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Skybird · 05-02-21, 05:59 AM

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung writes:
https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/bald-krie...lle-ld.1612685

Xi Jinping caught in the superiority trap - why China could soon be tempted to open war against Taiwan

What will happen in the future on the Taiwan Strait is a core question of world politics, which also determines the prosperity in Europe. Xi Jinping is thinking of making the dream of a united China come true under his leadership - with violence if necessary.

The figures speak for themselves: In 2020, Chinese military aircraft violated the “air defense and identification zone” designated by Taiwan for over 100 days. According to the Ministry of Defense in Taipei, this was the case again on 75 days by mid-April 2021. The number of machines involved is in the hundreds; These are slow-moving, propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft, but also modern fighter jets and strategic bombers that can carry nuclear weapons. In March, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense had to admit that, due to the strain on resources for the aging air fleet, it would no longer be possible to deploy its own interceptors and that it might be necessary to limit oneself to watching the People's Liberation Army fighters only on the anti-aircraft screens. -

Against this background, the Commander in Chief of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, spoke at a hearing in the US Senate in March that China could attempt to invade Taiwan within six years. The publicist Anne Applebaum exaggerated this on Twitter in April when she put forward the thesis that the Biden administration must be prepared for an invasion of Taiwan that is imminent at any time. -

In striking contrast, there is the sober, almost provocative serenity in Taiwan itself, where there is no sign of an imminent threat of war. The democratically governed island republic has come to terms with the threat that has persisted for decades. Domestically, issues such as stagnating wages, the rights of the LGBTQ community and the energy transition dominate. It was not until American pressure that a Taiwanese chip company recently ceased business with a company in the Chinese supercomputer program, which, according to US reports, is working on the most modern weapons that pose a serious military threat to Taiwan as well. -

The military performance of the Chinese army, which has not been involved in a war for decades, remains completely unclear. -

In view of this, what is the current situation? Is the danger of war in the West exaggerated by interested parties or is Taiwanese politics and society simply underestimating the Chinese determination to solve the "Taiwan question" by force? The answer to this can be summed up in a very simple formula. The decisive factor is a look at the time axis: in the short term, before the 100th birthday of the Chinese Communist Party in July and its next party congress in autumn 2022, no dramatic escalation is to be expected. After that, however, the Chinese patience with the status quo under the increasingly personalized rule of Xi Jinping is likely to come to an end, and Taiwan is likely to become the focal point in the looming comprehensive system and great power conflict between China and the USA. -

For years it has been a popular occupation among military planners and strategists: To assess the threat situation in the Taiwan Strait, military hardware (e.g. aircraft, submarines) is counted, the balance of power between those involved is analyzed, and the prerequisites for a Conquest of Taiwan by China is being scrutinized. The findings here are unmistakable: the military weight in the Taiwan Strait has shifted in favor of China, the USA has already fallen behind the People's Republic in important categories (such as the number of land-based short- and medium-range missiles). -

Even analysts in Taiwan attest to its own army that it is just an “empty shell”. The topography of Taiwan (a few flat, shallow stretches of beach in connection with mostly steep rocky coasts) and the climatic conditions (including a typhoon season lasting several months), on the other hand, make a landing operation on Taiwan seem like an incalculable game of vabanque. -

However, all of these investigations are the easier part for outside observers; it is much more difficult to look at the “software”: What does China want with the new military material? What can China do with it? Publicly available strategy papers and the Chinese military give an answer to the first question: Put Taiwan under military pressure, in particular to intimidate the pro-independence advocates and deter the USA from intervening in a conflict over Taiwan by incalculable costs. The military performance of the People's Liberation Army, which has not been involved in a war for decades, remains completely unclear. The interaction of branches of arms (so-called “combined warfare”) tends to exist on paper, the level of performance of a Chinese pilot in an aerial combat can at best be simulated. -

More important than the primary view of the military dimension, however, is the appreciation of the context. The "Goldilocks" era that has lasted since the beginning of the nineties is over, namely the best of all worlds for the Taiwan Strait, when the goals and means of all parties were essentially in harmony: no incalculable shaking of the status quo as well relying on economic interdependence between China and Taiwan. - Everyone involved believed that time was on their side. In the USA and Taiwan it was hoped that political reforms would take place on the mainland, in China that the ever closer economic exchange would automatically pave the way to unification with Taiwan. This phase is irrevocably over, all sides have contributed to it. -

In Taiwan, social and demographic change over the years has led to a specific “Taiwan identity”. Young Taiwanese today sometimes compare China with the Netherlands or Portugal, the former colonial powers that left their mark on the island, but with whom there is nothing beyond that. Under Trump, the US pushed for the delivery of modern weapons to Taiwan and sent high-ranking delegations to Taipei. US President Biden has continued this policy with other omens (emphasis on human rights and inclusion of the allies) up to now. -

The most important changes, however, are clearly to be found on the part of China under Xi Jinping. The pragmatism towards Taiwan that we encountered until a few years ago has come to an end; a climate of nationalistic upsurge and ideological backwardness now dominate. The economic rise of China, especially the pull of its own market on western companies, has changed the risk calculation in China. Under the slogan “the East is rising, the West is falling”, the conviction that originated from Marx's historical materialism is breaking through that China will win in the systemic struggle with the West, as it were, according to the laws of nature. -

This does not automatically lead to a military conflict over Taiwan. In the short term, Beijing will continue to rely on a combination of military pinpricks, diplomatic isolation, economic incentives, cyberattacks and the infiltration of the political system against Taiwan. The role of the head of state and party leader Xi Jinping personally will be decisive, both positively and negatively. Viewed positively, he is the only one who, because of his standing and personal power, can put a stop to escalating nationalist demands. -

On the other hand, all signals indicate that he sees himself as the only guarantor of securing China's rise to a great power, symbolized not least by the reintegration of Taiwan. In a political system with totalitarian tendencies that is now highly tailored to him, his personal willingness to take risks will be a central variable in the future. One would expect from the outside that a rational view of the possible costs of a military adventure would have to prevent Beijing from unconditional escalation. -

However, this point of view only covers part of the Chinese calculation. One should not lose sight of the heroization of their own glorious willingness to make sacrifices (which, for example, led to victory in the Korean War), which is widespread among political decision-makers in China and repeatedly instrumentalized by Xi, opposed to a war-weary, exhausted, internally torn USA . A fatal momentum of their own could easily feed from these ideological narratives. -

What will happen on the Taiwan Strait in the future is a key question that will also determine prosperity in Europe. China and Taiwan are the decisive links in transnational value and supply chains for high-tech products of all kinds. If an unusual drought in Taiwan is already having an impact on the chip production of the world market leader TSMC and the availability of semiconductors in the West, everyone can imagine for themselves what would be at stake in an armed conflict in the Taiwan Straits involving the United States.

05-02-21, 05:59 AM	#32
Skybird Soaring Join Date: Sep 2001 Location: the mental asylum named Germany Posts: 40,494 Downloads: 9 Uploads: 0	The Neue Zürcher Zeitung writes: https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/bald-krie...lle-ld.1612685 Xi Jinping caught in the superiority trap - why China could soon be tempted to open war against Taiwan What will happen in the future on the Taiwan Strait is a core question of world politics, which also determines the prosperity in Europe. Xi Jinping is thinking of making the dream of a united China come true under his leadership - with violence if necessary. The figures speak for themselves: In 2020, Chinese military aircraft violated the “air defense and identification zone” designated by Taiwan for over 100 days. According to the Ministry of Defense in Taipei, this was the case again on 75 days by mid-April 2021. The number of machines involved is in the hundreds; These are slow-moving, propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft, but also modern fighter jets and strategic bombers that can carry nuclear weapons. In March, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense had to admit that, due to the strain on resources for the aging air fleet, it would no longer be possible to deploy its own interceptors and that it might be necessary to limit oneself to watching the People's Liberation Army fighters only on the anti-aircraft screens. - Against this background, the Commander in Chief of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, spoke at a hearing in the US Senate in March that China could attempt to invade Taiwan within six years. The publicist Anne Applebaum exaggerated this on Twitter in April when she put forward the thesis that the Biden administration must be prepared for an invasion of Taiwan that is imminent at any time. - In striking contrast, there is the sober, almost provocative serenity in Taiwan itself, where there is no sign of an imminent threat of war. The democratically governed island republic has come to terms with the threat that has persisted for decades. Domestically, issues such as stagnating wages, the rights of the LGBTQ community and the energy transition dominate. It was not until American pressure that a Taiwanese chip company recently ceased business with a company in the Chinese supercomputer program, which, according to US reports, is working on the most modern weapons that pose a serious military threat to Taiwan as well. - The military performance of the Chinese army, which has not been involved in a war for decades, remains completely unclear. - In view of this, what is the current situation? Is the danger of war in the West exaggerated by interested parties or is Taiwanese politics and society simply underestimating the Chinese determination to solve the "Taiwan question" by force? The answer to this can be summed up in a very simple formula. The decisive factor is a look at the time axis: in the short term, before the 100th birthday of the Chinese Communist Party in July and its next party congress in autumn 2022, no dramatic escalation is to be expected. After that, however, the Chinese patience with the status quo under the increasingly personalized rule of Xi Jinping is likely to come to an end, and Taiwan is likely to become the focal point in the looming comprehensive system and great power conflict between China and the USA. - For years it has been a popular occupation among military planners and strategists: To assess the threat situation in the Taiwan Strait, military hardware (e.g. aircraft, submarines) is counted, the balance of power between those involved is analyzed, and the prerequisites for a Conquest of Taiwan by China is being scrutinized. The findings here are unmistakable: the military weight in the Taiwan Strait has shifted in favor of China, the USA has already fallen behind the People's Republic in important categories (such as the number of land-based short- and medium-range missiles). - Even analysts in Taiwan attest to its own army that it is just an “empty shell”. The topography of Taiwan (a few flat, shallow stretches of beach in connection with mostly steep rocky coasts) and the climatic conditions (including a typhoon season lasting several months), on the other hand, make a landing operation on Taiwan seem like an incalculable game of vabanque. - However, all of these investigations are the easier part for outside observers; it is much more difficult to look at the “software”: What does China want with the new military material? What can China do with it? Publicly available strategy papers and the Chinese military give an answer to the first question: Put Taiwan under military pressure, in particular to intimidate the pro-independence advocates and deter the USA from intervening in a conflict over Taiwan by incalculable costs. The military performance of the People's Liberation Army, which has not been involved in a war for decades, remains completely unclear. The interaction of branches of arms (so-called “combined warfare”) tends to exist on paper, the level of performance of a Chinese pilot in an aerial combat can at best be simulated. - More important than the primary view of the military dimension, however, is the appreciation of the context. The "Goldilocks" era that has lasted since the beginning of the nineties is over, namely the best of all worlds for the Taiwan Strait, when the goals and means of all parties were essentially in harmony: no incalculable shaking of the status quo as well relying on economic interdependence between China and Taiwan. - Everyone involved believed that time was on their side. In the USA and Taiwan it was hoped that political reforms would take place on the mainland, in China that the ever closer economic exchange would automatically pave the way to unification with Taiwan. This phase is irrevocably over, all sides have contributed to it. - In Taiwan, social and demographic change over the years has led to a specific “Taiwan identity”. Young Taiwanese today sometimes compare China with the Netherlands or Portugal, the former colonial powers that left their mark on the island, but with whom there is nothing beyond that. Under Trump, the US pushed for the delivery of modern weapons to Taiwan and sent high-ranking delegations to Taipei. US President Biden has continued this policy with other omens (emphasis on human rights and inclusion of the allies) up to now. - The most important changes, however, are clearly to be found on the part of China under Xi Jinping. The pragmatism towards Taiwan that we encountered until a few years ago has come to an end; a climate of nationalistic upsurge and ideological backwardness now dominate. The economic rise of China, especially the pull of its own market on western companies, has changed the risk calculation in China. Under the slogan “the East is rising, the West is falling”, the conviction that originated from Marx's historical materialism is breaking through that China will win in the systemic struggle with the West, as it were, according to the laws of nature. - This does not automatically lead to a military conflict over Taiwan. In the short term, Beijing will continue to rely on a combination of military pinpricks, diplomatic isolation, economic incentives, cyberattacks and the infiltration of the political system against Taiwan. The role of the head of state and party leader Xi Jinping personally will be decisive, both positively and negatively. Viewed positively, he is the only one who, because of his standing and personal power, can put a stop to escalating nationalist demands. - On the other hand, all signals indicate that he sees himself as the only guarantor of securing China's rise to a great power, symbolized not least by the reintegration of Taiwan. In a political system with totalitarian tendencies that is now highly tailored to him, his personal willingness to take risks will be a central variable in the future. One would expect from the outside that a rational view of the possible costs of a military adventure would have to prevent Beijing from unconditional escalation. - However, this point of view only covers part of the Chinese calculation. One should not lose sight of the heroization of their own glorious willingness to make sacrifices (which, for example, led to victory in the Korean War), which is widespread among political decision-makers in China and repeatedly instrumentalized by Xi, opposed to a war-weary, exhausted, internally torn USA . A fatal momentum of their own could easily feed from these ideological narratives. - What will happen on the Taiwan Strait in the future is a key question that will also determine prosperity in Europe. China and Taiwan are the decisive links in transnational value and supply chains for high-tech products of all kinds. If an unusual drought in Taiwan is already having an impact on the chip production of the world market leader TSMC and the availability of semiconductors in the West, everyone can imagine for themselves what would be at stake in an armed conflict in the Taiwan Straits involving the United States. __________________ If you feel nuts, consult an expert.