TMO 2.5 with custom mods
100 difficult cams and contacts off.
(Note* This report is shorter and has a lot of data from memory as I forgot to save the log somehow, power went out and lost all the data after 11 April, until 1 May)
Below is a link to a patrol chart. This is from the USS Drum website and is the route followed on actual ninth war patrol as well as on ninth patrol in the sim.
https://i.postimg.cc/fbxxcLSS/drum-patrolchart09.jpg
USS Drum SS-228
Tenth War Patrol
9 April-1 June 1944
Area: Bonin and Northern Volcano Islands
(A) Prologue
Returned from eighth patrol on 7 December, 1943. Three weeks of refit by Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., assisted by the relief crew of Submarine Division 101.
Left Pearl Harbor January 9, 1944 and arrived Mare Island on January 16, 1944.After eight consistent war patrols and heavy damage sustained on last two, Drum was due for an overhaul. Overhaul conducted at Mare Island January- March 1944. New conning tower installed due to crack from previous depth charging. New SJ-1 radar with PPI display installed along with JP listening gear. Departed Mare Island on March 22, 1944 with a new conning tower, and all alterations completed. Arrived Pearl Harbor March 29, 1944.Loaded twelve MK 23 and twelve Mark 18 torpedoes April 7 and 8, 1944. Ready for sea April 9, 1944.
(B.) Narrative
9 April-
0900-Departed Pearl Harbor for patrol area via Johnston Island in company with Tambor.
1800-Lost sight of Tambor.
11 April-
0900-1200-Refueled at Johnston Island
12 April-22 April-
En route patrol area- Bonin Islands. No contacts. Oddly enough no patrol aircraft from Wake or Marcus Island.
22 April-
0300-Entered patrol area.
1458-SJ contact bearing 095 14 NM. Position 28 10 N 141 10 E
1500-PPI displays large grouping of nine ships with escorts ahead and on ahead flank, three total.
1502-General Quarters.
1520-Submerged for attack on port flank of convoy.
1545-Sound check reveals bearing change. At periscope depth, observed convoy zigged to SW. While this did not ruin the shot, it opened the range from ideal to long. Drum went to 100 feet and ahead full .
1600-Periscope depth. Plot shows should be able to fire at 3800 yards.
1605-ATTACK NO.1 Fired three MK 23 torpedoes from tubes 1,2, and 3. Range 3850 yards.
1606-All three torpedoes hit target. Large fires observed and target listing.
1609- NAGARA MARU 7145 tons sunk 28 N 141 24 E.
1610- Type A Shimushu Class escort closing from bearing 030 range 3100 yards. Ordered Drum to 300 feet, rigged for silent running and depth charge.
1615-First in series of furious but ineffective attacks by two escorts.
1700-Last depth charge run. Escorts heard leaving area.
2100-Surfaced. Secured General Quarters and reloaded torpedoes. Began searching to regain contact for end around.
2309-Regained SJ contact at 13 NM bearing 004.
23 April-
0000-General Quarters Torpedo Surface Attack.
0010-Off starboard side of convoy. Targets medium sized tanker and medium sized merchants. Convoy zigged forcing Drum to fire earlier than planned.
0011-ATTACK NO. 2 - Fired three MK 23 torpedoes at tanker. Range 2000 yards AOB 80 POA MOT Depth 8 ft.
0012-Three torpedoes hit the tanker, which exploded in massive fireball, illuminating the area, including Drum, which was over half way through it's turn away.
Drum, illuminated by star shells and searchlights and at a closer range than planned due to the unexpected zig came under heavy machine gun and auto cannon fire from merchants and escorts, as well as 3 or 5 inch gun fire with some splashes landing close as Drum sped away in overdrive at 22 knots.
In lieu of diving continued high speed run alternating 5 degrees rudder for constant helming, this preventing accurate gunnery by escorts. Port lookout, Petty Officer 2nd Class D. Rosencrans was lightly wounded by machine gun fire.
After ten minutes of pursuit Drum has opened range but was still pursued by a Wakatake Class DD and the Mikura Class Type B escort. Eventually the range was opened and they turned back to join the convoy. A definite close call caused by the unexpected zig at key moment before firing.
0016-SEITO MARU 5150 tons sunk 27 19 N 141 28 E.
0400-A follow up attack was planned, however a squall set in with heavy seas, rain, and fog. SJ contact was just and not regained. Drum turned north back into patrol area.
27 April-
0904- At dawn, SD contact. 8 NM closing fast. Position 26 15 N 141 39 E. 50 NM SW Haha Jima.
1004-Sound has fast screws at 101 bearing. SJ sweep at radar depth has lone contact bearing 099 13 NM. Rapid bearing suggests high speed target.
1016-Masts of a warship spotted.
1028-General Quarters. Contact is a full sized destroyer. Believe aircraft, while did not attack Drum spotted her and called in a surface patrol.
1034- DD's track presented favorable setup for stern shot with Mark 18 torpedoes.
1046-ATTACK NO. 3- Fired two MK 18 torpedoes from tubes 7 and 8 at zigging destroyer. Range 1800 yards AOB 75 Depth 5 feet. POA MOT.
1047-Both torpedoes hit the destroyer causing explosions and fires . Two large holes amidships at water line.
1050- Minekaze Class Destroyer sunk 1215 tons. 26 1 E 141 48 N
1100-Surfaced. Secured from General Quarters.
28-29 April-
Only contacts were daily SD contacts, no visuals.
Patrolled submerged off West coast and harbor of Chi Chi Jima through day of 29 April.
30 April-
0700-Received radio report of enemy weather ship or picket in vicinity of Sofu Gan, set course for Sofu Gan at 18 knots.
1 May-
0701- SJ contact on line pip off Sofu Gan.
0715-Submerged for approach and prepared for Battle Surface at dawn
0801-As dawn broke, observed stationary tug like vessel presumed to be a weather ship and picket anchored 5000 yards SE of Sofu Gan. What is believed to be a 4 inch deck gun observed forward.
0805-General Quarters- Battle Surface Gun Action
0810-Surfaced.
0811-Commenced firing from 4500 yards. Three hits amidships at water line and in deck housing.
0813-Target finally replied with a few rounds from deck gun. Crew ordered to target enemy weapons.
0816-Enemy guns now silent after several hits by 4 inch 50 cal gun. Switched back to aiming for waterline and hull.
0817-Vessel is burning and listing. Ceased fire.
0821-Enemy weather tug/picket estimated 1100 tons sunk. 29 47 N 140 23 E 4200 yards SE of Sofu Gan. Survivors seen in raft.
0825-Drum secured from GQ turned south at high speed.
2-7 May- No contacts aside from daily SD contacts.
8 May-
0000-0800-
Replaced MK 23 in tubes 1-4 with MK 18. Forward load out is now 4 MK 18 in tubes 1-4, two MK 23 in tubes 5 and 6. Three MK 24 in reserved. Four MK 18 in stern tubes with two four reserves.
11 May-
0510- SJ contacts 349 14 NM. 27 41 N 141 28 E. PPI indicated 2-3 ships in column with one ahead and one on each flank. Possible TF or fast moving convoy as SJ shows rapid bearing change.
0515- General Quarters.
0538- Visual on targets. Lead DD possibly Akatskuki Class followed by CL possibly Oyodo Class followed by CA. Possibly Takao Class.
0547-Drum struggling to pull ahead. Engines on overload. Speed 22 knots.
0552- Turning about to bring bow tubes to bear as could not outpace the targets and burning precious fuel.
0554-Submerged for attack. Moonlight prevented surface attack. Contact report sent to COMSUBPAC. Task Force sighted . Position 27 33 N 141 23 E Course 179 speed 22 knots
0604- ATTACK NO 4. Fired four MK 18 Range:1400 AOB 70: Torpedo depth: 10 feet POA: MOT with two degree spread on TDC.
0605-Just after torpedo #4 exited the tube. Intense, short scale pinging began. A check showed a large DD beleived to be Shimakaze astern of Drum at 10000 yards. Drum went deep rigged for silent running and depth charge.
0608-Depth charge explosions. Drum shaken but undamaged. Depth 300 feet. Drum descended 380 feet.
0630-DD's appear to have lost contact with Drum. Many depth charges heard estimated 3000-6000 yards aster With winds at 13 knots, the chop and thermal layer encountered at 197 feet appear to have thwarted the counter attack. Also, like many previous encounters with escorts of capital ships, the effort is not so much to destroy a submarine but to pin it down while the larger warships escape.
0720-Lost contact with DD, last heard leaving area at high speed. Drum at 380 feet. Maintained silent running. Secured from General Quarters. On course to NW to clear area. Likely ASW patrols will arrive in area.
0914-Periscope depth. All clear. Secure silent running. Winds appear to have dropped to five knots
0915- Drum remained submerged for rest of day to avoid ASW aircraft and surface patrols in area. ASW efforts heavy.
2200-Surfaced.
12 May-
0001-Received orders to assume lifeguard position off Iwo Jima for strikes on
15 May.
0532-Ten NM west of Iwo Jima. Observed carrier based aircraft TBF F6F attacking Iwo Jima. One F6F was observed crashing into ocean. No bail out observed. Swept area , no downed aircrew reported or located. Returned to Bonin Islands area.
16-19 May- Storms arrived in area. Persisted through afternoon of 19 May.
20 May-Fuel low and per operation order, set course for Pearl Harbor.
1 June-
0900-Docked at Pearl Harbor.
(C.) Weather
Weather en route to area was excellent with calm seas mostly. Weather in patrol area was superb, aside from a squall that arrived , preventing a follow up night surface attack on 23 April. Weather remained excellent until 16-19 May when heavy seas, wind, and rains persisted for several days. Weather began to clear when Drum departed patrol area on 20 May.
(D.) Tidal Information
In the Bonins and Kazan Retto, sets of about one knot were encountered when close to the islands, predominantly to the southward. Southerly winds decreased this set.
No set was experienced when well off the islands both to the westward and to the eastward.
(E.) Navigational Aids
Sofu Gan was as usual for boats operating in the area used as a navigational aid in addition to sighting and SJ targeting of Chi Chi, Haha, and Iwo Jima Islands.
(F.) Attack Data
Torpedo Attack No. 1
Date: 1944/04/22 Time:1604 Location: 28 N 141 24 E.
Description: Submerged attack. Fired three MK 23 torpedoes from tubes 1, 2, and 3 at a large NAGARA MARU class AK from 3850 yards, AOB 80. Torpedo depth was 8 feet with point of aim(POA) middle of target (MOT).
Result: All three torpedoes impacted target causing large fires. AK NAGARA MARU 7145 tons sunk at 1609.
Torpedo Attack No. 2
Date:1944/04/23 Time:0011 Location:27 19 N 141 28 E.
Description: Fired three MK 23 torpedoes from tubes 4,5,6 at tanker. Range 2000 yards AOB 70 POA: MOT Torpedo Depth: 8 ft.
Result: All torpedoes impacted. Tanker erupted into massive fireball a was likely carrying refined aviation or vehicle gasoline southbound. The last two torpedoes were somewhat redundant as the first torpedo set off the explosion. AO SEITO MARU 5150 tons sunk at 0016 hours.
Torpedo Attack No. 3
Date:1944/04/27 Time:1046 Location: 26 1 E 141 48 N
Description: Fired two MK 18 torpedoes from tubes 7 and 8 at zigging destroyer. Range 1800 yards AOB 75 Depth 5 feet. POA: MOT.
Result:Both torpedoes impacted the destroyer causing explosions and fires . Two large holes amidships at water line. Target took forward port list. Minekaze Class Destroyer sunk 1215 tons sunk at 1050 hours.
Torpedo Attack No. 4
Date:1944/05/11 Time:0604 Location: 27 33 N 141 23 E
Description: Fired four MK 18 torpedoes at Takao Class Heavy Cruiser. Range:1600 AOB: 70 POA MOT w/ two degree spread on TDC. Depth 10 feet. Target Course and speed: 179 degrees at 22 knots.
Result: Missed Reason(s): Enemy destroyer detected Drum just after torpedo four was fired. An audible alarm klaxon was audible through the hull, searchlights observed and the target slowed, then sped up with a hard and impressive starboard turn (away from Drum) which likely caused the torpedoes to miss ahead. This of course, was quite disappointing as had a near perfect set up with wakeless torpedoes on an important enemy warship.
Gun Attack No. 1
Date:1944/05/01 Time:0811-0817 Location: 29 47 N 140 23 off Sofu Gan.
Description: Fired thirty-one 4 inch 50 Caliber rounds at a 1100 ton armed weather tug from 4500 yards.
Result: Twenty-two of thirty-one rounds hit the target, demolishing it. Roughly 50 percent of hits focused on the water line but the vessel, like most wood construction Japanese vessels was stubborn. The dawn attack surprised the crew as the vessel was at anchored and did not return fire until several rounds hit hit the vessel.
Drum's gun crew quickly silenced the the 4 inch gun mounted forward with several hits. Several more hits at waterline and in the pilot house area/deck left the tug burning and listing. Finally, the vessel sunk at 0820 off Sofu Gan. Survivors were observed in a raft but were not approached. Drum's 20 MM guns were manned but were not utilized in this action.
(G.) Mines
No mines were encountered.
(H.) Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasive Tactics.
Enemy air patrols and surface patrols in the area were generally heavy. Typically when between 25-28 N and 139-142 E would encounter two SD contacts per day, usually before noon and in later afternoon early evening.
When within one hundred nautical miles of Iwo Jima and Chi Chi Jima, would encounter SD contacts at night. The APR-1 RWR did detect radar emissions from these night flyers. However, none detected Drum as submerging out of caution was typical.
After Drum sunk the Minekaze Destroyer, no more surface patrols were encountered Believe this was possibly the lone ocean going patrol vessel in region. Small PC type craft were observed at long range at Chi Chi and Haha Jima.
Counterattack #1
The enemy's counter attack with depth charges on 22 April was initially intense but quickly faded and not effective. This was a welcome respite considering the intense and damaging attacks Drum had began to routinely experience on prior two war patrols. The thermal layer and choppy seas certainly assisted Drum's evasion, which was standard with depths of 300-380 feet with speed bursts as needed and constant turning, alternating of direction.
Counterattack # 2
Two enemy escorts opened from from 2500(forward)-1900(aft to port of Drum) yards away on Drum, initially with a barrage of machine gun and auto cannon fire and then main battery fire. A few rounds of the auto fire did strike the Drum, wounding a look out.
The convoys unexpected zig left Drum somewhat sandwiched and firing at 2000 yards instead of 2500 on the target. The target's massive fuel laden explosion illuminated Drum, compounded by star shells and searchlights.
Drum was half way through turn away to starboard in 180 degree turn when the torpedoes hit. "Ahead Emergency" was ordered placing overload on engines. Drum accelerated to a 22.5 knot surface speed, estimating a 2.5 knots speed advantage of the old destroyer and the escort, which continued to fire even as Drum's stern was now showing them as she raced into the night.
Five degrees right/left rudder applied alternately gave Drum a decent zig pattern which helped avoid accurate gun fire from the escorts. Eventually with range opened, both ceased fire but continued pursuit for some time, before slowing and turning back. Obvious these escorts do not have a surface search radar.
Counterattack #3
The sneaky manner in which the enemy DD was able to get near Drum unnoticed during the attack on the cruiser was impressive. It is possible the DD was returning from it's sweep and heard the torpedoes fire. As has proven typical with escorts of large warships or fast moving merchants, the counter attack was to keep the submarine pinned down while the heavies escaped at high speed and out of range. The attack was brief and inaccurate but achieved its goal. Evasion was standard method and depth.
(I.) Lifeguard Operations
Per orders received via radio assumed lifeguard positions off Iwo Jima. SD radar detected inbound strikes at 11 NM. Visual identification was made on TBF and F6F aircraft.
No calls for assistance were received no damage aircraft ditching or pilots/crew bailing out. However, one F6F was observed crashing. Drum went to scene and swept area but located no downed aircrew.
(J.) Major Defects and Damage.
Drum suffered no damage this patrol nor defects.
This was Drum's first patrol with two new type of torpedoes, the MK 23 and 18. Performance of both were excellent with no known malfunctions.
(K.) Radio
Radio performance was excellent.
(L.) Radar
The new SJ-1 surface search radar performed excellently with average detection range at fourteen nautical miles. The new PPI display provides a real advantage in tracking targets and setting up for attack.
SD radar performed well, with typical detection at thirteen nautical miles.
(M.) Sound
Sound conditions were generally poor to average in the area. The JP-1 sound gear, installed during the navy yard overhaul performed well but did not provide an discernible advantage on this patrol.
The temperature gradients, choppy seas, and others seemed to provide not ideal sound conditions for the enemy hindering their tracking and attacking of Drum.
(N.) Thermal layers
Thermal layers were encountered at 196, 240, and 233 feet.
(O.) Health, Food, and Habitability
Since the entire patrol was on the surface in cool spring weather, the boat was comfortable all the time. This fact also cut the time lost due to minor ailments to a minimum. Two mild cases of catarrhal fever each were cured in three days.The food was well prepared throughout the run.
Petty Officer 2nd Class Dilbert H. Rosencrans suffered minor injuries from gunfire during the surface attack on 23 April. Rosencrans was return to duty with one day.
(P.) Personnel
Lieutenant V. O.McDonald assumed the role of Executive Officer upon the detachment of Lieutenant R. B. P. Digby during the overhaul period. Throughout the period roughly half of Drum's crew was rotated out. Since the ship was out of the areas five months, to the day, much indoctrination of the new officers and men was necessary. However, performance of crew was excellent throughout the patrol.
(Q.) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used
Miles Gallons Gals/Miles
Pearl to Johnston 813 12306 15.1
Johnston to Area 3000 30715 10.2
In Area 1 6233 33473 5.4
Area to Majuro 5295 30343 11.9
Total: 12641 106837
(R.) Duration
Days Enroute to Area 13
Days in Area 31
Days Enroute to Majuro 9
Days Submerged 3
(S.) Factors of Endurance Remaining
Torpedoes: 12
Fuel 20157 gallons
Provisions 0 days
Personnel 14 days
Limiting Factor of This Patrol: Fuel and Operation order.
(T.) Remarks.
Aside from the convoy contact of 22/23 April, the lack of consistent merchant traffic in the area was disappointing as this since has long been a busy shipping corridor. A patrol to the east of the Bonins since the area was unoccupied also provide fruitless. It is possible the enemy has limited or even terminated this shipping route at this time.
It is believed the enemy is using a new, larger, and more powerful depth charge as the explosions seem to emit more of shockwave even at greater distance. Depth charge capacity and deployment apparatuses such s throwers seem more common as well. Further more, the convoy attacked was large by imperial standards and had three escorts and further suggests an actual convoy system has been implemented.