zelensky discusses Ukraine's defense needs with Macron by telephone

President Volodymyr Zelensky wrote on Feb. 10 that he had a "very positive and focused call" with French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss Ukraine's defense needs and the situation along the front line.

Ukraine's defense needs encompass drones, artillery, ammunition, electronic warfare capabilities, and a spectrum of air defense systems, varying from portable to long-range, according to Zelensky.

Zelensky and Macron also reportedly discussed preparing a bilateral document outlining security commitments, drawing from the principles outlined in the G7 Vilnius Declaration.

G7 leaders presented the declaration at the July NATO summit in Vilnius. The Group of Seven comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., the U.S., and the EU.

The declaration envisages that each member would focus on long-term bilateral cooperation to help Ukraine build up a military force capable of defending the country and deterring future Russian aggression.

The cooperation would include providing modern military equipment on land, in the air, and at sea, training, intelligence sharing, developing resistance to cyber and hybrid threats, supporting Ukraine's defense industrial base, and interoperability with NATO forces.

"Such security agreements demonstrate Europe's leadership, motivate Ukrainian society and warriors, and send a strong signal to Russia about Europe's unwavering support for Ukraine," Zelensky said.
https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky...-by-telephone/

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by mapuc

It wouldn't matter who's in charge for the UAF if military supplies comes to an end.

Markus

Agree the main problem is too few at the moment and slow delivery of military supplies. The U.S. army increase production of 28,000 155-millimeter howitzer rounds a month by the spring and 40,000 rounds per month by 2025 Army acquisition secretary Doug Bush said the service now aims to boost its monthly production to 36,000 by March, 60,000 by September, 70,000 to 80,000 in early 2025, and 100,000 by the end of calendar 2025. The countries of the European Union began with a head start, producing about 230,000 155mm shells a year, about one-third more than the U.S. By February 2023, European production was at 300,000 rounds annually, according to Estonian defence officials. By November, capacity had risen again, though assessments differ. European Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton suggested that Europe could now make some 400,000 rounds annually. Estonia’s Pevkur, speaking at a November media roundtable, put the figure between 600,000 and 700,000 and said it would reach one million rounds in 2024. But the EU will not meet its goal this spring, Estonian defence official Kusti Salm said the plan would likely be fulfilled by mid-2024. And in the long term, Pevkur said, even more shells will be required to backfill stocks, support NATO regional plans, and keep Ukraine in the fight Pevkur estimation is that we have to produce in the next ten years around 3 million rounds in a year.

In October, NATO’s senior military officer, Adm. Rob Bauer, said that the price for one 155mm shell had risen from 2,000 euros ($2,171) at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to 8,000 euros ($8,489.60). For comparison, the U.S. currently pays $3,000 for its most modern shells, according to an Army spokesperson. That price includes the charge, fuse, and shell body. Unlike the U.S., European 155mm production is primarily in the hands of the commercial market. That means that European countries can incentivize production increases through purchases, but cannot order factories to invest in automation, double shifts, or build new plants, as the U.S. has. There really isn’t any government that can command industry to produce more, they have to place orders through contracts.

Some individual countries have ordered more munitions. Germany and the Netherlands budgeted billions more in military aid for Ukraine, november 2023. Still, overall defense spending across Europe remains sluggish.

[Dargo]

We have to be careful that we don't become well typical of the Free West typical of the modern culture of we've seen that now, and we're starting to get pretty bored, and we're in the mood for a nice film and that the public is very quickly bored and strongly both politically and culturally shows enormously fickle behaviour. We always have some new hype, some new panic, we're a bit of a hysterical society and of course that's down to how we can actually live an enormously contented pleasant materially quite secure life. So an enormous amount of time has to be filled with things that are seemingly of the enormous importance. I find questionable that you have this whole atmosphere of we've, seen it now it's sitting, a little bit against it's not fun any more, the flags aren't flying any more hanging, a little limp along the masts. No, it is still a matter of eminent strategic importance that that war in Ukraine at least is not lost whether that war can be won totally in 100% I doubt. But the fact that Putin can take a country just like that is 100% a signal that they are winning in the anti-West bloc.

I think Zelenskyy did a fantastic job under those difficult circumstances O okay people around Zelenskyy say to the media to expect that these mistakes will still have painful political consequences, but first the war has to be won, well that may take some time. I don't think that war can be won at all in the sense that where Putin throws in the towel and disappears and immigrates to Tibet or something. It is more difficult laborious, it's going to take longer than we thought and because we prefer it all to be triumphant, the sun keeps shining, the flags keep flying that there's nothing difficult in particular and where we don't suffer either. We're now in a bit of a depressed atmosphere around this war, which is not justified in my opinion. Again, it is of eminent importance that Putin is finally put in his place. Winston Churchill in World War II proposed all kinds of things that were utterly knackered, but it's a good thing he was there because he did the right things. Because he assured the British at the moment supreme that they had to fight on that it was important that they fight on, and you need somebody like that, so he knew how to do that in a convincing way. So is Zelenskyy perfect, no, but Zelenskyy emerged as a deserving war leader.

It is also a bit of Zelenskyy disappoints us a bit. We still sat and cried at the TV, but we don't have that any more. It is all part of one of a broad pattern of, how shall I put it, strong sentiments and utter thoughtlessness

[mapuc]

Markus

[Dargo]

OK, another copy/past of western media annualising armchair warriors see nothing in this like i see nothing in those western media that goes deeper to the actual capability of this general. He is 10 year older and did study in Russia fought in conflict of Russia make him a soviet doctrine lover every good military studies from Sun Tzu to Alexander the Great to … to Clausewitz and generals executing recent past wars. This general knew Russia would invade did prepare for that case and fought successfully in the Ukraine war (Kyiv defence, Kharkiv offensive), suddenly is a bad general yeah sure.

[Jimbuna]

Russia’s war economy cannot last but has bought time

It was March 2022. The Russian rouble crashed, the value in London of corporate giants Gazprom and Sberbank fell 97%. Queues began to form at cash machines in Moscow. Oligarchs' yachts, football teams, mansions and even their credit cards were seized.

Russia crashed into a major recession.

This was the immediate result of the most extraordinary attempt by the West at financial containment of Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.

At its heart was the seizing of the Russian state's official foreign exchange assets and, in particular, the unprecedented freezing of the central bank's $300bn (£238bn) in reserves.

Western governments pointedly shied away from using phrases like "economic war", but it certainly seemed like there was a financial theatre of battle with the Kremlin. It was better than the alternative of direct confrontation between nuclear states.

Some two years on and there is quite a change in this economic backdrop.

In a long and rambling interview this week, President Putin gleefully exclaimed Russia as the fastest growing economy in Europe.

Last week, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) underlined the resilience of the Russian economy when it upgraded its forecast growth for this year to 2.6% from 1.1%.

Based on the IMF's figures, the Russian economy grew faster than the whole G7 last year, and will do so again in 2024.

These are not just numbers. The stalemate in Ukraine last year and the growing expectation of a frozen conflict on the ground across this year, has been underpinned by Russia's remobilisation of its economy to its military effort, especially in the construction of defensive lines in the east and south of Ukraine.

Western leaders argue that this model is utterly unsustainable over the medium term. But the question is - for how long it can sustain?

Russia has transformed its economy into a mobilised war economy. The Russian state is spending a record in the post-Soviet era.

Military and security spending at up to 40% of the budget is back to late-Soviet era levels. Other areas of state support to the population have been squeezed to make up for funding the production of tanks, missile systems and those defences in occupied Ukraine.

On top of that, despite Western restrictions on Russian oil and gas, the flows of hydrocarbon revenues have kept coming into the state coffers.

The tankers are now going to India and China and more of the payments are in Chinese yuan rather than the US dollar.

Russian oil production remains at 9.5 million barrels per day, barely down on pre-war levels. The country has skirted sanctions by buying and deploying a "shadow fleet" of hundreds of tankers.

Last week, its finance ministry reported that hydrocarbon taxes in January exceeded levels seen in January 2022, just before the invasion.

The ongoing flow of foreign exchange into Russian oil, gas, and diamonds has also helped alleviate the stress on the value of the rouble.

Western leaders are adamant that this cannot last, but recognise its impact.

One world leader recently said privately: "2024 will be much more positive for Putin than we thought. He has managed to reorganise his own industry more efficiently than we thought."

But this form of economic growth has greatly increased Moscow's dependence on oil revenues, on China and on non-productive war spending.

As demand for oil and gas peaks, and competitor production from the Arabian Gulf comes on-stream in the coming year, Russia will be exposed.

Statistical rises in gross domestic product (GDP) from the production of tanks and shells that are then blown up in the Donbas, in eastern Ukraine, are also far from productive.

Meanwhile, Russia has experienced a brain drain of some of its most talented citizens.

The Western strategy has been not to lay siege to Russia's economy, but to engage in a cat and mouse game to restrict access to technology, raise costs, limit revenues and make the conflict unsustainable long-term.

"We'd rather Russia uses its money to buy tankers [for oil] than tanks" one US official told me. In the oil market, the aim of policy is not to try to prevent India, for example, from buying Russian oil but to limit the profits from that trade going back to the Kremlin war machine.

But this resilience and stalemate can last the rest of this year at least. It feeds into the clear strategy in the Kremlin of waiting for a possible change of US president and a reduction of Western funding for Ukraine's defence.

That is why attention is now turning back to the central role of those hundreds of billions in frozen Russian financial assets.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told me last month: "If the world has $300bn, why not use it?" All of those frozen funds should be deployed to fund Ukraine's rebuilding effort, he said.

The UK's Chancellor Jeremy Hunt and Foreign Secretary David Cameron back the move.

Lord Cameron told me: "We've frozen these assets. The question is are we going to use them?"

He said "using some of this money now is if you like an advance payment on [Russian] reparations" for its illegal invasion of Ukraine, and could be used "to help Ukraine and save Western taxpayers money at the same time".

The G7 has asked its central bankers to come up with a technical and legal analysis. Central bankers are understood to be uneasy. One top financier told me there would be risks to what he called "weaponising the dollar". Traditionally, central banks enjoy sovereign immunity from these sorts of actions.

A plan being developed would use the funds, or the profits from the investments to raise tens of billions of dollars for Ukraine.

But it is a balancing act. If Russian assets are seized in this way, then what message does it send to other nations, perhaps in the Gulf, or Central Asia, or Africa, about the safety of their safe-haven reserves in Western central banks?

These relationships are some of the central arteries of global finance, recycling hundreds of billions of dollars used to pay for energy, across the world. Putin certainly wished to communicate that China was now emerging as an alternative, if not for the West, then for emerging economies.

The Russians have also indicated that they will take court action over any seizure, and in turn take similar assets from Western companies frozen in Russian banks.

So the shadow battle over Russia's economy is essential to understanding where this conflict and the world economy, is going.

Russia's war economy can not sustain long-term, but has bought the country some extra time. The West is about to up the ante, after Russia displayed this unexpected resilience.

The precise form of this financial escalation will have consequences, well beyond Russia and Ukraine.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-68249043

[Skybird]

I am still amazed that it was seriously assumed that a country that is practically self-sufficient and autark in supplying its population with food and its own industrial supply of basic raw materials, and that has the largest reservoir of raw materials in the world, could be sanctioned with economic sanctions and boycotts, all the while over 60% of states are still doing business with Russia, and in many cases are even expanding them. Just as we have overestimated the war-deciding impact of Western weapons, we have underestimated Russia's economic resilience - and still do, because I am pretty sure that Russia will also find a solution for the predicted end of Russia's economic resilience.

In any case, we have now heard so often that Russia cannot do this and cannot sustain that, that this premature swan song has become literally boring.

And in the end, two facts remain:
1. Ukraine is slowly but surely losing the war, at least for the time being - and an end in this trend currently is not in sight.

2. Any late economic consequences for Russia will very probably not have a decisive impact on the Russian war effort during the active phase of the war or even force it to break off, as was the Western calculation. And what may or may not impact on Russia after the war, is nothing that helps Ukraine while the war is raging.

[Jimbuna]

Russia has recruited as many as 15,000 Nepalis to fight its war. Many returned traumatized. Some never came back

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/a...cmd/index.html

[mapuc]

Originally Posted by Skybird

And in the end, two facts remain:
1. Ukraine is slowly but surely losing the war, at least for the time being - and an end in this trend currently is not in sight.

2. Any late economic consequences for Russia will very probably not have a decisive impact on the Russian war effort during the active phase of the war or even force it to break off, as was the Western calculation. And what may or may not impact on Russia after the war, is nothing that helps Ukraine while the war is raging.

I guess you're right Ukraine will slowly lose the war..It will however not be on the battlefield they are going to lose the war.

As mentioned before they will lose it in the west.

I'm 110 % Sure that Ukraine will win this war, if they get all the weapons and ammo they need.

Markus