Quote:
Originally Posted by Kapitän
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Sunday, 7 March 1943 - Kiel Kriegsmarinewerft
Final Adjustments and Pre-War Patrol Preparation:
- Testing of Navigational and Radio Equipment.
- Loading of Provisions, Ammunitions and Torpedoes:
Ari and A/A ammunition:
- 10,5cm-SK-C/32: 150 x SpG; 80 x PbG; 20 x LkG
- 3.7cm-SK-C/30: 2550 x PbG
- Twin-M.G.-2cm-C/30: 5280 x SpG (2 x 2640); 2720 x PbG (2 x 1360)
Torpedoes:
- Tubes I-IV & VI: T-3 (G7e), Pi-2/Pi39H (MZ/AZ)
- Tube V: T-4 "Falke" Pi-2/Pi39H (MZ/AZ)
- Bow above floor plates: 2 x T-3 (G7e), Pi-2/Pi39H (MZ/AZ)
- Bow under floor plates: 4 x T-1/G7a FAT (AtoFat), Pi-1/G7H/K-a (AZ only)
- Aft under floor plate: 3 x T-1/G7a FAT (AtoFat), Pi-1/G7H/K-a (AZ only)
- Upper deck containers: 10 (8 fwd, 2 aft) x T-1/G7a (Ato), Pi-1/G7H/K-a (AZ only)
Daily Op.-Briefing:
B) 1) Warfare against the African supplies from North America in the area north and south of the Azores has led to failure. Neither a U.G.S. or G.U.S. convoy has been intercepted by means of a patrol or reconnaissance channels ("Rochen, Robbe"). The enemy's possibility of taking evasive action north or south of the Great Circle are very great - owing to the great length of the entire route without any significant extension of the convoy route.
B) 2) The tricky situation of the forces defending the bridgehead Tunis, forces action against African supply lines. As, for one thing, the attacking of the convoys in the area of the Gibraltar lines is unpropitious owing to strong defence, for another, as described in 1), the interception of convoys halfway is pointless in view of the size of the area, the following is the remaining possibility:
Deployment of U-boats off the North American departure ports. Interception here and pursuit to open sea.
It must be ascertained in this connection:
a) The aerial defences off the coast is apparently very strong, disposition must therefore be stationary.
b) Facts of ports of departure and times of leaving are unpredictable therefore a certain number of boats are necessary
c) Defences, taken as a whole, mean a withdrawal to outside the coastal area during the full moon period. Consideration of these facts leads to the demand for an adequate number of boats, some of which would act as reconnaissance units stationed directly in front of the harbor, the others further out to act as "pick-up" groups able to operate on the reconnaissance groups reports. Owing to the length of the approach route, only a small percentage of U-boats (at the moment type IXc) come into the question. The following boats originally intended for deployment in the Cape Town area were distributed for this: U 172, U 515, U 513, also U 167, U 130, U 106, U 159.
U 648 (Ltnt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) undergoes Final Repairs at Blohm & Voss shipyard Hamburg.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115 |
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
+++++++
U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Monday,
8 March 1943 - Kiel Kriegsmarinewerft
Final Adjustments and Pre-War Patrol Preparation:
-
Testing of Short Range Radar FMG 41G (gU) FuMO 29 Seetakt equipment.
- Loading of Provisions, Ammunitions and Torpedoes:
Ari and A/A ammunition:
- 10,5cm-SK-C/32: 150 x SpG; 80 x PbG; 20 x LkG
- 3.7cm-SK-C/30: 2550 x PbG
- Twin-M.G.-2cm-C/30: 5280 x SpG (2 x 2640); 2720 x PbG (2 x 1360)
Torpedoes:
- Tubes I-IV & VI: T-3 (G7e), Pi-2/Pi39H (MZ/AZ)
- Tube V: T-4 "Falke" Pi-2/Pi39H (MZ/AZ)
- Bow above floor plates: 2 x T-3 (G7e), Pi-2/Pi39H (MZ/AZ)
- Bow under floor plates: 4 x T-1/G7a FAT (AtoFat), Pi-1/G7H/K-a (AZ only)
- Aft under floor plates: 3 x T-1/G7a FAT (AtoFat), Pi-1/G7H/K-a (AZ only)
- Upper deck containers: 10 (8 fwd, 2 aft) x T-1/G7a (Ato), Pi-1/G7H/K-a (AZ only)
Daily Op.-Briefing:
2) The reports from U 333 (Oblt. Werner Schwaff; in deputize for "Ali" Cremer, in hospital) of 5.3 and U 156 (KrvKpt. Werner Hartenstein) of 6.3 confirm the conjecture of several weeks that the enemy was using new methods of locating which could not be picked up by Fu.M.B. equipment. Reports from both boats at sea and from Commander's upon return from patrol revealed occasionally at first, then more often, that they had been attacked by a/c at night (mostly in the Biscay and Trinidad areas) without previous appearance of an a/c searchlight in the vicinity, or radar activity being confirmed. The following new methods of locating appear possible according to observations and deliberations.
2) A) The enemy is working with either very high or very low, and therefore scarcely a completely inaudible frequency impulse. This possibility is strengthened by the observations of U 214 (VIID; Kptlt. Günther Reeder) from the Caribbean Sea. The P.O. Telegraphist Bruster, on confirming scarcely audible impulse frequencies, installed the magic eye of the wireless receiver Ela 10.12 in the Metox receiver in order to make visible the inaudible impulse frequencies. In this way apparently, a location was once confirmed.
Magic eyes are to be installed in the receivers of all outward bound boats, after P.O. Tel. Bruster's report to the S.O. Naval Signals and Communications Equipment Command. Apart from this, on 6.3 a number of oscillographs were sent by courier to the western area to be added to the Metox receiver in order to ascertain as soon as possible whether the enemy is in fact, working with inaudible impulse frequencies.
Boats at sea have received instructions to send observations if necessary.
2) B) The enemy is working on carrier frequencies outside the frequency range of the present Fu.M.B. receivers. The shooting down, over Holland of an enemy a/c apparently carrying an apparatus with a frequency of 5.7 centimeters is the only indication at present of this possibility. It is possible that the enemy is attempting to escape from the frequency range of our Fu.M.B. which indicates the knowledge of this and the introduction of countermeasures.
2) C) The enemy uses his search and locating apparatus for a very short space of time (2 to 3 secs). This method is a development and perfecting of the economical use of locating already observed. It would be very difficulty and almost only occasionally possible for an Fu.M.B. observer to confirm a location with the Fu.M.B. equipment at present in use. Theoretically it appears desirable to counter all these three possibilities in the following way:
Use of an aperiodic, untuned receiver with optical sight indicator, in which every location will be immediately seen, whether carrier or impulse frequency. It remains to be seen whether this possibility is technically practicable. Further information in this connection is to be requested directly from the appropriate departments.
U 648 (Ltnt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) undergoes Final Repairs at Blohm & Voss shipyard Hamburg.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115