[Skybird]

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung writes:


"Let us hope that it is not true; but if it is, let us pray that it does not become common knowledge," the wife of the Anglican bishop of Worcester is said to have exclaimed in the face of Darwin's theory that humans and apes have common ancestors. A similar reflex can be observed in German politics at the moment, ever since Chancellor Olaf Scholz propagated the "turn of the times" when he drew a picture of a fundamental upheaval in European history on February 27: the world had become a different place overnight as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the European security order had been shattered; our freedom, our democracy and our prosperity were in existential danger; Russia's President Vladimir Putin was on his way to establishing a Russian empire.

The horror of Putin's war of aggression led to a moment of clarity. The resolutions Scholz announced in his historic speech met with broad consensus in the Bundestag. They include arms deliveries to Ukraine, far-reaching sanctions against Russia, a strengthening of NATO's eastern flank, a "special fund for the Bundeswehr" secured in the Basic Law, more than two percent of gross domestic product for defense, and an immediate reduction in energy dependence on Russia. Did German politicians understand that the turnaround announced by Scholz was more than just a shock moment that would eventually pass?

In view of the fundamental upheavals in the international order, the measures announced by the government so far can at best be a start. But seven weeks later, it seems as if the federal government has become afraid of its own clairvoyance. The momentum of the turn-of-the-century speech has almost passed again. It has just become apparent how difficult it is for the actors to think about politics on the basis of a reality that is not that of their own socialization. The caesura announced by Scholz for German foreign policy has so far been hesitant. It even seems as if the traffic light coalition is primarily concerned with imposing as little caesura as possible on itself and its electorate.
In the mills of the coalition

In Kiev, there is a justified impression that Germany has not followed up sufficiently on its big announcement that it would break the taboo on supplying Ukraine with weapons: Germany is delivering too hesitantly, too little, too late. The "special assets of the Bundeswehr" are in danger of being pulverized in the mills of the coalition and the intrigues of the opposition. Moreover, it is becoming clear that there will be no increase in the regular defense budget (which will remain unchanged at 50.1 billion euros until 2026), but that the 100-billion-euro fund will be used successively over the next few years to ensure that Germany meets NATO's two-percent target. [Skybird: Didn't I say within one or two days that I believe the German chnages when i see them and that the special fundings will be wasted like described here...? Heck, its GERMANY we are talking about, the SPD - the unshakable Russia-friends par ecellence...]

The question of how to proceed when the additional money is used up in a few years is left to the successor government. Germany is also acting with the handbrake on economic sanctions. The German government does not want to do without Russian energy imports in the short term. According to the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection, Robert Habeck, the Federal Republic would otherwise be threatened with mass unemployment and poverty. People would then "no longer be able to heat their homes," Habeck said.

German foreign policy is not moving decisively on either arms deliveries or broader sanctions. It is following the European convoy, and often only when there is no other way. Now would be the right moment to communicate clearly what it actually means to defend a free and open, just and peaceful Europe.

It is in Germany's own security interests to hinder and weaken the Russian war machine in Ukraine. The lukewarm response of Europeans and Americans to the 2014 annexation of Crimea has invited Putin to further land grabs. The whole thing was further promoted by the willingness to return promptly to business as usual with Russia, when Nord Stream 2 was already launched in 2015 by the Russian corporation Gazprom and five European corporations.

Together with its partners, the German government should now do everything in its power to ensure that Putin does not emerge as the winner from this war. Because if, as a result of the Russian invasion, the realization takes hold that those who brutely enforce territorial claims with military force will be rewarded, this will have far-reaching consequences for stability in Europe.



The last few weeks have shown that the Europeans, together with the Americans, can indeed significantly influence the course of the war if they support Ukraine. Further sanctions must be imposed as quickly and disruptively as possible. If the German government continues to reject a comprehensive energy embargo, it could at least support intermediate steps, such as a European oil embargo or punitive tariffs. Germany should not only provide money to upgrade Ukraine, but finally support and organize the delivery of heavy weapons.

It is fatal for the deterrent effect of the West that our partners in the EU and NATO are getting the impression that Germany is more of an obstacle than a pacesetter. Not only in the Kremlin, but also in Beijing and Taipei, people are watching closely how resolutely the EU and the U.S. react to Putin's aggression. For Germany's export-dependent economy, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would have devastating consequences.

Now would be a good time to take a closer look at relations with China. One of the great lessons of Germany's failed policy toward Russia is that "change through trade" does not have the desired effects, at least in autocratic systems. The much-vaunted energy partnership has not brought Russia closer to the West, but has made Berlin vulnerable and susceptible to blackmail. Lessons should be learned from this experience that not only energy flows but also economic networks and cross-border financial and data traffic can be used as weapons. Especially when the relationships are not reciprocal.

The extensive macroeconomic interdependencies with China also harbor security risks that have not been recognized in Germany for a long time, as has been shown, for example, in the expansion of Germany's 5G mobile networks. The German government should look very closely at strategic dependencies on Beijing that have arisen and develop a comprehensive diversification strategy. In terms of China's economic presence in Germany and Europe, it is important to strike the right balance between security, openness and economic resilience. In doing so, the German government should be aware of how close the authoritarian partnership between Russia and China has become.

With regard to the European security order, a return to the status quo ante is impossible. Putin no longer accepted the order based on the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris even before the attack on Ukraine. The Kremlin sees this order as a construct of the West that was imposed on Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, as a veto power, it wants to be able to set rules that restrict the sovereignty of its neighbors. As long as Putin is in the Kremlin, security in Europe cannot be organized jointly with Russia. Rather, it is a matter of effective security from Russia.

This will be exceedingly painful for Germany and Europe. The relationship with Russia will be characterized by permanent crisis management. In addition, there is a nuclear threat that was thought to have been overcome, but without the institutional and regulatory framework to contain it.

With Joe Biden, an American president is still in office who is heavily involved militarily in Europe. But this is not likely to last, even if Donald Trump does not return to the White House in 2024. In the long run, China is the bigger challenge for the U.S., and the Europeans must move quickly to shoulder the brunt of deterring and containing Russia.

Germany has a special responsibility in strengthening national and alliance defense. It must play a leading role in further strengthening the credibility of NATO and alliance cohesion and become the backbone of conventional alliance defense in Europe.

The international upheavals cannot be stopped or reversed. That is why Berlin must now do everything in its power to adapt German foreign, security and economic policy to the realities of the new era as quickly as possible.
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Jana Puglierin is a political scientist and heads the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations.


Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)