Quote:
Originally Posted by Kapitän
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Sunday, 9 May 1943 - West of Vigo
- continued from 9 May 1943, 2220 -
2233 - Outgoing F.T.: To B.d.U.:
9.5., 0920, Qu.1577CG, Escort Group with Escort Carrier and three Destroyers and again at 1700 in Qu.1755CG, both on course NW, 18kn. Both times not able to attack due to attack of carrier based airplane and high swell at day time. No damages. Suspect two different escort groups. Switching to Circuit Amerika-I. 497cbm. 15 eels. ENE5/4, clear, visibility 7.5nm, >1000mb. - RST -
2304 - Incoming F.T.'s:
From O.K.W.:
a) The German occupation government in the Netherlands declared martial law.
b) The "San Marco" Italian naval infantry regiment surrendered at Bizerte, Tunisia.
From O.K.M.:
a) In order to make it possible for the boats to guide in other boats when they themselves have sighted a convoy even when there are major differences in fixes, a shadower's signal buoy has been constructed and two boats (U 358 and U 381) have been equipped with one to try out. The buoy is to be fired as a star or rocket in the same way as the former signal rocket with axial staff, and will be distinguishable by very obvious characteristics from star signals and illuminant rockets, as the enemy often uses these to lead our boats astray. If these buoys are satisfactory, it is intended to use them operationally.
From B.d.U.:
a) U 666 Oblt. Herbert Engel) brought down a "Halifax" (misidentified as a Sunderland) with 6 shots at 1028 in the Bay of Biscay, Qu. BE 6888. The Halifax only strafed the boat on its first attack and received AA hits in one of the port engines during a second run. The pilot then apparently lost control when turning to come in again and the Halifax crashed into the sea about 500m (546 yds) from the boat, killing the crew of eight.
b) U 648 (Oblt.d.R. Peter Arthur Stahl), 168, 381 and 226 refueled from U 459 (KrvKpt. Georg von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf).
c) U 663 (KrvKpt. Heinrich Schmid) was not found and so far, has not reported. According to dead reckoning she must enter port at the latest on 12.5.
d) U 531 and 438 were probably caught unawares and sunk in the thick fog while operating on convoy No.36, U 438 was probably lost after a daylight attack. U 630 and U 192 (Oblt. Werner Happe) did not report at all after attacking the convoy. Last message from U 630 was dated 21.4. as she left the supply boat in BD 25. U 192 last radioed on 3.5. from AJ 3757 (Convoy No. 33). Both these boats may therefore have been lost earlier.
5 boats must be considered lost.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115
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tarted new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
+++++++
U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Monday,
10 May 1943 - West of Vigo
0201 - Trying to re-establish contact with the escort groups in the area. Course 52°.
0242 - Qu.1577CG - Course 128°.
0402 - Qu.1812CG - Course 180°.
0454 - Qu.1815CG - Course 231°.
0545 - Early Morning Dawn.
0703 - Sunrise. Weather and Sea unchanged in 2 days.
1017 - Qu.1767CG - Course 270°.
1039 - Qu.1759CG - FuMB Detection in 250°true and 262°true (no Magic Eye), E=18000. 2xH.F.
1043 - Destroyer bearing 344°, E=138000, on course NNE, medium speed.
1047 - Trying to get a closer look. Course 315°, Full-Ahead.
Slowly more and more destroyers come into sight, a River Class Frigate can clearly be identified. Appears to be a Hunter/Escort Group consisting of at least 7 destroyers, on course 18°, 12 kn.
1052 - New course 18°, 2xH.F./13kn. Approaching as close as 9400m - no detection.
1124 - On course 0°. Decision to break-off pursuit. Reason:
1. Unfavourable attack conditions, i.e, medium heavy swell and no cover due to clear daylight;
2. Numeric superiority of enemy;
3. Such attack not within scope of actual Op.-Order.
1140 - Running off on course 110°, and at 1153 on course 164°.
1200 - Qu.1764CG -
Days Run: 183.6nm - ↗ 174.3nm (20h 50') - ↘ 9.3nm (3h 10')
Total: 1138.1nm (5tg 22h) - ↗ 1096.5nm (5tg 7h 10') - ↘ 41.6nm (14h 50')
495cbm (3cbm in 24h); Course 164°; Weather and Sea unchanged in 2 days and 5h.
Note: Possible salvo shots with 3 torpedoes are: I-II-III and II-III-IV.
1215 - Qu.1764CG - Course 270°.
Outgoing F.T.:
To B.d.U.:
1200 Enemy Task Force 7 Destroyers in Qu.1753CG on course 18°, 12kn. Attack not possible due to seastate and no cover due to clear daylight. Continue outbound transit. 495cbm. ENE5/4, medium heavy swell, clear, visibilty 7.5nm, >1000mb. - RST -
1355 - Qu.1755CG - 225RPM/8kn.
2120 - Sundown. Weather and Sea unchanged in 2 days and 14h.
2244 - Qu.3955CF -
2303 -
Incoming F.T.'s:
From OKW:
a) Heinz Guderian tells The Führer of his misgivings about the Zitadelle plan. Uncharacteristically, Hitler responded that, he too, had concerns about an offensive at Kursk.
b) The British 1st Army reached Hammamet, Tunesia, with the British 6th Armoured Division cutting off our troops at Cape Bon, Tunisia.
From B.d.U.:
a) U 663 (KrvKpt. Heinrich Schmid) not found.
b) Received the following orders for torpedo equipment of boats:
1)
Standing B.d.U. Order No. 40 (Appendix 5) for the torpedo equipment of boats with the Pi 2, Fat G7A and FAT G 7e at present available.
2)
Standing B.d.U. Order No. 309: New depth settings of Pi 2 with "MZ one" (Previous reference: Standing B.d.U. Order No. 35 and Standing B.d.U. Order No. 301 "Draughts of Merchant Vessels".).
3)
Standing B.d.U. Order 306: Method of using FAT torpedoes (incl. Operational release of FAT G 7E).
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115