[Skybird]

The Süddeutsche Zeitung (!) writes:


"Voll erwischt"

Germany is stumbling unprepared through a world beset by a historic number of crises. Its previous foreign-policy beliefs are no longer suitable - and it hardly dares to adopt new ones. This weakness makes external aggression possible in the first place.

The past few years have been extremely irritating for the Germans' self-image in foreign policy. The country that found its balance in the world in good deals and good advice has found that one certainty after another is waning, influence is waning and the oh-so-comfortable stability is melting away. A sense of insecurity, sometimes even hopelessness, has taken hold.

In the last few months alone, the catalog of decline has encompassed the entire cosmos of foreign policy self-evident: The U.S. is ruled by an anti-democratic narcissist and narrowly escapes a democratic collapse, France's neighbor declares the common defense alliance brain-dead, nationalists and populists drive the EU apart, the most important economic partner - in the Far East - destroys the globalized trade world out of national interest and en passant builds a new world order. Ah yes, almost forgotten: After 20 years, a military mission in Afghanistan ends in flight and collapse. And now Russia is preparing to wage a war to its liking in order to underline its blackmailing will - simply because it can.

It's no surprise, then, that the ever-pandemic nation reacts intolerably to the overdose of crisis, that it demands guidance or, in the worst case, gives up its bearings because the compass has been out of adjustment for far too long. The never-ending series of dramatic world events, fits of weakness and defeats has triggered a great sense of helplessness and helplessness - and this testifies to naiveté and despondency in dealing with the world.

One of the ritualized demands of the Munich Security Conference, and not just since German President Joachim Gauck's appearance, has been the sentence that Germany must assume more responsibility in the world. This sentence, delivered with great determination, usually ended: nowhere. Because whenever this Germany strived for more responsibility, it happened according to the formula "more of the same". More money, more talks, more reminders, more demands. German foreign policy is the master of the middle, of balance, of timidity, of caution.

These qualities are usually also well invested, especially when foreign policy is conducted in the derivative of the Germans' most important interest: Europe, the EU, is Germany's guarantor of peace and prosperity, which is why the powerful country in the middle should be as careful and constructive as possible in cultivating the unity and cohesion of the community.

But there are just a few other assumptions that the country faithfully follows without having questioned their suitability for the year 2022. It was the German diplomat Thomas Bagger who named the two most important ones in a sensational essay three years ago. Is it true, then, that the road leads to ever more democracy, liberality and the rule of law, that these forms of government are superior and irresistible, and to that extent will sooner or later be accepted by all? And is it correct that military power no longer plays a role, precisely because one is surrounded by friends?

This basic trust in the good and the true, in the power of example, can already be considered arrogant. Today, in the crisis vortex of the time, it is dangerous to form foreign policy with the ideas of the post-reunification years and otherwise take refuge in moral superiority. Let the others buy weapons - for Germany, the likelihood of war is ruled out because common sense forbids it. The problem is that this is not the first time that Vladimir Putin has considered war to be an effective means of asserting his interests. The world that Germany prettifies for itself usually shimmers in harsh black or white.

So the moment had to come when this merciless world would also seize the timid Germany by its greatest weakness: morality. Is it reprehensible and even war-promoting to provide the threatened Ukraine with weapons for its own defense? Or is there not an obligation to help one of the biggest victims of Nazi atrocities to repel an invasion by its Russian neighbor?

It is indeed characteristic of the German debate that it is conducted almost exclusively in moral categories, but is not decided along the question of what helps to assert German interests? What do the classic military principles of deterrence and a credible defense capability still mean? And what does it say about the world's perception when this nation, filled with peacefulness, questions the logic of nuclear deterrence every four years at the Bundestag elections and pretends that none of this is any longer its business?

As the world becomes rougher and more unpredictable, Germany takes refuge in an ideal landscape, true to the principle that good will prevail. The extent to which this attitude is now seen as a weakness and a burden for the alliance was amply documented in the Ukraine crisis. The real bill, however, is due in Germany itself, where this historic crisis density comes up against a largely unprepared population that simply lacks the tools to deal with blackmail, coercion, military threats and attacks on the political system. Insecurity is created by an aggressor. But it becomes dangerous only through weakness.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)