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Originally Posted by Kapitän
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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Tuesday, 1 December 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft
Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):
Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.
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The "Grado" Battalion of the "San Marco" naval infantry regiment of Italian Navy, is attached to our Army units in Tunisia. Our 10th Panzer Division launches a counterattack in Tunisia, pushing back the British 11th Brigade. Meanwhile, British 2nd Parachute Brigade crosses Miliane River south of Oudna airfield and continues northwest toward El Fedja.
After supplying U 564 - 519 - 86 - 92 - 653 orders are to occupy the intended reconnaissance lines to cover the America - Gibraltar convoy traffic. U 106 has recently joined Group "Westwall". Boats received orders to patrol in reconnaissance channels from CE 1363 - CE 4966 on 3.12. at 0800, course W., daily reckoning 160 miles in the following order: U 106 - 103 - 130 - 515 - 155 - 91 - 185 - 564 - 519 - 86 - 92 and 653.
The verbal reports of the Captains of U 263 (Kptlt. Kurt Nölke) and U 613 (Kptlt. Helmut Köppe) completely back up the accuracy of the resolution to move westward from the Gibraltar area. Both Captains' reports are in agreement regarding the very strong and dangerous air patrols which forced boats to remain submerged for excessive lengths of time. The fact that both boats returned to W. France in spite of heavy damage is on the one side, due to the outstanding quality of German U-boats, on the other side, due to the aggressive and unshakeable character of the crews, especially the Captains. As long as such crews (both boats on 1st war cruise) come from the homeland, one need have no misgivings regarding the future of the U-boat war. Also if the war becomes more difficult, these men will meet it with still greater fortitude.
In spite of these difficult circumstances which made the operations of larger numbers of U-boats W. of Gibraltar useless, 2 have closed the Moroccan harbors, through use of U 618 (Oblt. Kurt Baberg) and U 432 (Kptlt. Heinz-Otto Schultze). The possibility to gain something by sending single boats close to the coast must at least be attempted.
(Signed): DÖNITZ.
Italian blockade runner "Cortelazzo" was attacked by an English cruiser in BE 8481 at 1600 and was scuttled by the crew. Returning boats received orders, as far as fuel situation allows, to proceed at high speed to scene of the action and to take the crew on board. The first 5 boats can be in position after about 26 hours - 3 more with course of the 3rd and three more in the morning of the 4th/12. A U-boat coming from the E. goes to meet a life boat sailing to Spain. On assembly the boats are to begin the search according to weather conditions and drift. It is intended to use 3 Condor (rec. planes) on the 2nd.
U 648 (Oblt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) conducts U.A.K.-Training at Kiel.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115 |
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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Wednesday,
2 December 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft
Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):
Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.
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U-boat Success in November 1942.
1) U-boat success in November reached a new high and will probably mount to 900,000 T. The time has come to regard these results in a true light and to give propaganda proper guidance in this connection.
2) Merchant ship sinkings, losses and serious damage to U-boats, which will not be changed appreciably amount to: in N. Atlantic: 300,000 T. 5 lost, 1 badly damaged. Remainder of the Atlantic except Gibraltar area: 360,000 T. none lost, one heavily damaged. Gibraltar - Morocco area: 70,000 T., 3 lost, 5 badly damaged. Mediterranean: 100,000 T., 5 lost, 8 badly damaged. Arctic: 35,000 T. none lost or damaged.
3) The evaluation of these figures is as follows:
a) A good three quarters of the sinkings were in the open Atlantic a great preponderance at the beginning of the month, before the beginning of the African operation. Success fell off appreciably after withdrawal of boats for the Gibraltar area. As already reported in the opinion of B.d.U. the initial success in the Atlantic was conditioned by lack of counter measures in connection with the African landings.
Losses in the Atlantic maintained themselves in normal times, namely one boat for each 130,000 tons.
b) The success in operations against the enemy in the approaches to Africa west of Gibraltar-Morocco and in the Mediterranean comprise only one fifth of the total results. It must be pointed out that the firm position of the enemy at the time of the landing resulted in the heaviest losses, namely 1 boat for every 20,000 tons sunk and in addition a much higher percentage of boats heavily damaged. The losses in this area are therefore percentage wise more than six times as high as those in the entire Atlantic, about the North Atlantic. The average operational time of the 19 boats was only 8 days and of these boats none was in action 13 days after the beginning of the operation.
c) Results in the Arctic are of no numerical importance.
4) The outlook for December is unfavorable. According to the record month of November the smallest results are to be expected because:
a) The favorable conditions in the Atlantic cannot be taken advantage of because of withdrawal of boats to the Mediterranean and the Gibraltar-Morocco area.
b) In the Capetown area there are only 2 boats, which will probably have fired all their torpedoes in the course of the month.
c) The counter measures off Gibraltar in spite of aggressive operations, have succeeded and attacks in this area can expect only losses without the corresponding possibilities of success. That prospects in intercepting the enemy in the approaches are smaller, has already been reported.
d) Fewer targets can be expected in the Mediterranean after the first stream of shipping has ceased, the number of boats was raised 50% more during November and the defences remained the same.
5) Conclusions in brief:
a) Success in November have no connection with operations against African shipping. The prospects of these operations are meager. The opposition propaganda in the press will make false reports and will wreck damage in the long run.
b) After the record month of November, December must fall off perceptibly.
6) U-boat command and U-boats are ready and willing to fight under most difficult conditions. B.d.U. however, is of the opinion that the command must make a clear picture so that the relationship between losses and success is factual. The foregoing situation report alone serves this point.
The U-boat arm will also fight in the future under the most difficult conditions wherever they may be committed.
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U 648 (Oblt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) concludes
U.A.K.-Training at Kiel.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115