[Kapitän]

Originally Posted by Kapitän

Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)

Sunday, 25 April 1943 - Bordeaux - (Easter Sunday)

Pre-war patrol preparation:

- Taking on of Fuel Oil (510cbm at 865kg/m³) and Lubricating Oil.

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Daily F.d.U. Briefing

O.K.M.-Report:
a) U 119 (XB; Kptlt. Horst-Tessen von Kameke) has put out for special duties (Mining Op. Halifax).
b) U 177 (IXD2; Kptlt. Robert Gysae) reported experiences with "Bachstelze".
c) Italian submarine Leonardo da Vinci hit British tanker Doryssa, en route from Cape Town, to Abadan, Iran, with a torpedo in the Indian Ocean at 1726 hours. At 1845 hours, a second torpedo hit her. Shortly after, Leonardo da Vinci closed in and sank the tanker with gunfire. 53 were killed, and the 11 survivors were picked up by British whaler HMSAS Southern Barrier five days later. Having expended all torpedoes, Leonardo da Vinci began her journey back to Bordeaux.

B.d.U.-Report:
a) Convoy No. 28 (HX.234):
At 0130, U 648 (Oblt.d.R. Peter Arthur Stahl) sends F.T.0128/25/138: Due to A/C positioned 60nm behind Trotha-Convoy. Due to weather max. speed 11kn. Question continue Op.
At 0200, another boat reports wind N.N.E. 9, seaway 8, visibility 500 meters.
At 0900, U-Stahl is diving for torpedo maintenance and at 1218, receives F.T.1050/25/151 from HQ: Break off Op., proceed to SW.
At 1554, U-Stahl receives F.T.1249/25/153 from HQ: Group "Meise" in new order Junker, Mäder ..., proceed at cruisng speed to position in patrol line from AK 2386 to 0347. Slow NE convoy will pass the area of the patrol line tomorrow.
At 1718, U-Stahl surfaces and is in AK 3451 at 2400h, wind and sea have subsided considerably.
The main reason for the failure of the operation can be attributed to the extremely changeable visibility experienced during the night, and very unfavorable weather, hail, fog, rain, snow squalls. The convoy exploited this very cleverly for his zig zags. The enemy sailed in line ahead with about 10 ships, and destroyers or escort vessels were disposed in the gaps (later it is determined, that convoy HX.234 consisted of 46 ships and 21 escorts).
The Commanders, for the most part inexperienced and fresh from home waters, were unable to cope with these conditions.
Air activity was so intense on the 24th, that all boats were beaten off and lost the convoy. As intensified air activity is anticipated in the vicinity of Iceland on the 25th, the operations were broken off on the morning of that day. Altogether 2 ships of 19,500 GRT were sunk and 2 ships torpedoed.
b) The loss of U 191 (Kptlt. Helmut Fiehn; Convoy No. 30/ON.178) and U 189 (KrvKpt. Hellmut Kurrer; Convoy No. 28/HX.234) must be presumed. The boats reported for the last time on 23.4 from AK 01 and AK 15 respectively.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115

Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)

Monday, 26 April 1943 - Bordeaux -

Pre-war patrol preparation:

- Trimming trials at Bordeaux roadstead and Test cruise at Gironde Estuary.

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Daily F.d.U. Briefing

O.K.W.-Report:
a) RAF bombers conducted a raid against Duisburg.

B.d.U.-Report:
a) U 566 (Kptlt. Hans Hornkohl) experienced a severe a/c depth charge attack at 2325 in BF 4599 (outbound from Brest). Unable to submerge, return passage. Close escort by 4 Ju 88's from daylight, also escort by F.O.I.C. Western Defences.
b) Final summary on Convoy No. 28 (HX.234):
The slight success achieved, in an operation lasting four days and with a fairly large numbers of boats, may be explained as follows: The conditions of convoy warfare are becoming increasingly difficult, above all the case of convoys in the N., where the nights are especially short, and the enemy is able to provide protection with strong air forces from Greenland, and to an even greater extent from Iceland. Boats usually choose a night when a large number of boats are in contact with the convoy, and the not disproportionately strong defence makes success appear likely. The night of 23/24 in this case. Before this, only one boat was in contact and afterwards the air protection was too strong. This night was the only chance. It could not be exploited owing to the very unfavorable weather conditions in conjunction with the inexperience of the large number of new Commanders who were not equal to the situation.
On the next to last day the convoy air escort was particularly strong and all hopes of success had to be abandoned. Surface protection was of normal strength. 4 boats were attacked by depth charges by the convoy. One boat U 189 (KrvKpt. Hellmut Kurrer), was sunk by the convoy escorts after reporting contact for the last time on the afternoon of the 23rd.
c) U 648 (Oblt.d.R. Peter Arthur Stahl) is standing up and down in ordered position of new patrol line.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115