[Bubblehead1980]

TMO 2.5 w custom mods

100 difficulty. No contacts, no cams.


USS Drum SS-228
Seventh War Patrol
16 August- 6 October 1943

Assigned Area-Palau-Wewak-Rabaul shipping lanes

(A) Prologue

Returned from sixth war patrol 26 July 1943. Normal refit by the Submarine Repair Unit, assisted by U.S.S. FULTON, at Brisbane, Australia. Ready for sea: 16 August 1943.


(B) Narrative

16 August-

0930-Departed Brisbane en route patrol area via Milne Bay.

1130-Trim dive.

26 August-

0006-SJ contact 026 9 NM.

0009-General Quarters. Night surface torpedo

0024-One troopship est 6000 tons, one DD. Contact Report sent to CTF-72. Position 1 06 S 141 05 E Course 343 Speed 10 knots.

0028-Reply from CTF-72. Attack. Escorts should be attacked if possible.

0037-ATTACK NO. 1 Fired four MK 14 torpedoes. Target 1: KITRUIN MARU AP(3 torpedoes) Target 2 Minekaze Class DD (1 torpedo) Range :2400/2000 AOB 70/100 Torpedo depth 10 ft/3 ft POA MOT

Torpedo 1 impacted AP but was a confirmed dud. Torpedoes 2 and 3 impacted causing heavy damage. Torpedo 4 missed the DD just astern as it sped up after torpedo hit the first target. Drum illuminated by star shells and searchlight. DD turning after Drum, firing deck guns. two close splashes off bow. Ordered dive to 300 ft. Rigged for depth charge and silent running.

0038-KITRUIN MARU 6783 tons sunk 106 S 141 08 E.


0119-Close DC. Heavy damage reported in forward torpedo room.(See damage section). Damage control team assigned. Flooding reported.

0123-Flooding reported under control.

0151- Sound contact fading. Believe contact is "sleeping" trying to listen. Drum depth is 500 ft.

0230-Drum back at 350 ft.

0500-Radar depth: SJ contact 194 8 NM>

0502-Surfaced. Secured GQ.

0505-Inspection shows damage to torpedo tubes of varying degrees. Torpedo tube # 2 inoperable, under repair.

0800-Storms. Heavy seas, wind, medium fog, light rain




29 August-


1039-SD contact 16 NM. 0 50 S 140 50 E. Submerged

1300-Surfaced


1 September-

1431-SD contact 11 NM closing. Submerged. 2 S 142 0 E


1627-Surfaced.

28 August-
0100-Repairs on torpedo tube #2 complete. Tube is operational again.


5 September-

0524-Spotted three sampans ahead. Trailing for dawn gun action.


0540-General Quarters Battle Surface Gun Action

0610 - BATTLE SURFACE GUN ACTION. Approached from astern Commenced firing.

0624-Ceased fire. One large two medium sampans sunk by gun fire at 1 45 S 140 46 E. 80 tons (estimated) each.

5 September-27 September-

Patrolled assigned area with no contacts, aside from occasional SD contact at long range.


30 September-

0214-SJ contacts bearing 356 9 NM.

0221-General Quarters- Night surface torpedo.

0229-Contact report sent to CTF-72 Convoy sighted. Position: 2 23 S 143 31 E Est speed 8 knots est. course 261.

0238- Convoy course is 261 8.5 knots in two columns with five ships one known escort. Escort is Chidori or Otori type. Merchants are all AK of mid to large size.



0253 - ATTACK NO. 2 Range:2400/2300 AOB:70/95 POA MOT, Fore, Aft, MOT Torpedo Depth:10 ft.

0255- three torpedoes hit first target setting it afire. Three torpedoes hit second target, all confirmed duds. Convoy opened up with gunfire as Drum fled NE at high speed.

0300-SHAJIMA MARU 6450 tons sunk 2 25 S 140 46 E. Escort attempted to close Drum at high speed but unable to locate, slowed and began searching.

0354-Enemy escort is depth charging, convinced Drum had submerged. Drum on surface closing for follow up attack on surface with stern tubes.

0414- ATTACK NO 3. Fired four MK 14 from stern tubes on surface. Range: 1900 yards AOB 85 POA MOT. Four torpedoes hit SEIA MARU setting fires and causing list.

0416-SEIA MARU 7590 tons sunk. 2 26 S 143 24 E

0430-Secured GQ. Reloading torpedoes. End around for dawn submerged attack. Fuel is limiting factor as have just enough to move ahead for attack. Due to depart op area 0000 1 October.

0737-Regained SJ contact. General Quarters

0744-Smoke sighted bearing 054.

0820-Convoy zigged south west


0833-Submerge for attack.


0912-2000 yards off convoy track course 261. Escort is roughly 8000 yards astern of convoy, possibly checking out a false contact or guarding for a rear approach. This is fortunate as left convoy unguarded.

0923- ATTACK NO. 4 Range 900 yards AOB 90 Torpedo Depth 10 ft POA MOT MOT Fore mast, Aft mast. Four torpedoes fired, four impacts. Ship decimated. HAKUSIKA MARU 8150 tons sunk 2 23 S 143 31 E

0924- ATTACK NO 4a Range 900 yards AOB 85 Torpedo depth 10 ft POA MOT Fired two MK 14 torpedoes as trailing ship presented a favorable set up after hits on HAKUSIKA MARU. Both torpedoes hit the zigging target. RYUNN MARU class freighter crippled listing to starboard, large fire amidships, engine noises ceased. Moving to position for coup de grace with stern tubes if needed, all bow tubes expended.

0926-Sound check has escort closing from medium range, all clear.

0936- While moving into position. Crew of crippled freighter, in spite of list and fires fired at Drum's periscope with deck gun.

0937- Sound: Warship closing fast bearing 221 long range.

0939-Fired one MK 14 torpedo Range 700 yards AOB 90 MOT depth 6 ft. torpedo impacted. ship quickly completed its roll to starboard. RYUNN MARU 6538 tons sunk 2 16 S 142 56 E.

0942-Enemy escort sighted bearing 130 estimated range 6600 yards , closing. Drum to 300 feet, rigged for silent running and depth charge. Remaining enemy AK on zig course 261 unable to attack.

0950- DD on scene, pinging dropping charges astern, none close.

1010-DD overhead.

1011-While Drum was at a depth of 350 feet, a large, close pattern of depth charges caused heavy damage(see damage section). Flooding reported in forward torpedo and control room.

1018-Flooding reported under control in forward torpedo and control room . Forward dive planes inoperable.

1300-After several hours of evasion, lost contact with enemy.

1353-Secured GQ maintained silent running.

1833-Periscope depth. Clouds overcast, light fog, light chop to seas.

1935-Radar depth. SJ and SD sweep. All clear.

1845-Surfaced.

1848-Set course for Brisbane. Inspection shows boat has heavy damage (see damage section).


2 October-

0345- cleared Vitiaz Strait


6 October-

1800-Docked Brisbane. Terminated patrol.


(C) Weather
The area between the north coast of New Guinea and the Admiralty Islands \was generally favorable for most of the patrol, with the occasional squall popping up. The average winds were force two, predominantly southeast to southwest. Most days the sea were calm and glassy or has a light chop.

(D) Tidal Information
Variable currents up to one knot, setting southeast to southwest were noted well off the coast of New Guinea, south of the Admiralty Islands.

(E) Navigational Aids
None sighted.


(F) Attack

Vessels sunk by torpedo:

Date Time Ship Tons Location

9/5/1943 0038 KITRUIN MARU 6783 106 S 141 08 E

9/30/1943 0300 SHAJIMA MARU 6450 2 25 S 140 46 E

9/30/1943 0416 SEIA MARU 7590 2 26 S 143 24 E

9/30/1943 0923 HAKUSIKA MARU 8150 2 23 S 143 31 E

9/30/1943 0939 RYUNN MARU 6538 2 16 S 142 56 E


Vessels sunk by gunfire

9/5/1943 0624 Sampan x 3 80 (each) 1 45 S 140 46 E. 80 tons.



(G) Anti Submarine Measures and Evasive Tactics


Enemy ASW skill and efforts have definitely showed improvement with both depth charge attacks endured on this patrol causing heavy damage. Enemy active and passive sonar gear seems improved in ability and when combined with ideal sound conditions to gain and maintain contact on submerged submarines.

Enemy escorts are now typically equipped with both depth charge racks and throwers, enabling them to lay impressive patterns.

A noticeable enemy tactic is to "fake" a depth charge run coming from astern at high speed and not drop, but then to quickly turn in front of the submarine's expected path, in a version of "Crossing the T", laying patterns ahead and on top of the the submarine with racks and throwers.

Enemy seems to have implemented a convoy system as no unescorted vessels were encountered nor have been in last couple of patrols. Convoys typically consist of four to six vessels in two parallel columns with roughly 1000 yards between ships. Typically, there are two escorts, which make sweeping movements ahead and astern, often unexpected radical runs to the flanks.


While enemy tactics and weaponry to counter submerged attack have been improved, the night surface torpedo attack has proven quite effective. The enemy's apparent lack of surface search radar, combined with the darkness of the night and lack of escorts covering the flanks from which attacks are carried out, permits these attacks. Naturally, for a proper shot, submarine must close to 3000-2500 yards on the surface . The risk of gunfire, especially after illumination by star shells and searchlights from both escorts and the armed (often heavily) merchants, as well as possible ramming provides a certain amount of risk as well.

No surface patrols were encountered on this patrol. No patrol aircraft were sighted, with just a limited number of SD contacts.


Evasion on this patrol was fairly standard for the Drum. Depths of 300-400 feet with constant turns being conducted with 5-10 degrees rudder, silent running at 80 rpm, 50 at times, with max speed bursts when appropriate to get out from under depth charges and make radical course changes.

During the depth charge attack on 26 August, Drum was forced to a depth of 500 feet. Flooding caused the initial descent with leveling off at 475 feet, but when contact seemed to have a lock on Drum, eased down to 500 on next run and with a speed burst. At this depth, the enemy had difficulty tracking Drum. Once felt had shaken the escort, went back to 350 feet for safety and was able to slip away.


During the depth charging of 30 September, Drum was at 350 feet, having just slowed from a burst of speed when a well placed pattern ahead caused heavy damage, including flooding. Drum descended to 401 feet before backing full was able to level boat off and counter flooding. The forward dive planes were found to be inoperable, which made controlling the boat and evasion difficult. Drum was forced to endure several more patterns while conducting repairs and backing at moderate to high speeds. This seemed to confuse the enemy as their patterns were off mark each time.

Eventually, with flooding curtailed and water pumped, was able to control Drum better and maintained depth of 375 feet for rest of the evasion.

(H) Major Defects and Damage


The attack of 26 August caused serious damage to Drum. with forward torpedo room taking the brunt. Flooding and opening of sea vales causing moderate flooding in forward torpedo room. WCA sound gear and sonar head hoists were damaged.

All six forward torpedo tubes suffered heavy damage, with number two left completely inoperable for two days. All tubes were repaired following this attack over next 72 hours.

Air and water lines in conning tower and control room were leaking but repaired.


The depth charge attack of 30 September caused serious damage, much of which could not be repaired at sea.

A very close and large pattern caused leaks and flooding in forward torpedo room and control room. The damage control party were able to quell the flooding quickly and have water pumped out in just over an hour.

All six forward torpedo tubes were damaged beyond repair at sea. All forward torpedoes were expended at this point. Inspection revealed outer doors blown away.

The forward dive planes transmission was damaged beyond repair and thus the dive planes were rendered inoperable. This made evasion difficult let alone normal submerged operations.


The radio receiver was heavily damaged and was not able to be repaired before arriving back at Brisbane.

Inspection upon surfacing showed the 4 inch 50 cal deck gun to be heavily damaged and inoperable, along with the forward 20 MM mount. The aft and aft deck mounts were undamaged. Repairs were attempted but not completed before arriving back at Brisbane.

Most concerning is the apparent hull damage. Drum's hull was compromised by an estimated 20-21 percent.


Torpedo performance was greatly improved on this patrol. With the magnetic features of torpedo exploders disabled, premature detonations have been eliminated. All torpedoes appeared to run at set depth. As an attempt to prevent duds, care was taken to fire for torpedo impact at acute angles when possible per message received from CTF-72 on 18 August. 21 torpedoes were fired this patrol, with four confirmed duds.

(I) Radio

Radio equipment worked fine until the 30 September attack when the equipment, the receiver in particular was damaged and unable to be repaired before returning to Brisbane.


(J) Radar


SJ radar performance was improved this patrol. Contacts were typically detected at 8..5-9 NM. There remains a tendency of radar contact to weaken and at times to lose contact when at an AOB l to target ess then 75 or greater than 100. SJ radar has proven vital during night surface torpedo attacks.


SD radar performed well detecting contacts typically at 13-14 NM.


(K) Sound

Sound conditions were generally ideal, a blessing and a burden. The conditions permit Drum to easily track targets, but also enables the enemy's ASW efforts.


(L) Density Layers

Thermal layers were detected between 190 and 311 feet.


(M) Health , Morale, and Habitability.


Crew performance and morale was overall excellent. Those assigned to the forward torpedo room had a bit of a rough go at this time out, battle flooding twice and other serious damage in their compartment. Fortunately, all injuries were minor. One crewman was treated for battle fatigue as the events of 30 September left him shaken. Within a few days he returned to his normal duties. However, he was detached from the Drum upon return to port.




(N) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used

Brisbane to Area 2776.2 Miles 24288 Gallons
In Area 2390.4 Miles 10590 Gallons
Area to Brisbane 2530.0 Miles 33057 Gallons
Total 7696.6 Miles 67935 Gallons

(O) Duration

Total duration: 50 days

Days in patrol area: 34

Days en route to patrol area:10

Days en route to Brisbane: 6.5

Note: Transit Vitiaz Strait en route home in lieu of crossing north of Admiralty Islands and down the east coast of New Ireland, which cut transit time off. Given Drum's material state and given the chance of no encountering significant enemy forces in the straits, opted for the route , which could transit in one night.


(P) Factors of Endurance Remaining

Heavy damage
Torpedoes Remaining: 3-all stern.
Fuel: 17694 gallons

1 October was already scheduled departure date from patrol area.


(Q) Remarks


A challenging and ultimately successful patrol with five enemy merchant vessels sunk, as well as three sampans. The amount of time between the first ship sunk on 26 August and the last on 30 September, with no shipping contacts (aside from sampans) in between along these normally busy but ill defined shipping lanes leads me to believe the enemy changed their routes for most of September to avoid submarine attack, switching back towards the end, which routed the convoy encountered on 30 September into Drum's lap as had set course to the east to return to Brisbane.

Improved torpedo performance has greatly improved morale and ability to properly dispatch enemy shipping.