[Skybird]

Germany's "army reform" shoots way too short. From the Neue Zürcher Zeitung:



https://www.nzz.ch/der-andere-blick/...urz-ld.1824898



The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine is in its third year. Statements by Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin and his propagandists indicate that the regime in Moscow is preparing for a long and violent conflict with the liberal West. And how does Germany react?



It is - once again - rearranging the command levels and command structures of its armed forces, separating the strategic from the operational and the operational from the tactical level more strictly, once again restructuring the Ministry of Defense and renaming the whole thing "The Bundeswehr of the Turning Point". Boris Pistorius, head of the German defense department, presented the plans on Thursday in Berlin.


After reading the paper, one wonders: Have these people still not heard the shot? When will the federal government finally draw the necessary conclusions from the war in Ukraine for the Bundeswehr? And: How long will it take until then?



In order not to be misunderstood: It is right to combine the two operational commands to plan and lead operations at home and those abroad, as Pistorius plans to do. When it comes to defending Germany and its partners, it doesn't matter whether the soldiers are fighting near Stralsund or Danzig. Command over them must rest in one hand, regardless of the fact that in the event of war it would be transferred to the NATO supreme commander anyway. National defense equals alliance defense.


It is also right to combine logistics and medical care in a support command and to dissolve the previous organizational areas. The armed forces base (logistics and support services such as military police) and the medical service had, typical of the “Bundeswehr Peace Army”, created bloated staffs and duplicate structures since they were set up at the beginning of the 2000s. Many of these soldiers can now return to the force. Experts are needed there.


Pistorius can also be credited for wanting to create the organizational conditions for a possible reintroduction of compulsory military service. For this purpose, the civil defense administration should set up a coordination office.


So far, so understandable. But is that supposed to be all? This is the plan for the “Bundeswehr of the turning point”? This is what Germany's war capability should look like?


People rub their eyes, especially when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Where are the drone battalions, where are the “counter-UAV units” to combat drones? Where are the plans for a Bundeswehr facility to research and use artificial intelligence in the military? Where is the plan for an armed forces think tank that will evaluate and analyze the war in Ukraine? Where are the conclusions from the fighting in the East for the further formation of the German army? These questions are just examples of what is missing from Pistorius' plan.


“By restructuring the Bundeswehr, we are taking joint responsibility for a secure tomorrow in a demanding security policy environment and are organizing defense effectively and results-oriented.” Such PR phrases can be found in the plan for the “Bundeswehr of the Turning Point”; It was leaked weeks before Pistorius' press conference.


In an earlier version, the plan was entitled “Bundeswehr of the Future”, but it did not contain any answers to the really pressing questions. Pistorius must consider whether he has appointed the right people for this important work with his State Secretary Nils Hilmer and the composition of the “steering panel” in which his plan was largely developed.


Because it is the minister who always correctly talks about the German army's fitness for war. The war against an opponent like Russia - as can be seen in Ukraine - is primarily waged on land. And it has to be won there. That's why Germany essentially needs an army that is fit for war, divided into large units that already have the human and material resources at their disposal in peacetime with which they can fight without external support. “Train as you fight” was already the motto during the years of the Afghanistan mission (2002-2021). This premise applies even more today.


But instead of reintegrating the logistics forces and medical troops directly into the Bundeswehr's combat units, everything basically stays the same. Even if the armed forces base and medical service are dissolved as organizational areas, the Ministry of Defense rejected the idea of making the large army units operational on their own and without external support, as was the case during the Cold War. Inspector General Carsten Breuer, Germany's highest-ranking soldier, justified this at the press conference by saying, among other things, that for the the army it would currently not be reasonable to integrate new units.


Breuer surpassed this dubious statement on Wednesday with the remark that the war in Ukraine could not be instrumental in preparing the Bundeswehr for war. What then?


Breuer, who is considered an assertive pragmatist, should know that the national security strategy and defense policy guidelines have described Russia as an enemy and the greatest threat for years. So what should the Bundeswehr primarily prepare for, if not the type of warfare that Russia is practicing in Ukraine (and already indirectly through hybrid warfare against NATO)?


It may be that Pistorius gave his “steering panel” too little time for the reform plan, with just five months. But the new image of war has not only been evident in Ukraine since last November. For more than two years we have seen how Russia is waging war today. Just one example: masses of Ukrainian soldiers suffer severe burn injuries due to the widespread use of flamethrowers on the ground and aerosol bombs from the air. Where can you find the plan for a formation of the German medical troops that is adapted to this war?


It is a groundbreaking reform that will change the structure of the Bundeswehr, says Pistorius. At first glance it may look like this. It would be desirable for the Bundeswehr if responsibilities were actually clearer and the diffusion of responsibility was reduced.


What is more important for Germany's defense capability is what follows this Thursday's announcements. So far, Pistorius has only touched the level directly under his management area. It is to be hoped that any further reform proposals for the Bundeswehr will have more substance. They should be available in the fall. Otherwise it could appear as if Germany is underestimating the military threat posed by Putin's regime.