Quote:
Originally Posted by Kapitän
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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Tuesday, 24 November 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft
Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):
Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.
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The 3rd Battalion of the "San Marco" naval infantry regiment of Italian Navy completes its transfer from Corsica, France to Tunisia.
The request for situation reports of attack possibilities and countermeasures in the Gibraltar area reveals the following:
U 130 (KrvKpt. Ernst Kals): No possibility of attack near the coast because of constant air patrols. Contact on convoys impossible to keep due to screening vessels by night and heavy air patrols by day. Boat believes it best to stay outside the area of air patrols in order to attack convoys reported from other sources.
U 155 (Kptlt. Adolf Cornelius Piening) has established nothing outside presence of patrol craft and radar. Strong air and sea patrols up to 500 miles from the coast. In the present position she has been forced to submerge by day and has been subject to Radar by night. This boat also considers operation outside air patrol area as essential for successful attacks.
U 185 (Kptlt. August Maus) is sailing W. because of heavy damage and is ordered to go to U-tanker to carry out repairs.
U 118 (XB; KrvKpt. Werner Czygan) designated as tanker for Group "Westwall" received orders to take operational areas CF 70 and 80 and DH 10 and 40. As her first supply operation, she is to operate with Gibraltar area boats.
U 263 (Kptlt. Kurt Nölke) a boat of Group "Westwall" was bombed by a plane in CG 7294 at 1145 and is unable to dive. Boats nearby ordered to go to her assistance. About 0200 she was bombed again and was unable to fight the plane off without damage to herself. After the boat had been made dive worthy the others were ordered back to their sectors. Joint return through Bay of Biscay was agreed upon with U 511 (Kptlt. Friedrich Steinhoff).
U 173 (Oblt. Hans-Adolf Schweichel) belongs to Group "Westwall" and last reported on 16 October from about DJ 2284. Further radio messages have not been received in spite of repeated requests to do so. According to Radio Intercepts a U-boat was attacked in DJ 22 on 18 November and believed destroyed. Possibly U 173 was sunk in this engagement. We must consider her lost.
U 184 (Kptlt. Günther Dangschat) was operating against Convoy No. 66 (ONS.144) and on 20 November in BC 28 she was forced to veer off by far ranging screening vessels. Boats involved were ordered to the attack. U 184 has not reported since. Her loss is probable.
U 505 (Kptlt. Peter Zschech) attacked a fast freighter in EH 3773 on 24 November and in DT 9787 and 9785 on 25 November, course S.E. Impossible to close with her because of speed limitations due to faulty diesel. Ship was evidently a member of convoy which had broken up.
According to previous Radio Intercept an enemy plane scored a bomb hit on a U-boat in BF 5282. It was believed to be U 413 and a light sweeper flotilla was sent at high speed toward the point. Of the boats in question, U 413 - 507 - 217, U 217 (VIID; Oblt. Kurt Reichenbach-Klinke) has not yet reported. We await further reports. U 413 and U 507 are moving on.
U 648 (Oblt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) conducts U.A.K.-Training at Kiel.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115 |
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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Wednesday,
25 November 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft
Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):
Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.
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The Führer orderes the
seizure of the French fleet at Toulon, France.
Gibraltar situation - Morocco area:
1) In an effort to completely intercept the stream of shipping to Gibraltar from England and America as well as the southwest, the first placements of boats in areas CG 90, 80, DJ 10 and 20 was made close to the coast. On 18 November heavy defenses and countermeasures close to the coast made it necessary to move farther from shore in area CG 80. On 20 November the limit had to be extended to CG 70. As a result a wide gap was made west of Cape Vincent, through which shipping from England could pass without being attacked. Similarly shipping from the S.W. would not be apprehended.
Since this disposition brought no success, placements along an E-W line was ordered on 23 November. In this way a final attempt was made to intercept traffic through the "Hole". On the other hand, boats were given the option of operating freely in case of countermeasures became to strong close to Gibraltar and Morocco. This new disposition of craft brought no success. Whether because of intercepts, or reports, from Gibraltar many convoys must have passed through this area and not one was seen, an indication that countermeasures were successful in keeping boats submerged day and night at some distance.
2) For the purpose of clearing up the situation, 2 well known captains (U 155; Piening - U 130; Kals) were requested to give their opinions of the possibilities for success and the anti-submarine situation in the last operational area. According to the reports of the two captains and previous reports of other boats, the following situation is presented:
Since the enemy has gained a foothold in Morocco his anti-submarine measures have strengthened greatly. Heavy air patrols day and night ranging 300 miles from land, patrol craft and destroyer search groups divided among the area, make even one's presence in these areas difficult and dangerous. With one exception (ship alone sunk by U 92) convoys are strongly protected and air patrols are rapidly making attack area untenable. The U-boat should not be committed in areas close to land since it is not able to take evasive measures.
Example: Attacks on convoys in the North Channel have been considered impossible for the past 1 1/2 years, and in this connection it is worthy of notice that defences in that area were never so strong as those of Gibraltar are today, surface and aircraft radar and patrols not considered. 3) Since 20 November there has been no further success reported, so that the total in the Gibraltar - Morocco area remains at the following level:
12 Nov. DJ 2519 3 explosions, 1 hit seen on freighter. U 173
13 Nov. CG 8830 4 hits on Birmingham type cruiser, 1 DD probably sunk. U 515
14 Nov. Fedala Roads 2 transports sunk, 1 probably sunk. Total 22,500 tons. U 130
14 Nov. CG 4556 "Warwick Castle". U 413
15 Nov CG 8665 3 hits on 3 large transports. U 155
16 Nov DJ 2284 Hit on 6,000 tonner. U 173
16 Nov CG 9457 Ship 12,000 tons sunk. U 92
20 Nov. CG 8731 3 steamers 15,000 tons sunk, 1 steamer torpedo. U 263
The transport "Warwick Castle" was sunk W. of Lisbon by a boat returning to port.
Therefore in the last 5 days: 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer and 5 ships were sunk 7 ships torpedoed.
In the next 4 days: 3 ships sunk, 1 ship torpedoed and no further sinkings since 21 November.
Against this we suffered the following losses and damage out of total of 23 boats.
Total loss: 3 boats U 411 - 98 - 173.
Badly damaged so that immediate return was ordered: U 218 - 613 - 413 - 566 - 263.
A number of boats suffered minor damage from plane bombs of D/C's.
Deductions: Attack of supply shipping in the usual stationary manner no longer possible within 500 miles of Gibraltar. Further delay does not indicate losses. Without corresponding compensating possibilities of success.
Conclusions: Attacks on supply shipping must be carried out beyond the range of enemy air patrols, since it then can be treated as a pure convoy action this must be begun on the "Starting side of the Atlantic" so far from Gibraltar that attack is possible for several days.
4) From the data at hand (U-boat sightings intercepts, intelligence reports) is is decided that evidently a larger part of ships used in the African landing, especially troop transports from England and a few convoys from America came from the N.W.
a) There are only small prospects of success in operations against shipping from England since there are constant English air patrols in the area. Running attack is therefore impossible and the prospects for stationary attacks are bad since the area to be occupied between 11 and 24° is too large. Convoys can be cut up by incoming and outgoing boats and short operations are possible by these boats and can be carried out if the convoys are sighted
b) Attack on the America - Gibraltar supply traffic: Only 2 reports given along the enemy route: Convoy in CF 4399, course E. on 2 November (sighting report of U 514) convoy N. of Azores course E. on 16 November (Spy). The entire Great Circle route between Norfolk and Boston on one side and Gibraltar on the other side lies N. of the Azores between 39 and 42 N. and this offers promise for a fair amount of success to operations in that area.
Aims: Boats of Group "Westwall" which have sufficient fuel are to take position in observation line from CF 6518 to 9189 and sail westward toward the presumed convoy route. Boats which are low on fuel are to refuel at once and join the group in order to broaden the observation strip. Boats to sail together westward to about CD 20. From here attacks can be carried out without the presence of enemy aircraft from the east. If no convoys are sighted this operation will be considered a failure. On the other hand, interception of only one convoy will result in greater success than Group "Westwall" has had thus far.
He 111 aircraft from Tatsinskaya Airfield and Morozovskaya Airfield in Rostov Oblast, Russia fly 75 tons of supplies, mostly fuel, into
Stalingrad.
U 648 (Oblt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) conducts
U.A.K.-Training at Kiel.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115