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Originally Posted by Kapitän
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Saturday, 5 June 1943 - East of Brazil
0946 - F.T. from Spitzbergen Weather Station: To Naval Command:
Were attacked today by Norwegian troops. Escaped to the mountains. Portable Radio loosing power. No supplies.
- Hazlenut Weather Station - Kross Fjord - Svalbard -
1110 - Early Morning Dawn.
1200 - Qu.5551FS - Days Run: 180.7nm - ↗ (24h)
Total: 5745.7 (31tg 22h) - ↗ 5509.5nm (28tg 8h 44') - ↘ 236.2nm (3tg 13h 16')
436cbm (1.5cbm in 24h); Battery 74.3%; Course 169°; 3xT-3, 2xEtoFat, 1xT-4; 9xBold; SSE6/5, clear, visibility 5.7nm, >1000mb.
1206 - Sunrise. Weather and Sea unchanged in 4 days and 20h.
1247 - Qu.5554FS - Control Point 3 reached.
1307 - Supply Ship (Merchant Raider) in sight straight ahead, E=10500.
1347 - Course 180° - Small Ahead.
1607 - F.T. from F.d.U. Norwegen: To all Northern Boats:
Go to Spitzbergen and rescue staff of the weather station Hazlenut in the Cross-Fjord.
2307 - Incoming Radio Reports:
From B.d.U.:
a) The following information has been given to the boats, based on general experiences and reports:
I. B.d.U.-Standing Order No. 12:
1) The enemy is prepared to resort to any means in the battle against U-boats.
It is suspected that explosives are fixed to lifeboats, cases, rafts, barrels etc. which fire when a U-boat approaches. Boats should therefore be suspicious when such objects are sighted, especially on the usual approach routes and in the usual operations areas in the N. Atlantic. Rafts and lifeboats should only be approached to determine the name of the ship, if they are found in a position where a ship has definitely sunk, or, in remote areas if, after close scrutiny, they are clearly seen to be harmless.
2) Boats should not approach the wreckage after an aircraft has been shot down. There is great danger from depth-charges which may roll out of the bomb racks, as has been proved in one case.
II. To boats with Radar:
Boat's own Radar set should be used to detect enemy aircraft in the former Biscay, if boats have to proceed on the surface. Aircraft are picked up at a range of at least 10 kilometers at a minimum height of 500 meters. Radar interception by enemy aircraft need not be expected for the present.
b) U 440 (Oblt. Werner Schwaff) has not reported since she left Nazaire on 26.5. She was probably destroyed by aircraft in Biscay. There is no further information.
B-Dienst Report:
a) In an American U-boat situation report of 4.6 up to 20 boats were reported within 300 miles around AJ 54. One radio message was made from this area from AJ 2960 on 3.6. Actually, there were only two boats there. This situation report seems to show that the enemy definitely suspects a considerable number of U-boats in the sea area between Newfoundland and Greenland. This time, information which he usually obtains from aircraft sightings and radio D/F is lacking. It remains to be seen whether he will soon discover the present absence of U-boats in the North Atlantic.
Again, several boats are believed to be within 150 miles around AK 3520, S-W bound, according to accurate radio D/F.
2323 - Sundown. Weather and Sea unchanged in 5 days, 7.5h.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115 |
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
+++++++
U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Sunday, 6 June 1943 - South-Atlantic
1125 - Early Morning Dawn.
1200 - Qu.5582FS - Days Run: 15.7nm - ↗ (24h)
Total: 5761.4 (32tg 22h) - ↗ 5525.2nm (29tg 8h 44') - ↘ 236.2nm (3tg 13h 16')
435cbm (1cbm in 24h); Battery 74.3%; At Merchant Raider; 3xT-3, 2xEtoFat, 1xT-4; 9xBold; SSE6/5, clear, visibility 5.7nm, >1000mb (Weather and Sea unchanged in 5days, 20h)
Cmdr.: As there is no improvement of the sea state, I decide to dive for Torpedo Maintenance.
1300 - Giving Flag Signal to Merchant Raider. Diving without forward speed. T=10 after 2min.
1302 - 96rpm.
1309 - T=50. Course 180°. 65rpm.
1310 - Beginning of torpedo maintenance.
1401 - Tube I serviced.
1452 - Tube II serviced.
1543 - Tube III serviced (Tubes I-III are T-3/Pi39H). - Break until Watch Change -
1656 - Tube V serviced (EtoFat/Pi39H).
1747 - Tube VI serviced (T-4/Pi39H). CO₂ Warning at 1.7% (after 4h 48min.).
1800 - Dinner -
1845 - 96rpm. Setting for T=20.
1851 - At Reception Depth. Battery 68.6%; CO₂ 1.9%.
1900 - Qu.5585FS - Surfaced after 6h and 11.9nm. - Weather and Sea unchanged.
1901 - Boat ventilated.
1910 - Running back to Merchant Raider.
2012 - Decision to attempt supplying at the Leeward side of the Merchant Raider.
2115 - Fuel hose connection done by crane. Supplying of provisions by rope connection. Charging batteries.
Messages transferred by Merchant Raider (see Annex I to KTB).
Had to interrupt supply process due to slight ramming caused by heavy swell - no damage.
2145 - Decision to break-off supply process and battery charging due to heavy sea state.
2150 - Running off on easterly heading.
2332 - Sundown. Weather and Sea unchanged in 6 days and 7.5h.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115
Annex I to KTB:
O.K.W.-Report:
a) The new French Committee of National Liberation made a radio broadcast from Algiers, French Algeria, pledging to abolish the "arbitrary powers" imposed by the French government in Vichy and to restore "all French liberties, the laws of the Republic and the Republican regime".
O.K.M.-Report:
b) The USAAF made its first operational sortie with the North American A-36 Invader (also known as Apache) when the 27th Fighter Bomber Group based at Rasel Ma in French Morocco participated in a mass fighter-bomber assault on the Italian Island of Pantelleria.
B.d.U.-Report:
a) U 177 (IXD2; Kptlt. Robert Gysae) situation: Miss at inward-bound freighter on 3.6. in GR 5319, end-of-run detonation after 7 minutes. At dusk on 5.6. convoy coming from Saldanha Bay sighted, consisting of about 12 ships with destroyers and corvettes. Deterrent depth-charges. Shadowed by hydrophone bearing as far as GR 2536, in fog, with visibility about 200 meters. Then, while she was preparing for a surface attack, the fog lifted and she found herself in the center of the convoy. Heavy gunfire from all ships. Boat shook off pursuing vessels. She was bombed by a flying boat. No damage.
b) U 198 (IXD2; Kpt.z.S. Werner Hartmann) sank the British "Durma", 2,304 GRT, in KP 5989, course 2500, speed 7 knots, and in KP 9754 the American "William King", 6,800 GRT, main course 2800, speed 10 knots. She took the Chief Engineer of the first ship on board and the Captain of the second.
c) U 119 (XB; Kptlt. Horst-Tessen von Kameke) is steering for CD 4855 to deliver her remaining fuel to "Milkcow" U 488 (Oblt.d.R. Erwin Bartke).
d) U 214 (VIID; Oblt. Rupprecht Stock) reported minelaying operation in Dakar carried out.
e) U 450 (Oblt. Kurt Böhme) was attacked by an aircraft with bombs and aircraft armament at 1050 in AE 8542 and severely damaged. Watertight stern, No. 1. and No. 3. main ballast tanks and all external fuel tanks damaged. Strong trace of oil, 7 wounded, 4 of them seriously, including the C.O. Boat dived after the third attack. She reported at 0100 course 200, and requested assistance. Boats in the vicinity were ordered to make for U 450. She herself was to continue on her passage to W. France. Unfortunately there is no boat with a M.O. nearby.
For distribution of M.O.'s:
The orders given to boats for beating off aircraft in surprise attacks will necessarily mean that bridge personnel will be wounded more often. C-in-C Navy therefore gave orders some time ago that by the beginning of July every second boat to leave port should, if possible, carry a M.O. So far 29 Medical Officers were appointed to IXd2 boats and tankers according to plan and a further 17 were available for other boats. There are at present 16 M.O.'s at sea. The special training of new M.O.'s is now so far advanced that from now on every other boat to leave port in June will have a M.O. on board. Boats leaving W. France will also carry M.O.'s in accordance with orders, provided the officers asked for are appointed in time.
B-Dienst Report:
a) U-boat sightings by the enemy: GR 2530, and 5 others from the Iceland area including 3 D/c attacks (U 450). An English a/c also reported a surfaced U-boat in 36° 30' N and unknown longitude (U 594 - 409?) The a/c returned to its base owing to engine damage and because the navigator was wounded. 2 other a/c reported a D/c attack.
b) 4 enemy Gibraltar a/c were ordered at 1715 to return to their base at once, and not to attack U-boats (Probably own S/m's in the vicinity).