Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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Wednesday, 30 September 1942 - Paris, Avenue Maréchal Maunoury
Our Luftwaffe Ace "Jochen" Marseille has fallen:
After a dive bomber escorting mission, the engine of Hauptmann Hans-Joachim Marseille's Bf 109G-6 fighter caught fire southeast of El Imayid, Egypt. Unable to make it back to his airfield due to black smoke entering the cockpit, our 22-year-old "Star of Africa" attempted to bail out, but while doing so he struck the vertical stabilizer across his chest and hip. He fell to his death 7 kilometers south of Sidi Abdel Rahman, Egypt at 1142 hours. For a moment, a horrific blow to our morale, which however, only strengthens our determination and resolve in seeing through our war effort until final victory.
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Briefing and hand-over of my duties as 1. Admiralstabsoffizier operativ (A I op) 'Geleitzugs-Asto' (convoy staff officer) to my successor Kptlt. Adalbert Schnee (formerly, commander of U 201).
In his new role, Kptlt. Adalbert ("Adi") Schnee, will take over my task of planning and organising operations against Allied convoys:
Submarine situation and intended operations.
Note: Submarine situation reports will be sent to Naval War Staff at pre-set intervals. They will set out a summarized assessment of the situation and the intentions of B.d.U.
1)
Convoy situation in the North Atlantic:
Contrary to convoy methods during the first six months of 1942, convoys are no scattered over a wider area. Even so, the spacing out is not nearly so great as in Autumn 1941, and remain within certain limits on either side of the Great Circle. Information gathered through Radio Intercept Intelligence and experienced gained on the timing of convoys have made it possible to track down convoys, especially when westbound. Prospects are still considered favorable on this respect. The successes scored against the convoy from 9-13 Sept. and the failure from 20-22 Sept. clearly show the decisive role played by the weather. When operating against North Atlantic convoys the medium sized submarines have the advantage.
2)
St. Lawrence and Belle Isle Straits:
The operations carried out by 3 boats have been very successful. Defences proved comparatively weak and were limited to direct convoy escorts. Further boats are to be sent out to make the most of this situation.
3)
East coast of North America:
Operations ongoing for some time; busy shipping well defended convoys close inshore in shallow water; good successes, but also caused several losses. Air patrolling is particularly strong. But when occasion arises it is planned that single boats shall lay mines.
4)
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea:
Comparatively high losses have been suffered, probably through air attacks.
Radar interception gear can certainly protect the boats at night, but it cannot facilitate attack. Thus it is intended to station at most single boats in this area if the occasion offers. The area concerned is that of Old Bahama Channel - Windward Passage - Jamaica, where the majority of convoys pass through. Climatic conditions and the necessity for lengthy submersion result in strain for the crew, so that a lengthy stay offers little chance of success.
U 202 (Kptlt. Günter Poser) has been ordered to operate East of 52° West, off Trinidad, as electric compressor has broken down.
5)
Area round Trinidad:
West of Trinidad the conditions are rather similar to the above. The likelihood of contacting convoys is of course, greater near the port of departure. On the other hand, the area East of Trinidad has proved exceptionally favorable. Convoys have not yet been observed here, air patrolling is less, naval anti-submarine measures (destroyers) have been observed for the first time recently. The difficulty lies in picking up the obviously frequently varied approach courses of the single ships, and this accounts for the patchy nature of successes.
It is striking that so far only a little eastbound shipping has been contacted. It is possible that this is only exceptionally routed via Trinidad.
With the Freetown area, the area East of Trinidad will continue to be the focal point for large submarines. Medium sized boats can and will be employed there, provided previous refueling from submarine tankers is possible.
6)
North - South Convoy Route ("SL" and "OS" convoys):
It has been repeatedly possible to pick up "SL" convoys according to plan, though admittedly so far north pursuit could not be continued very long because of the appearance of air escorts. The drawback of operating against these convoys is that when a convoy has been missed the next one does not pass for about 10 days.
Thus these operations are worth while only when carried out by submarines en route for the Freetown area, i.e. for medium sized boats only if they can be refueled.
Accordingly Group "Iltis", which is at present operating here, is to proceed farther into the Freetown area after refueling.
7)
Freetown area:
Has again proved very fruitful. Despite numerous successes, a major change of the shipping route or a soft-laid reaction by the enemy in reply to the sinkings has not been noticed. A major change of route would not be possible either here or in Trinidad.
It is intended that Group "Iltis" shall operate after refueling with other large boats.
8)
Harbors in the Gulf of Guinea:
No experience is yet available for these harbors. 2 large boats have left for this area, two Italian boats will also operate.
9)
Intended operations for Cape Town and East Africa:
Are given separately, also opinion on sanctioning attacks on the coast of Brazil.
Group "Eisbär" (U 68, 172, 159, 504) U 179 and U 178 have been given operational freedom in the area bounded as follows, once the first surprise attack has been carried out:
FE 9179 - GZ 1599 - coast of Africa. Southern boundary 40° South. U 179 has been ordered to wait in left half of GR 40 until attack is sanctioned.
10)
Off Iceland:
At present the first attempt to operate with submarines against Murmansk convoys. Light nights and powerful air patrolling prevent successful operations here during the summer. Despite this, it has been possible for single ships to remain off Reykjavik for a long time.
It is intended to send out single boats here when there is an opportunity during the new moon period. When more reliable news that a "PQ" convoy will shortly leave port, several boats should also be available, providing they put out from home waters.
11)
The situation in Coastal Waters and in the Bay of Biscay:
Is governed as before by the danger of air attacks and mines.
Although
U 165 (FrgKpt. Eberhard Hoffmann) announced that she was entering on 28 Sept., she has not yet arrived. Air reconnaissance yielded no information. The loss of the boat must be assumed, probably through bombing attack. There was a reliable sounding radio announcement of submarine sinking by the R.A.F. in the Bay of Biscay.
The repeated requests regarding the air forces and the naval forces under Admiral Western Defences can merely be emphasized once again.
Luftwaffe bombers attacked Lancing and Colchester, England.
RST
KvtKpt.& A I op
(convoy staff officer)