[Sailor Steve]

Monday, November 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a report from the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the occupation of Memel prior to ratification of the Treaty.

General Desticker reads and comments upon the report.

(After a short discussion it was decided to approve the report as prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles, and that no troops should be sent to Memel before the entry into force of the Treaty.)


2. The Council has before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the suppression of the Inter-Allied Transport Commission.

General Desticker reads and comments upon the report.

(It is decided to suppress the Inter-Allied Transport Commission, as proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles in their report.)


3. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation on the Hungarian situation.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon the note prepared by the French Delegation. He wishes to bring to the attention of the Council that in paragraph 2 of Page 4, the phrase relative to the Inter-Allied force under discussion should be understood in the sense that the force includes only Serbian, Romanian and Czecho-Slovak troops, under an Inter-Allied command.

Mr Polk states that he has not yet seen a final report from Sir George Clerk and he thinks it might be advisable to await this information before discussing the question. He should, however, inquire how the Council intends to treat the Inter-Allied Commission of Generals; if this Inter-Allied Commission has not succeeded, it is because the Supreme Council has not backed it up sufficiently.

M Berthelot thinks that they have not carried out with sufficient authority the instructions given them by the Supreme Council, and on the other hand they have not shown initiative, and do not seem to have had a consistent policy. As for Sir George Clerk, he does not seem to have succeeded in his mission with Herr Friedrich. The affair seems to be dragging along; H Friedrich has not yet retired and the Democratic Government has not been formed as was expected by the Council. He adds that the French proposition is not to belittle the mission of Sir George Clerk in any fashion, but it is important to clear up the situation and settle this vexatious question.

M Pichon thinks it is extremely important to solve this question as soon as possible.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Romanian and Hungarian questions of course involve each other. Sir George Clerk has insisted on the importance of getting the Romanians out of the country, and a stable government cannot be formed until this has been settled. The information from Sir George Clerk says there might be disadvantages, but the balance of advantage is that the Romanians should be gotten out. The Romanians are defying the Council. S Bratiano was dragging on negotiations with no intention of following the instructions of the Council. He certainly thinks that they should insist on getting an answer from Romania and he thinks that the Council should publish the note which has been sent to Romania. S Bratiano was spreading false versions of the note, sent in the course of the electioneering campaign which is going on in Romania, and is pretending that there is no disagreement as between the Allies and Romania.

M Berthelot states it is quite evident that the Romanian troops should first get out but there is great danger if the Romanian troops are to leave the country before other troops are sent to replace them. In that case, the Allies will find before them at Budapest only a Friedrich Government which has in its hands a force of police; outside of Budapest is Admiral Horthy with an army of 20,000 men or so; at any rate he is reactionary and is a symbol of the Hapsburgs. In conclusion: first, the Romanians should get out; secondly, the Romanian troops should be replaced in such a way that the Allies will be in a position to impose their policy at Budapest; but the departure of the Romanians will be dangerous if the Allies do not have other means of controlling the situation. As far as the Romanians are concerned, there is no doubt whatever they should be obliged to answer the note which has been sent them, and it might become advisable to publish this note, although this might not be of very great practical value, as elections were being held at this time. S Bratiano Is pretending that this note had never been delivered to the Romanian Government by the Conference. According to his theory, only three out of the four Principal Allied and Associated Powers had presented the note, and the Italian representative had not associated himself with this step. General Coanda, who has just arrived in Paris, claims that there is no need to reply to a note which has not been received.

Mr Polk has noticed in the French note a reference to the American General which he does not approve. He thinks the American General has been doing his best to follow his instructions. His only contention is that Romania is not on trial, but that the Supreme Council should be obeyed. The impression is going abroad in Romania that the orders which are being executed by the Commission do not correspond to the real orders of the Supreme Council and also that if the text of the note does not sound quite French, it is because it stands for an Anglo-American translation. On the whole the impression is that America was against Romania; that is not so, it is only a question, as he has said before, of the orders of the Supreme Council being followed. If there is so little coordination of action between the Allies in this case, it augured badly for the future.

M Pichon says they are all agreed that the Inter-Allied cohesion should be maintained.

Mr Polk asks how it is possible after they had ordered the Romanians to leave Hungary, to think of leaving them in the Inter-Allied forces referred to in the latter part of the French note.

Sir Eyre Crowe said M. Berthelot’s remark - that the Supreme Council’s note had not been received, - is a surprise. If that is so then they cannot insist upon its being carried out. That lack of cooperation in Bucharest is very serious.

S Scialoja remarks that he has no information on the non-presentation of the note by the Italian representative; he will, however, get more information on the subject.

M Pichon states that according to a telegram from the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest there has been delay in presentation of the note to the Romanian Government for the reason that the Italian representative has not received his instructions. A second telegram has informed him that the note has been delivered by three out of four representatives of the Allies without awaiting any longer the instructions of the Italian representative. He does not know whether the Italian representative has now received these instructions, but he wishes to point out that the Romanians are still maintaining that they have not received the note.

Sir Eyre Crowe mentions that S Bratiano is spreading the report that this was an Anglo-American intrigue.

M Pichon is of the opinion that the note should be published so as to put a stop to these rumors, and also a further note, should the Council so decide.

Mr Polk wishes to point out that the Council can only repeat the conclusions it has adopted at its meeting of August 5th or thereabouts.

M Berthelot wishes to point out that one cannot reproach the French Government with having opposed itself to any of the orders sent to Bucharest. The French representative has always delivered the notes either in the name of the Allies or in the name of the French Government. Should S Bratiano wish to try and cause disagreement between the Allies this should carefully be avoided. He repeats that two points are to be distinguished; on the Romanian question there is no discussion possible as to the attitude to be taken, but the Hungarian question remains. The departure of the Romanians from Budapest runs the risk of bringing about a state of anarchy or the reappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy.

Mr Polk thinks that early in September the Council had ordered the Romanians to turn over 10,000 rifles to the Hungarian police which was to be organized, and he understands that only 1,000 rifles had been delivered up to this time without bayonets, without sufficient ammunition, and that the machine guns had been delivered without tripods. He thinks there would be no use sending another Mission to Budapest if there was to be no compliance with the orders already sent out by the Council. If the present Mission had not done its work, it would then be advisable to recall it.

M Pichon agrees that this might be exact, but there remains the danger of an armed force under the orders of Admiral Horthy, with the shadow of a Hapsburg reaction. The Romanians might be lying, but they again affirmed that they had given up these arms; it would be easy to verify this through the Mission and the orders should then be carried out. He again pointed out how dangerous it would be to recall Romanian troops without being able to oppose an Inter-Allied force to the Horthy force. It is important to organize a democratic Government at Budapest or it will be impossible to sign peace with Hungary.

Mr Polk wishes to remark that four of the Powers had sent representatives to report on conditions in Hungary - he personally had great confidence in General Bandholtz, - and if the Council did not have confidence in these representatives it was for it to recall them. Later the Council had sent Sir George Clerk, in whom also he had the greatest confidence. He thinks the Council should have confidence in the men they send on these Missions, and he considers it had been well represented so far.

M Berthelot says that if the police force at Budapest is armed, that does not inspire great confidence, for it is in the hands of the Friedrich government. It is quite clear that the Council got its information from representatives wherever sent; it had also the advantage of a general view of all the problems. The important question is that there should not remain a dangerous and ridiculous center of disorganization in central Europe; a negative policy was not sufficient. They should have a positive policy.

M Pichon asks what is to be done about Hungary. Are they going to deliver it to the Friedrich government or to the Archduke? As the Allies will not have forces available to send there, it seems that the best solution would be to have the occupation force composed of Serbian, Romanian and Czechoslovak troops under an Inter-Allied command. If the Council had in mind a better solution, this was the time to put it forward.

Mr Polk asks whether the question should not also be examined by the Financial experts.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that Sir George Clerk should be informed by telegram of the discussion, and asks for an opinion on the possibility of employing Romanian, Serbian and Czechoslovak troops.

Mr Polk agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe, that the Council should not think of acting without Sir George Clerk’s opinion.

M Pichon remarks that Sir George Clerk could also consult the Generals.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquired whether, in the existence of the disturbed state of the country, it would be expedient to use Romanian troops, and whether a force containing Roumanian and Serbian troops would work well.

M Berthelot thinks that this was simply a question of command. He thinks, however, that the Romanians might be excluded, especially if this exclusion might be used to show them how little confidence was put in them by the Supreme Council. But it was most important that they should have the symbol of an Inter-Allied force, so as to disarm Horthy. Telegrams would not be sufficient to do this. This occupation would not be very long, and with an efficient high command it would be easy to await the formation of a democratic Government.

M Pichon sums up, stating that the Council is agreed to send immediately a telegram to Bucharest, insisting that the Romanian Government should answer the last note sent by the Council. M Berthelot will now prepare the text of this telegram.

M Berthelot submits to the Council a draft telegram which is approved. He thinks it advisable to give the text of this telegram to the Romanian Delegation that same afternoon, and to publish the new and the former note the next day.

Sir Eyre Crowe informs the Council he has at that moment received a telegram from Sir George Clerk, which he proceeds to read to the Council.

(The Council unanimously agrees to adjourn the examination of the draft telegram to be sent until the next meeting of the Council)

(It was decided:

(1) To send a note to the Romanian Government insisting on a prompt answer to the note which had already been sent by the Council on October 12th;

(2) That this note should be immediately delivered to the Romanian Government at Bucharest by the four representatives of the Powers without waiting for further instructions from their respective Governments;

(3) To give the Romanian Delegation at Paris a copy of this note that same afternoon;

(4) That the present note, and also the original note, should be published the following day.)


4. The Council has before it a report from the New States Commission and a draft Treaty with Greece.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the report of the New States Commission and the draft Treaty with Greece. He adds that the proposed Treaty concerns European territory only and should any Asiatic territory be attributed to Greece at a later time, a new treaty will be necessary. Greece should also be informed that the Treaty would be communicated to her at this time, but that the signature would only follow upon the final attribution to her of certain territories.

(After a short discussion it is decided:

(1) To approve the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece, prepared by the New States Commission;

(2) That in communicating the text of this treaty to the Greek Delegation the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should inform the Delegation that it only applies to territories situated in Europe, and that Greece will not be asked to sign the Treaty before the territories to be attributed to her had been determined.)


5. M Fromageot wishes to inquire which Powers should figure in the preamble of the Treaty with Bulgaria, and also which Powers are to sign. America and Japan were not at war with Bulgaria, but it seemed anomalous that they should not sign, taking into account the different dispositions of the Treaty.

Mr Polk understands that the question has already been settled and that it was agreed that all the Principal Powers sign.

M Fromageot says that as for the other Allied and Associated Powers, a certain number had not declared war against Bulgaria, but their full powers had already been presented to the Bulgarian Delegation; under those circumstances they have a right to sign. He proposes that a circular letter should be sent them asking whether they intended to sign, and he thinks this would not delay the delivery of the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals.

(It was decided:

(1) That all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty with Bulgaria;

(2) That a circular letter should be addressed to the other Allied Powers which had not declared war against Bulgaria, to inquire whether it was their intention to sign the Treaty.)


6. The Council has before it the note from the Dutch Government and the draft reply prepared by the Drafting Committee to this note.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon both documents. He wishes to add that the note sent by the Supreme Council on October 15th to Germany conformed to the declarations made in March at the Conference in Brussels concerning the question of ships in course of construction. He wishes to point out that the decision was formerly that all ships in course of construction were to be delivered to the Allies.

S Scialoja remarks that, in the reply to the Dutch Government, paragraph 7, Annex 3, to Part VIII of the Treaty with Germany should be had in mind. A possible objection from the Dutch Government should be foreseen: the Treaty states that Germany agrees to take any measures that might be necessary for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which might have been transferred during the war to neutral flags. It therefore follows that Holland might very well tell the Allies that they should address their demands to Germany and not to her. He would like the Drafting Committee to take into consideration the possibility of that objection in the note to be sent to Holland.

Mr Polk states that apparently the said paragraph ties the hands of the Supreme Council; but as a matter of principle, this would not be in accord with the American view of International Law. Should not this note be sent back to the Drafting Committee to prepare a text which would satisfy all the members of the Council?

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark that if an argument is begun with the Dutch Government it will be difficult to foresee how long this discussion might last.

(It is decided to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the Dutch Government for further examination.)


7. The Council has before it a report from the Allied Railways Commission in Poland relative to the opening for commercial traffic of the three railroads crossing the German-Polish frontier north of Warsaw.

Colonel Kisch reads and comments upon this report. He brings up the personal suggestion that the Armistice Commission was not the proper authority, but that the question should be referred to the Allied Representatives in Berlin.

(After a short discussion it is decided to approve the conclusions of the report as presented by the Allied Railways Commission in Poland, with this modification: that the Allied Military Representatives charged with the Polish-German Affairs acquaint the German Government with the agreements if any, concluded at Warsaw.)


8. The Council has before it a request of the European Danube Request of the Commission on the International Conference to establish the regime of the Danube, as provided for in Article 349 of the German Treaty.

(After a short discussion it is decided to refer this request to the Drafting Committee for examination and report as to points of law.)



9. The Council has before it the request of the European Danube Commission for the attribution of two tugs to that Commission.

(It is decided to attribute two tugs belonging to the Enemy Powers to the European Danube Commission for an indemnity to be fixed by the arbitrators.)


10. The Council has before it the note from the German Delegation to the Reparations Commission regarding the transport by sea of potatoes purchased by Germany in Denmark.

(It is decided to refer back to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission this question for examination and report.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)