[indy]

Sixth War Patrol

July 29, 1944 - September 22, 1944

Lt.Commander Guy E. O'Neil, Commanding Officer

Prologue

After a brief stay in Fremantle Western Australia lasting from July 4th until the 19th, the GUNNEL once more headed out into harm's way. During her stay in Fremantle a refit was performed by the USS GRIFFIN and the members of Relief Crew, Division 121. Ships officers and crew left the ship for two weeks recreational leave in the Perth area during this period.
On July 14, 1944 Lt.Commander. G.E.O'Neil, USN, assumed command of the GUNNEL, relieving Commander John S. McCain, USN. Commander McCain moved on to a new duty assignment after a very capable, rewarding and rigorous tour of duty. During his tenure he placed the GUNNEL in commission, trained a new crew, and completed 5 war patrols into enemy controlled waters from North Africa to Southeast Asia. At this time, Lieutenant Lloyd R. "Joe" Vasey, USN, who served initially as First Lieutenant and Torpedo and Gunnery Officer, and then for the majority of the subsequent war patrols as Executive Officer and Navigator, also received orders moving him on to a new duty assignment in submarines. Commander McCain remained in the service during the years following the war, ending his career as a four star Admiral in command of all US Forces in the Pacific region during the war in Vietnam. Lieutenant "Joe" Vasey also remained in the service after the war advancing to the rank of Rear Admiral, USN.
Lieut. Clarence J. Zurcher, USNR, who had been serving as Torpedo and Gunnery Officer under Commander McCain, took over as the Executive Officer and Navigator under Lt.Commander O'Neil. Lieut.(jg) T.E. Stephens and Lieut.(jg) E.W. Murphy had been temporarily detached for a period of rest and for duty with the relief crew while the GUNNEL was out on the 5th patrol and they now returned. Lieut.(jg) Stephens relieved Lieut. Zurcher as Torpedo and Gunnery Officer, and Lieut.(jg) Murphy resumed his previous duties as First Lieutenant. Lieut.(jg) S.L.Knotts continued as Communication Officer. Other officers remaining unchanged in their assignments were Lieut. W.P. Robinson, Engineering and Diving Officer, Lieut.(jg) J.M. Thornton, Commissary, and Assistant Engineer, and Lieut.(jg) J.L. Shillansky Assistant Communications and Commissary Officer. At this time also CMoMM G.D. Hansen reported aboard to relieve CTM R. D. Pickard as Chief of the Boat. Chief Pickard received orders to return to the States as part of the commissioning crew for a new submarine being built.
As earlier noted in these accounts of the GUNNEL war patrols, the paragraphs following which commence with time in bold face (date/times underlined) are excerpts from the Commanding Officer's official wartime Patrol Report and Deck Log submitted at the end of the patrol. These reports are now unclassified, and can be found in the official files of the U.S. Navy. To these original reports which follow, Guy O'Neil, Captain USN (Ret), who as Commanding Officer at that time held the rank of Lt.Comdr., USN, (hereafter Former C.O.), along with former members of the wartime crew, have added additional comments and recollections of that experience. These later additional comments are printed in Italics to distinguish them from the wartime narrative. Where possible, the names of the former members of the crew are noted, and attribution given to their recollections. Extensive research of the historical records has been made to insure the faithfulness of GUNNEL's story. Captain O'Neil and the editors welcome your comments and we take full responsibility for any omissions or inaccuracies. We especially encourage relevant submissions from former crewmembers and their families.
The sixth patrol was conducted in the Sibuyan Sea area and off the west coasts of Southern Luzon and Mindoro Islands.
The Official report follows:

July 18, 1944: Refit completed. Regular ships officers and crew returned from leave. Commenced loading and completed minor items of repair. In addition to the normal refit the following work was accomplished.
(Capt. O'Neil, former C.O.)"The system of refit and rest between patrols, set up early in the war, was a major contribution to the success of our Submarines. When the war commenced, the submarines in the Pacific and the Philippines were the first ships out of port to carry the war to the Japanese. It was very soon evident they were undermanned and, with the few available, overextended. Peacetime complement for the fleet class boat such as the GUNNEL, (the SALMON, SS182, was my home then) was five officers and 54 men. This manning level was sufficient for peacetime operations, three or four days at sea during most weeks, with often a whole week or two in port. Now we were out fifty-five to seventy days on our own, with only two weeks in port upon return to make repairs, resupply and get back on station. At sea, the men and officers spent their off watch hours, when not at battle stations,, in maintenance and repair of machinery. We ate and slept in the few hours left over. Upon return we had to accomplish our own refit, albeit with help from the tender, taking a few hours off when we could. When we went to sea again we were worn out. This situation fortunately soon changed. In my case, upon return from our third patrol, I believe early June, 1942, the submarine service had established a two week refit period for each submarine between war patrols, during which the officers and men were sent ashore to rest areas. Relief crews had been formed, made up of one quarter of each crew detached in rotation, plus replacements from the States, to accomplish the maintenance and repair work, while the remainder rested. Additional officers and men were added increasing the boat complements. Submarine Tenders, such as the U.S.S, GRIFFIN, provided all the support a major shipyard could offer with their heavy lift capability and mechanical, electrical, optical, and weapons shops."
The patrol report continues:

1. Replaced SJ Radar training shaft with latest enclosed gear type.
2. Overhauled #2 and #3 main engines.
3. Moved SD Radar receiver forward to location on #1 periscope well in control room.
4. Repaired #2 periscope which had been flooded with oil and had jammed power shift control. On Installation, switched location of scopes placing the attack periscope in the forward postion.

"Jack McCain had requested shifting position of the attack scope, and I concurred. This was the primary scope used by the C.O. for submerged attack as it tapered at the top to a small diameter tube not easily seen. The other scope contained a radar antenna in addition to the optics and being bulky it was normally only used for an occasional last moment radar range before firing. As the torpedo data computer (TDC) was located adjacent the after scope, the attack scope needed to be shifted to the forward position so that the C.O. using that scope and the fire control party at the TDC weren't all trying to occupy the same space. (Former C.O.)
"For those readers unfamiliar with submarines and the equipment we used to find and attack enemy shipping, the SJ radar was used for surface (ships) search. The antenna was mounted on the top of a vertical shaft in front of and at the top of the periscope shears and continually rotated in use. The picture presented at the receiver in the conning tower on a circular screen is now familiar to anyone who has seen war movies. Ship contacts appeared as spots of light, called "pips", and the number, distance, and true bearing of the ships in a convoy could be determined by measurement from the center of the screen. A second small screen, called the Plan Position Indicator (PPI), was used to show a small-magnified section of the main screen to examine in detail relative positions of the ships within a convoy. This was a great help in getting into a good firing position at night. as one could often recognize the escorts from the convoy itself by the size and relative location of the individual pips. Although the Japanese anti-submarine escorts did not have surface search radar detection systems, it was not the disadvantage it would appear to be. They had excellent optical equipment and well-trained lookouts, and despite our relative small silhouette at night, they could often see us first at distances we could not yet see them visually."
"The SD was the aircraft search radar and its antenna was installed on top of a pole aft of the periscope shears. The receiver was mounted in the Control room and showed only the range to the contact, not the direction.. This was a somewhat crude but effective device, which saved our necks many a time. By the end of the war this was being replaced by the SV, which had a rotating antenna and showed both direction and range. During the war we all believed the Japanese had radar detection equipment installed in their aircraft, and could detect our air search radar and home in on our signal when we turned the radar on, so we normally sent brief pulses by keying at random intervals. After the war we found they had no such gear in use, it was just that they operated so many search aircraft in these areas that we naturally picked them up beyond visual range every time we turned the set on. We were not attracting them by using the radar."
July 19, 1944: Underway, made a trim dive in operating area followed by sound tests in Cockburn Sound.
"As we took in the lines and pulled away from the dock, I suddenly realized the loneliness of command. From this moment on, every action we took, every move we made, were my responsibilities. I would have help and advice, but the decisions were mine alone. In the five days since I spoke the words, 'I relieve you sir', to Jack McCain before the assembled crew, I had been observing them (and I'm sure they were looking at me). I felt confident that they and I were ready and capable for what was to come. I hoped they felt the same about me. The difficulty would be the gaining of their trust and confidence. Jack McCain was a tough act to follow. He was a strong character and I would do many things differently. In the crews mind this was still McCains boat, and I was an unknown, an outsider. There was a lot to be accomplished, and I started at once by leaning heavily on the new Exec, Lt. Jim Zurcher, and the new Chief of the Boat, CMoMM G.D. Hanson, for help, and they were up to the challenge. This was a well-trained crew, but there were changes I had to make. As a PCO (prospective Commanding Officer) waiting for assignment, I had prepared my Standing Order Book for guidance of the OOD watch standers, and I knew how I wanted the Fire Control Party to work. I put Jim Zurcher on this at once to assign the people and lay out their tasks to my way because once underway and past the entrance buoy the training exercises would start. Every ship contact, radar or visual made a good exercise for the tracking party who manned the TDC in the Conning Tower and the plotting table in the Control Room. Their job was to determine from radar, sonar, and visual bearings with ranges if available, the course and speed of a target vessel. With this information and observations I could make, I was responsible for putting the boat into a position to successfully launch torpedoes despite the best efforts of a very capable enemy force to prevent that. I also ordered surprise dives at odd and unexpected times, and I carried a stop watch to check the time it took to submerge to 52 feet, the depth at which the highest point of the periscope shears went under. As I remember now, a minute and a quarter from the time I or the OOD willed to dive was acceptable in normal Sea State, and I have seen it done in 42 seconds. Fire drills of course were frequently held which I initiated as I strolled through the boat, and power outages were arranged which required immediate shifting to hand operation of steering, and bow and stern planes submerged." (Former C.O.)
July 21-22, 1944: Underway conducting individual ships exercises.
"These drills became a night and day routine that I made sure we carried out without rest and repeated over and over until we were judged ready to go to war. Once we were in enemy waters there would be no forgiveness for mistakes." (Former C.O.)
July 23-27, 1944: Underway conducting practice day and night torpedo approaches. July 25th took Commander Sub-Div 121 aboard and conducted coordinated search and attack exercises with USS MUSKALLUNGE and USS FLIER on escorted ship as target. July 27th fired three exercise torpedoes and returned to port to complete loading. Took on board 24 Mark 14 torpedoes to complete full load.
"This training period at sea had been a work out for everybody, and I was about exhausted. This period was not only refresher training for the crew, it was graduation time for me. It was not too late to change the new C.O. and the Division Commander had to approve me as well as make the decision the boat was ready to go. We passed, It was go. The torpedoes fired were judged to be hits. Most importantly the torpedoes ran hot and straight and were recovered. It would have been most embarrassing to lose them. Exercise torpedoes were the regular torpedo but with an exercise head filled with sea water to give it the same weight. At the end of the run the air remaining in the torpedo air flask blew the head dry so that the torpedo would broach and float nose high for recovery and reuse. The Mark 14Torpedo was alchohol fueled, steam propelled, and could be set for two speeds; 46 knots, or 31-1/2 knots to a greater range. The warhead contained 668 pounds of Torpex, a sensitive and lethal explosive. With 6 tubes forward and 4 aft, we had all tubes loaded with one extra per tube. The torpedoes were supposed to be ready to go, but before we reached station each would be completely overhauled by our torpedomen who lived with them and were responsible for them."
"At the time this patrol report was written, 1944, neither the other officers, the Torpedo gang, nor I were aware of all the flaws in the design and operation of the torpedoes and their detonators issued for our use. We knew the magnetic feature of the detonator was unreliable and was to be disconnected in all torpedoes. We also knew the torpedoes tended to run deeper than set, we were told 4 or more feet, and we were prepared to set depths shallower than desired depending upon target and sea state. We did not know of two fatal flaws in their design and performance. The actual depth the torpedo ran upon leaving the tube was variable; it sometimes was a series of deep, porpoising, dives up to a run of 1-2000 yards or more and than gradually approaching a mean running depth somewhat deeper than set. More importantly the mechanical detonator tended to jam upon a straight on or nearly so, hit (in fire control terms, a 90-degree track, a right angle.) thus failing to detonate the warhead. The detonator would most often work however if the torpedo hit at an angle to the target hull. Unfortunately I always tried to set up for a 90-track which was considered the best tactic." (Former C.O.)
July 29, 1944, 1337(H): Underway in accordance with ComTaskForce 71 operation order #98-44 to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare against the enemy in the Sulu Sea. Routing via Darwin, East of Timor, Banda Sea, Molukka Passage, Celebes Sea and Sibutu Passage.
"Once past the entrance buoy, I could now remove my sealed orders from the safe and read my instructions. Other than the route to take, the patrol area, and date to return home they were brief: 'Conduct unrestricted submarine warfare on enemy shipping'." (Former C.O.)
1540(H): Commenced coordinated attack exercises with USS NARWHAL against single ship convoy consisting of USS CHANTICLEER, USS ISABEL and HMAS DUBBO. During these exercises the SJ radar gave very poor performance. After tuning to peak performance while tracking convoy a maximum range of 6,000 yards only could be occasionally had on the CHANTICLEER.
2200(H): Completed convoy exercises and set course in bombing restriction lane proceeding independently for Darwin. Continued working on SJ Radar through the night until the trouble was found to be in the Pulser Box of the transmitter. The spare pulser box carried was found to be in an equally poor condition giving negligible output power.
"We were supposedly safe from attack by friendly forces in these lanes. I made it clear to the lookouts however, they were to regard all aircraft and ships seen as hostile until proven otherwise." (Former C.O.)
July 30, 1944 0140(H): #1 Main engine found to have a broken head stud and placed out of commission. #2 Main engine was found to have a leaking liner seal ring which was renewed from spares.
"The following day, July 31, was uneventful as we continued at two engine cruising speed (15 knots) towards our scheduled stop in Darwin, West Australia. Most boats heading on patrol were scheduled, or allowed, to stop over briefly. It was not out of the way, and the cruise there provided a good shake down following the refit and training period just completed. I was thankful this time because we were having problems already with #1 and #2 Main engines, and using up our spares. Additional spare parts were available in Darwin.
While enroute assigned station, I started each day that we would remain on the surface with a brief trim dive at the beginning of morning twilight. A submarine has to compensate for changes in weight due to fuel, water, torpedoes, and food used during any lengthy time spent on the surface to ensure the next dive, planned or unplanned, will be at neutral buoyancy and smartly accomplished. Daily trim dives ensure one is never far off. While submerged, the trim is continually adjusted so it is only during lengthy periods on the surface that the trim can get off. Compensation for weight changes is accomplished by pumping sea water in or out of the trim tanks, or between forward and after trim; because the boat can be too heavy or too light, but also out of balance overall. The Engineering Officer was responsible for maintaining this balance by keeping track of all weight changes and their moment arm and noting the changes in the Diving Book. Before the first dive out of port the compensation is calculated and adjustments made as part of the rig for dive procedure. One hopes the weight changes were correctly estimated, else one could find the boat plummeting to the bottom upon diving, or almost as bad unable to get under at all. The first trim dive after a refit is always interesting and sometimes embarrassing to the Engineering Officer if his estimates are badly off. One had to remember that fuel oil is lighter than water, thus fuel used, makes the boat heavier over time, and fuel taken on in port makes the boat lighter the next dive. While at sea, torpedoes fired make no difference in the trim because they are replaced by an equal weight of water flooding back into the tube, which in turn is pumped into the trim tanks as torpedoes are reloaded from the racks. New torpedoes taken aboard in port however make a tremendous change because of their weight and moment arm (distance of the tubes from the center of gravity). Computing the proper trim after a Navy Yard overhaul is practically impossible, and we usually chose an area with a sandy bottom and something less than 150 feet depth for that first divc. If we turned out to be too heavy, the Diving Officer was ready to blow everything and hope to stop the descent before hitting the bottom. If too light one merely had to flood auxiliary ballast until the boat got under and then refine the trim, all of course while enduring caustic remarks by the skipper." (Former C.O.)
August 1, 1944 0925(H): (SC#1) Sighted Dutch K-14 Submarine on opposite course in position Latitude 20-20 S, Longitude 113-03 E. Exchanged recognition signals.
"The Dutch Navy operated several of their submarines out of Freemantle against the Japanese. I had a lot of respect for them. The boats were small, hot, crowded and leaky, similar to our old K boat class, and had a limited range and endurance, but they did a good job. Earlier in the war I had a few drinks with one of the K-14 officers, and I remember we commiserated together about a mutual problem; our main engine exhaust valves leaked badly while submerged. As he expressed it "the bloody exhaust walves" continually leaked on every dive. Every time I saw one of their boats I wondered if they ever got that problem licked. The SALMON never did." (Former C.O.)
0943(H): (AC#1) While submerging for training made a plane contact on the SD Radar at 14 miles. Plane not seen.
1200(H): Position; Longitude 19-57 S, Latitude 113-10 E.
1417(H): Fired ten rounds 4" common ammunition from the deck gun and 60 rounds 20mm ammunition for each 20mm gun. A homemade target was constructed but it sank immediately on launching due to an overzealous auxiliary man stuffing in a large lead hammer to make it float upright.
"This drill I remember went very well. Feeling pleased observing this drill. I saw no problems. Rudolph Velle, the Gun Captain and his crew worked smoothly in this practice shoot. They were obviously well trained. Dispersion of the fall of shot appeared normal for this type gun. The loading crew was working well bringing the ammo from the deck locker, and feeding the shells into the breech. Pointer and trainer were matching the slight roll and pitch. There was no indication of the trouble we were shortly to experience in a battle surface on an enemy target. We will never know, but my guess is the pointer's gun sight was not secured tightly following the last bore sighting during the refit, and this test firing jarred the sight off center without our knowing, causing the gun to shoot high later." (Former C.O.)
2215(H): Sent Gunnel #1.
"This message reported our expected arrival time in Port Darwin on the northwestern tip of Australia and to request the radar and engine spares we needed before proceeding to our assigned area. I was particularly concerned about the poor performance of the surface search radar, as that was a vital piece of equipment. The U. S. Navy maintained a detachment in Darwin to support our submarine operations utilizing Australian Navy facilities. Without this help we would have had to return to Freemantle. Once we departed Darwin, we would keep radio silence until ordered otherwise or an emergency. Darwin would have been a good base to operate from, but impossible to use as it was subject to occasional Japanese air raids. I had been in Darwin earlier in the war on previous submarines and once was caught in a Japanese air raid. It was not a happy experience. (Former C.O.)
August 2, 1944 1200(H): Position: Latitude 16-42S, Longitude 118-13E.
1800(H): #3 main engine out of commission for five hours due to faulty injector.
"Continued enroute Darwin conducting daily drills and section dives."(Former C.O.)
August 3, 1944 0200(H): Master gyro compass out of commission due to lost vacuum in North Rotor, commenced steering by auxiliary gyro.
0210(H): #3 main engine out of commission due to an improperly installed seal ring on one cylinder liner leaking.
1300(H): #3 main engine placed back in commission. Gyro placed in commission for awhile after vacuum pumped down but it started losing again so continued steering by auxiliary gyro.
"Our machinery troubles were worrying me. I looked into the matter carefully and had a long talk with Walt Robinson (Lt.(JG) Walter Robinson was the Engineering Officer) and with Chief MoMM G.D. Hanson, the Chief of the Boat. I concluded our problems weren't with personnel. We had very capable mechanical, electrical, and electronic technicians, and these troubles were not due to poor maintenance work at sea, or lack of knowledge of the equipment. On the contrary, we were finding the problems before they became really serious. Happening so soon after a refit during which the engines were taken apart and inspected, and faulty parts replaced convinced all of us the problem was probably faulty or poor quality parts, rather than poor work on our part or that of the refit crew. We could only soldier on and do our best. (Former C.O.)
2102(H): Sent Gunnel #2.
August 4, 1944 1200(H): Position: Latitude 12-48S, Longitude 126-34E.
"Continuing at cruising speed conducting daily drills and section dives." (Former C.O.)
1542(H): #2 main engine out of commission until 1800(H) due to faulty liner seal ring.
1800(H): Placed SJ radar out of commission to replace burned out tubes. The faulty pulser box in the transmitter is the cause of the tube trouble.
August 5, 1944 0605(H): (AC#2) SD radar contact 11 miles. Identified as Liberator bomber.
0615(H): (SC#2): Exchanged recognition signals with HMAS ML 814, commenced entry Port Darwin via swept channel.
0915(H): Moored Port side to Boom Jetty, Port Darwin, Australia. Received 23,299 gallons diesel fuel, 150 gallons lube oil symbol 9370 and 10,000 gallons fresh water. On arrival was informed required spare parts would not arrive until 1900H) so made tentative plans to depart early the following morning.
August 6, 1944 0300(H): Completed repairs to master gyro compass, SJ Radar and #3 main engine. In addition on routine inspection yesterday we found another faulty seal ring on one liner of #2 main engine which had to be replaced. At this point we only have enough replacement seal rings for four more units. As no SJ Radar spare parts arrived last night we replaced the SJ transmitter complete with one kept in Darwin for emergency repairs. The difference in operation was phenomenal and for the first time I was able to see how a PPI is supposed to work. Where the maximum range on a ship the size of the Chanticleer had been 6,000 yards, it now gave ranges of 15,000 to 20,000 on small craft.
"The engine breakdowns which began before reaching Darwin soon became an ongoing problem. The seal rings for the cylinder liners of our main engines, made of rubber, were in short supply. We were not the only boat using the Winton design engine. Australia was at the end of a long supply line, and as with many other spares, we now had to rely on parts manufactured in Australia. These parts were of a poorer quality and when they failed, cooling water for the cylinder would run into the engine sump, diluting the oil and causing further problems. On this patrol we had to renew the seal on eleven cylinders, which used all our on-board spares. Sal Bommarito, MoMM3/c who worked and stood watch as oiler in the forward engine room came up with the idea of putting rubber electricians tape under the leaking seal and reusing it as replacement. This made it difficult to reinstall the cylinder liner as it had to be pounded back in place and the water tubes on top of the liner could be easily damaged but it worked. We had an additional 13 cylinders develop small leaks for which we had to reuse old seals for some when the problem got worse. This meant we had to make continuous checks for possible bearing failures that could be caused by water in the lube oil, during which the engine would have to be taken out of service. Had the patrol lasted longer we would have had to cannibalize one engine for seal rings to keep the other three running. This became one of my irritating minor worries and a debilitating load on the machinist mates. As it happened #2 and #3 engines were used only in emergency after 28 August, due to the large number of water leaks and progressive dilution of lube oil." (Former C.O.)
0535(H): Underway enroute patrol area in Sulu Sea via the swept channel and Bombing restriction lane east of Timor.
0800(H): Submerged for a trim.
0815(H): Surfaced.
1200(H): Position. Latitude 121-10 S, Longitude 129-29 E.
"I planned getting past Timor Island during darkness this night, so we pressed ahead at best speed. At 1400(H))(AC#3) we had to submerge for an unidentified two engine bomber, but soon got on the surface again and continued without further incident." (Former C.O.)
August 7, 1944 0120(H): Picked up Northeastern corner of Timor Island on SJ Radar, range 40 miles.
0409(H): Commenced passage of Barrier.
"The Barrier referred to is the long chain of islands from Singapore to Java to Indonesia of which Timor Island and the group of small Islands and shoals extending to the eastward are a part. The Japanese occupied all of these Islands and all the Islands to the North with only the Timor Sea and Arafura Sea separating Japanese territory from Australia. Our main entrance and exit to and from Australia and Japanese controlled waters, was usually via one of two straits. My preference was the one we took now, the narrow deep-water passage between the eastern tip of Timor and the group of tiny islands and shoals in shallow water scattered 10 to 30 miles to the east. The other was Lombok strait between the Islands of Lombok and Bali, west of Timor, a deeper shorter route but more confining and better guarded. On this run we were scheduled to use Lombok on our return." (O'Neil Former C.O.)
0623(H): Submerged for a trim and to work on SJ radar training gear. On attempting to surface found transmitter tubes burned out in SD radar. These were replaced and at
1000(H): Surfaced.
1158(H): (AC#4) Lookout and OOD sighted one DINAH on port bow flying low on opposite course range about 8 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. Position: Latitude 7-25S, Longitude 126-50E.
"As I recall now the aircraft designated by the code word DINAH was a two place Japanese biplane with a single float which could be operated from a ship equipped with a catapult, or from a land base with a harbor. They were easily recognized as enemy as we had no biplanes in this area They carried small bombs and machine guns, but their main threat to us was sighting us and reporting our presence. We were soon due to enter several confined comparatively shallow waterways and straits and we didn't want our presence too well known. We were now in enemy waters. Both enemy and friendly aircraft patrolled this immediate area in depth for some miles. We were still protected to a degree from friendly aircraft by remaining in the defined bombing restriction lane, but I put no confidence in friendly aircraft understanding that, and my policy was to duck first on any contact." (Former C.O.)
1321(H): Surfaced.
"Upon surfacing at 1321(H) we found #4 engine exhaust was very loud and very noticeable on the bridge. I risked putting a man on deck, and he found there was a hole in #4 muffler. The area we were heading for, the Sulu Sea and Sibuyan Sea, had hundreds of little Islands with narrow passages and shallow water, many of which we would have to pass through on the surface. Many had Japanese outposts, Even at our best we seemed awfully noisy on the surface while we sneaked about at night trying to find worthwhile targets, and we were also afraid sparks from the hole in the muffler would be seen. The engine mufflers were mounted outside the pressure hull, under the superstructure deck, which meant crawling under the deck in the dark to work on the muffler. We were still in the bombing restriction lane, now moving away from the nearest land, so I took the risk of trying to repair the damage before we reached the next landmass and very likely encounter Japanese search planes. Winston Von Brethorst, MoMM 1/c, and his oiler watch mate in the forward engine room Sal Bommarito, MoMM3c agreed to climb under the topside decking aft and place a patch over the hole. They fashioned a tin band over an asbestos blanket, that worked well, and we breathed easier. The job was finally finished and we were quieter and felt darker when we left the protective lane at 1606(H)" (Former C. O.)
1606(H): Cleared Bombing Restriction Lane, set course for Greyhound Strait. Had intended to pass close by Northern end of Buton Strait but due to plane contacts and radar troubles had dropped behind schedule.
August 8, 1944 0543(H): Submerged for a trim.
0600(H): Surfaced.
"We were leaving the open area of the BANDA Sea, and would soon be entering the more confined waters of the MOLUCCA and CELEBESE Seas. I planned to pass to the west of TALIABU ISLAND, and stay in the deepest water I could find east of the small group of Islands comprising the BANGGAI ARCHEPELAGO and PELENE ISLAND. We would be passing very close to several Japanese occupied Islands. This passage was known as GREYHOUND STRAIT, and it was somewhat of a tight squeeze. There would be more soon to come. " (O'Neil, former C.O.)
0705(H): (AC#5) Plane contact on SD radar, 7 miles closing. Submerged to avoid detection. Position: Latitude 03-50.15S, Longitude 124-57.5E.
0820(H): Surfaced.
1045(H): (AC#6) Contact on SD radar 18 miles, closing. Position: Latitude 03-16S, Longitude 124-48E.
1047(H): Contact closed to 10.5 miles without being sighted so submerged to avoid detection.
1242(H): Surfaced.
1535(H): Picked up TALIABU Island ahead, range 60,000 yards on the SJ radar. Patrolled off southern entrance GREYHOUND STRAIT until
1830(H): Commenced transit, passing to the eastward of TEMPAU Island, no activity was noticed.
2007(H): Completed transit of GREYHOUND STRAIT, set course to pass close to Cape PANGKALSIANG and thence to Cape FLESKO.
"We were now in enemy waters. All hands were informed to be alert and ready." (Former C.O.)
August 9, 1944 0308(H): Made contact with Cape Flesko on SJ Radar, range 60,000 yards. Crossed the equator at Longitude 124-20 E.
"Seafaring custom calls for initiating all Polliwogs (those who have never crossed the Equator) with an often crude, sometimes rough, and usually unpleasant ceremony. Those of us who had crossed the line and survived the initiation (otherwise known as Shellbacks) traditionally, under the authority of King Neptune and the Royal Baby, conducted this ceremony with much pleasure. However having just entered enemy waters I decided this was not the time to hold such an affair, and as senior Shellback with final authority I could declare any polliwogs aboard would be duly initiated by the experiences we were about to undergo. In any case the Gunnel had few if any Polliwogs for those in the original crew and Jack McCain had all been initiated enroute from Pearl Harbor for their second patrol, and all subsequent replacements from the States had crossed the line enroute Australia." "(Former C.O.)
0531 (H): (AC#7) Contact on SD Radar, 6 miles, closing. Submerged to avoid detection. Position: Latitude 00-17 N, Longitude 124-31 E. As plane contacts have been numerous between DAVAO and KENDAR decided to spend a day submerged close along the coast. The air conditioning immediately went out of commission and spent the entire day trying to make it work. Nothing sighted.
"In the early light of dawn, I saw the weather had turned squally, and the sky was overcast and cloudy. There were many whitecaps which should make it difficult for aircraft to spot us, but by the same token the cloud cover made it difficult for us to spot aircraft." (O'Neil, Former C.O.)
1727(H): Surfaced and set course for BANKA PASSAGE.
"Now that we were in enemy waters, and constantly under threat of discovery by aircraft patrolling these waters day and night, our routine would be to remain submerged during daylight and hunt and attack shipping on the surface at night. We would submerge while it was still dark, and remain down well into darkness. This was rough on the Exec who was the navigator because we could not be on the surface during morning and evening twilight; the optimum times for star sights. We would move about, at night remaining on the surface, relying upon our speed advantage, low visibility, and our radar to find and attack targets. Immediately upon surfacing each night our first priority was starting and completing the battery charge, usually an hour and a half to two hour task. By closing the Main Induction for a spell upon surfacing we could also air out the boat and get rid of some of the stale air we had been cooped up in all day. Once that was completed I could relax because I would have all four engines available to reach an attack position on any contacts made. Our usual cruising speed on the surface was 12-15 knots, which could be maintained on any two engines. They could also at the same time carry the finishing charge on the battery, or a float to keep it fully charged ready for the next day. This speed provided good coverage of our patrol area, and was economical of fuel use." (Former C.O.)
2045(H): (SC#3) Picked up radar interference 345 T, and at
2132(H): Exchanged recognition signals and calls with an U.S. Submarine by keying the SJ radar. Communication was established at an estimated range of over 20,000 yards and lost at 15,000, this being the closest the submarine passed us abeam.
2230(H): Commenced transit BANKA PASSAGE.
"Since noon we had been moving north close and to the east of the northeastern tip of CELEBES ISLAND, and we were now rounding the cape, turning westward and passing into the CELEBESE SEA. After passing TALISEI ISLAND light (unlighted) we would be in open sea and deep water for about 300 miles before reaching TAWI TAWI and SIBUTU PASSAGE through the SULU ARCHIPELAGO. This was the entrance to the SULU SEA our assigned area. Our Auxilliaryman was still working on the Air Conditioning system, but without results so far. The forward air conditioning unit was the one with troubles. The forward coils were just not producing. Temperatures forward of the engine rooms were staying in the 90 to 100 deg range, and the after coils in the engine rooms by themselves did not keep those spaces much if any below that same temperature range. It wasn't much help being on the surface as the outside air temperature was in the 90's in this latitude." (O'Neil, former C.O.)
August 10, 1944 0000(H): Completed transit and set course for SIBUTU PASSAGE, across Celebes Sea.
1200(H): Position: Latitude 03-31 N, Longitude 122-13 E.
"Seas all morning were choppy, wind force 2, and the skies were still cloudy and squally. I had four engines on the line and we were on the surface maintaining a propeller RPM to give us 17.5 knots. I wanted to get to SIBUTU PASSAGE at evening twilight so that we could continue on the surface through that strait, as well as the passage just beyond between Pearl Bank and Doc Can Island and be clear before morning light. Both were narrow passages with some shallow water and the channel ran close to many small Islands (particularly TAWI TAWI, a major Japanese base in the area). I didn't want to be caught in daylight in that confined area, some of it possibly mined, and have to submerge" (Former C.O.)
1743(H): Submerged for a trim. Inadvertently went to 250 feet straining the Pit Log Bellows and putting the pit log out of commission.
"This is exactly what I had mentioned earlier could happen if one did not make a frequent trim dive (and the reason I had ordered one now) after a lengthy time on the surface, or otherwise account for weight changes and keep the boat compensated. The Engineering Officer, Lt. W.P. "Robby" Robinson, was suitably embarrassed and my remarks to him were not too kind as "all back emergency", followed by "blow negative and main ballast" was ordered, which stopped the boats plunge at 250 feet. We eased back up again to 100 ft. without broaching, and corrected the trim. Had this been a crash dive to evade a plane or surface escort attack, it could have been more than embarrassing. Robby had neglected to note that we had been running on four engines and had used considerable fuel, which he had not compensated for over time and upon opening the vents the boat, unduly heavy, started dropping like a stone." (O'Neil, Former C.O.)
1821(H): Surfaced.
2018(H): Picked up Tawi Tawi Island on SJ radar, range 55,000 yards
2110(H): Commenced north bound transit Sibutu Passage.
2240(H): Completed uneventful transit Sibutu Passage. Set course for Doc Can Island.
"I never felt easy making these passages on the surface so close to land and in shallower water. I couldn't help picturing all sorts of dire happenings. These waters might have been mined since I last had passed here even though we had no intelligence reports so indicating. The USS ROBALO SS 273, Manning Kimmel skipper, was lost to a mine in Palawan Straits on July 26 less than a month before. But for a fluke of fate I would have been the new C.O. on that patrol, but that is another story. I didn't learn of ROBALO's loss until we returned from this patrol. After the war it was learned there were 4 survivors who subsequently were executed or died in prison camp. I could picture enemy lookouts ashore spotting us and ordering out planes or surface craft, or sending out orders for shore batteries to open fire. Flickering lights on the beach meant all sorts of things in the imagination and the dark. It was always a great relief to pull clear having accomplished the passage without incident. Hardest of all was maintaining a nonchalant appearance, an 'all is well' demeanor before the crew all the time. It wouldn't do to have the "old man" look fussed or worried." (O'Neil, Former C.O.)
August 11, 1944, 0055(H): Picked up Pearl Bank Lighthouse 15,000 yards by SJ radar.
"Unlighted of course. This was not much help for navigation but that's the whole point in war. The lighthouse and island showed up well on radar and the lookouts could pick it out visually as we got closer." (O'Neil, Former C.O.)
0130(H): Commenced passage between Doc Can Island and Pearl Bank
0239(H): Completed passage, entered area. Set course for DULUNGUIN Pt., MINDINAO, following SULU ARCHIPELAGO.
Each day was much the same. Each night we studied the general broadcast (called FOX Schedule) messages received for indications where enemy ships might be. I had also while enroute to station studied previous patrol reports with information on routes, and I tried to pick a position for the day within our assigned area that would give us the best chance of contact. While submerged by day we would take frequent, not more than half hourly intervals, observations by periscope, running at 100 feet between looks. The routine would be to come up to periscope depth (52 to 55 feet depending upon sea state), up periscope and a quick sweep all around the horizon for any surface object that might be close, and another quick sweep all around the sky for aircraft. Then down periscope, and assured there was nothing close to surprise us, up scope again for a slow sweep of the horizon hoping for masts, smoke, or any sign of ships approaching. We also kept a constant listening watch on our passive sonar. To conserve our battery, and to keep silent for best sonar performance we would run at 2 knots. If necessary, should ship contact be made, we could pull clear and surface out of sight of the targets, risking siting by aircraft, then use our high speed on the surface to gain position ahead on the targets track, dive, and make a submerged attack when the target reached us. In these waters, in the passages between islands, the water currents could exceed our slow submerged speed, and we would often find ourselves 40 to 50 miles from our dead reckoning position after a long day. The periscope observations were my responsibility, but once his days work in navigation was done, Jim Zurcher, the exec., shared this task. The other officers shared watch duty as "diving officer" in the control room submerged and OOD on the bridge while surfaced, and the lookouts were chosen carefully from the crewmembers with experience and good night vision. Upon diving they also manned the diving planes controls in the control room. During the night, the oncoming watch lookouts, and OOD would gather 15 minutes before time in the control room and don red goggles to prepare their night vision before going topside to relieve the watch. At night I pretty much lived in red goggles in order to be able to come quickly to the bridge when called."(Former C.O.)
0532(H): Sighted PANGUTARAN Island bearing 143 T, 30,000 yards.
0637(H): Submerged for a trim.
0650(H): Surfaced.
1056(H): Sighted SANGBOY Islands bearing 122 T
1454(H): (AC#8) Sighted one unidentified aircraft bearing 065 T, range about 10 miles, flying low on course 155 T. Submerged to avoid detection. Position: Latitude 07-38 N, Longitude 121-37 E.
1851(H): Surfaced and closed coasts of Mindanao to patrol about six to seven miles off point DULUNGUIN.
August 12, 1944 0501(H): Submerged for day's patrol on a line three miles off DULUNQUIN POINT.
"The day dawned with sky overcast, sea choppy, with moderate surface winds. It would be difficult to spot aircraft, but the choppy seas would make observation of our periscope difficult" (Former C.O.)
1030(H): (AC#10) Sighted one NATE, or OSCAR with its wheels lowered, bearing 157 T, range 3 miles, making climbing turn away from the coast. The officer of the deck thought it had just taken off from a position to the northward of the SIOKEN River and to seaward of the 245 foot hill shown at Latitude 07-43 N, Longitude 122-07.5 E on C.&G.S. chart 4065. Dust seen hanging in the air over this spot tends to bear this out.
1153(H): (AC#11) Sighted same aircraft as before bearing 260degT, about four miles, flying low and crossing astern headed for the coast at the same spot mentioned above. The eagerness of the O.O.D. to get deeper spoiled an opportunity to observe further actions of the plane but upon regaining periscope depth a few minutes later the plane had disappeared and another dust cloud could be seen forming above the supposed air strip.
1753(H): (SC#4) Sighted mast and smoke bearing 166 T near the coast. Went to battle stations and commenced approach.
"It was still too light to surface, but in hopes this ship was part of a convoy I set a normal approach course and kept watch with frequent periscope observations as we tracked his progress to solve for course and speed. At this point all we could do was wait for sufficient darkness to surface and attack and in the meanwhile maintain a position in which we could react to the situation as it developed." (Former C.O.)
1825(H): Target identified as lone sea truck proceeding north, speed 7 knots. Pulled clear and at
1921(H): Surfaced and manned tracking party. Found there were two targets, both sea trucks. Visibility was too poor for the deck gun and torpedoes were useless on him so decided to let him go. Continued tracking to give fire control party a workout.
2041(H): Closed range to 2000 yards and got a look in a flash of lightning to make sure he was a sea truck, then broke off approach. They were not worth giving our position away at this time. Resumed patrol to the south staying about 6 - 7 miles off the beach.
"This was the last ship contact we made the rest of the week. Our area was not shaping up very well as productive of good targets. It was very evident the Japanese were running out of shipping, and appeared to be building more and more of these small wooden vessels to supply their needs. My last patrol, in the PUFFER, was in the South China Sea and we found several convoys with large cargo ships and tankers. We continued searching hopefully for targets, surfaced at night, days submerged." (Former C.O.)
"We spent August 13 and 14 about 6 miles off the western shore of Mindanao running slowly between DULUNGUIN Point and ALIMPAYA Point, coming in to about 3 miles while submerged during the day. Nothing but formations of aircraft were sighted (AC#12) and (AC#13). Upon surfacing on the 14th at 1848(H) we departed Zamboango Peninsula, and set course for NASO Point, Panay Island about 120 miles north across the SULU SEA." (Former C.O.)
August 15, 1944 0527(H): Sighted NASO Point, Panay Island, bearing 008 T, 28 miles.
0605(H): Submerged for a trim.
0620(H): Surfaced. #3 main engine out of commission due to another bad liner seal ring.
0656(H): (AC#14) Sighted one unidentified aircraft bearing 262 T, range about 10 miles, on a northerly course. Submerged to avoid detection. Position: Latitude 10-06 N, Longitude 121-49 E. Decided to stay submerged as #3 engine, air conditioning plant, and SJ radar bearing transmitter all out of commission. Commenced closing NASO Point, Panay Island.
"I rather hated to stay submerged for any extended time, as the temperatures in the boat would work up to the 100 degree range. We needed to work on the engines and radar however. Some of the crew and officers were beginning to have trouble with heat rash. The forward coils were still not working properly even though we were continually searching for the cause. Fortunately there were no other health problems." (Former C.O.)
0740(H): (AC#15) Sighted two unidentified aircraft, possibly Tony's, bearing 036 T, range about 20 miles, passing from starboard to port making very high speed. Position: Latitude 10-07 N, Longitude 121-53 E.
1830(H): Surfaced and proceeded northward via CUYO EAST PASS, and TABLAS STRAIT. #3 Main engine, and SJ radar back in commission. Air conditioning plant remained out of commission the rest of the patrol.
"TABLAS STRAIT would take us into the SIBUYAN SEA, an access route through the Philippine Islands between SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS and the PHILIPINE SEA for traffic between Japan and the SOUTH CHINA SEA. The area would be rather confining with many small Islands and scattered shoal water, but with luck something important might come through." (Former C.O.)
August 16, 1944 0404(H): (SC#5) Contact on the SJ radar 330 T, 6600 yards. Maneuvered to avoid. His actions indicated he was patrolling between CONCEPCION and BANTON Islands at the northern end of TABLAS STRAIT. Position Latitude 12-49 N, Longitude 121-53 E.
0501(H): Submerged off DOS HERMANAS Islands and set course for BONDOC Peninsula.
1200(H): Latitude 13-10 N, Longitude 122-08.5 E.
1853(H): Surfaced for night patrol in southern approaches to MOMPOG Pass. Received orders to patrol SULU SEA north of 9-30 N.
August 17,1944 0500(H): Submerged for day's patrol on a line three miles off PINAMUNTANGAN POINT, BONDOC Peninsula.
1835(H): Surfaced. SJ radar out of commission due to burned out retardation coil.
"Fortunately we had an excellent radio/radar technician, Neil Carter as I recall now, who could find the problem and get the equipment back in operation." (Former C.O.)
2053(H): SJ radar back in commission. Commenced a search curve to cover area missed while radar was out of commission. Believe radar trouble due to extremely high temperature and humidity in the boat during the last week.
August 18, 1944 0403(H): (SC#6) Made contact with three ships on the SJ Radar bearing about 105°T, range 7600 yards, almost dead astern. The radar operator however was looking at the PPI scope set on the 8000 yards scale thinking it was the 40,000 yard scale as his instructions called for, and in the confusion allowed the contact to draw out to 12,000 yards, bearing 148°T before reporting his find at about 0418(H). Position: Latitude 13-06 N, Longitude 122-33 E.
"Yes, I was upset by this. Reading this report now I can't remember exactly what I did, but I am sure I let the Executive Officer know I was displeased. In any case it was a lesson learned, and the radar operator didn't let this happen again." (Former C.O.)
0420(H): Manned tracking party and headed south on four engines to get ahead of convoy which I supposed was on a southeasterly course. Nothing could be seen but the radar officer reported the pips indicated small or medium sized vessels and the range was opening fast showing high speed.
0432(H): The tracking party continued to report course of 045°T, speed 15 knots, so reversed course to head them off the other way. This was confusing as it either was a zig of 180°, or they actually were heading to the eastward to pass through the straits south of Bondoc into RAGAY GULF.
0447(H): (SC#7) The range had opened to 15,000 yards, with their course still 045°T, speed 15 knots when a ship was seen on the starboard beam at a range of 6,000 yards. Shifted to him as the first targets pips were becoming very weak and found he was on a course of 280°T speed 14 knots, which drew him back on our starboard quarter, range slowly closing.
0453(H): (SC#8) Sighted two more ships on our starboard beam, angle on the bow zero, range 6,000 yards by radar and closing rapidly. By this time it was becoming light so thinking the original targets had turned and headed north while we were tracking contact #7 above, turned and at
0455(H): Submerged to radar depth, manned battle stations and started approach on two closest targets south of us. After they came in sight by periscope they apparently turned to the west for they went by out of range. I couldn't see them well enough for identification but sound reported both high speed and slow speed screws. They disappeared in the direction of Mom Pog Pass.
The above was all very confusing at the time with the convoy apparently making a complete 360° turn, but on studying the chart later it appears one convoy, our first contact, was heading in an easterly direction for RAGAY GULF when they sighted another convoy, our second contact, heading north. They then turned south to avoid and after passing astern resumed their easterly course and we, running around to the northward of them picked the second group up on our starboard beam. As the second convoy was closing so rapidly, and it was getting light, there was no time to continue tracking and discover our mistake.
With their speed of 14 knots I figured they would arrive off the eastern enterance of Verde Island Passage at about 1300, so at
0553(H): Surfaced and set a course for the passage to the sourthward of MARINDUQUE Island. With our four engine speed we could arrive by 1200 giving us time to submerge and catch them off LOCOLOCO Point.
0753(H): (AC#16) Sighted two aircraft, type Sally, bearing 300°T, distance about 10 miles passing from starboard to port. Position: Latitude 13-05 N, Longitude 121-59 E. They went out of sight on our port bow still heading south so we continued on our way.
0756(H): (AC#17) Sighted two more aircraft, type Sally, bearing 330°T about 7 miles, crossing our bow from starboard to port. Position: Latitude 13-05N, Longitude 121-57 E. Their course would take them very close so we decided to dive, when
0757(H): (AC#18) Contact on SD Radar 3 miles closing fast. Submerged to 150 feet. Just before the radar mast went under the contact faded out at 1/2 mile. No bombs were dropped so he either didn't carry any or they were stuck in the racks. Decided as they knew our location we had better stay submerged and get away from our present spot.
"1/2 mile is 1000 yds. That was close. He was unarmed or he hadn't seen us yet." (Former C.O.)
0920(H): (SC#9) Sighted two sea trucks bearing 068&3176;T, 6,000 yards on a course of 300°T.
0932(H): (SC#10) Sighted one sea truck bearing 067°T, range 6,000 yards, on a course of 300°T. Position: Latitude 13-08 N. Longitude 121-55 E.
"Since diving at a little before 8 AM, we had sighted more sea trucks and this appeared to be a busy area. The problem was the shipping all appeared to be small wooden ships, not at all suitable for torpedoes. They were shallow draft and being of wood construction magnetic exploders were unsuitable. As I recall now, we had given up expecting the magnetic exploders to work as designed and had deactivated them depending upon the mechanical exploder to detonate the warhead upon contact. That in turn required a shallow running depth to hit such shallow draft vessels, and these torpedoes tended to porpoise when set to run close to the surface. The last three ships sighted were all too small for torpedoes. I remember feeling very frustrated." (Former C.O.)
1200(H): Position: Latitude 13-10 N. Longitude 121-45 E.
1221(H): (SC#11) Sighted masts of what turned out to be a convoy of six sea trucks bearing 331&3176;T, range about 10,000 yards on a course of about 095°T. They looked fairly defenseless, no guns could be seen, but assumed they carried at least 20mm machine guns. As our presence must have been known, and no aircraft had been sighted all morning since submerging, decided to try to pick off a couple by gunfire. Manned battle stations and at
1440(H): (Gun Attack #1) Surfaced and commenced firing with four inch and 20mm machine guns. Opening range about 2800 yards. Both 20mm immediately jammed, and the first four rounds of 4" went at least 2,000 yards over, so commenced a turn away to avoid closing range and to submerge as we were doing no good at all and I didn't want to expose personnel to the enemy's machine gun fire which so far was all short. At that instant at least two of the sea trucks and possibly a third straddled us with what appeared to be 3" gun fire from guns each towed on a barge behind them and hadn't been seen until we surfaced. These barges were about fifty feet long and about a five foot freeboard, and the gun, presumably an AA arrangement, had been covered by a green camouflaged tarpaulin. As we started shooting I had seen the covers cast off and great activity but not until they fired and I saw smoke did I realize what it was.
1501(H): The deck was cleared, but just as the diving alarm sounded and the last men were going down the hatch, one man was reported overboard. He was VELLE, Rudolph William, #224 42 10, MoMM1c, USN. His battle station was gun captain and investigation disclosed he had been knocked overboard by the recoil of the last shot fired by the deck gun. He was last seen astern, swimming with his head well above water and clear of the screws. I am convinced he was able to reach land as he appeared uninjured and is a good swimmer. He is undoubtedly now a prisoner of war. A sailboat not far away might have picked him up. Was intending to head back in an attempt to rescue Velle when
(Edwin H. "Ed" Leidholdt, a CPO Signalman at that time, recalls this event). "My post was at the forward 20-mm gun, the one that kept jamming. Clyde Pletcher was assigned the after 20-mm, but it didn't have a clear field of fire. My 20-mm became useless moments after we commenced firing. We had taken some ineffectual hits from small shells on our bridge plating, when the order came to 'Clear the deck'. Torpedomen Gene Glosson, the pointer on the 4-inch deck gun, fired the last shot that had just been loaded and I heard someone shout 'Man overboard'. I turned in time to see Velle hit the water. My immediate fear was he'd be sucked into the screws, turning at full speed. I saw him reach for a limber hole, miss and to my relief turn and swim strongly away from the boat."
(Former C.O.) "Velle did survive, although not without considerable mental anguish and physical trauma. He had to swim in the open ocean 14 miles to land, without a compass and most of the distance covered after dark. He doesn't remember getting ashore, but found himself among unknown Filipinos on a beach, not knowing whether they were friend or foe, where he was, or what he could do next. After the war he told some shipmates that he remembered his dismay at seeing his home submerge. He didn't remember seeing the PT boat, or hearing the depth charge because in his words 'I was too scared to focus on anything but my survival. I stripped down to my skivvies immediately and tried to hold on to my shoes and pocket knife, but I lost them'. In the end after finally reaching land, he was led to Filipino Guerrillas who got him aboard an old sailing schooner for passage to the Island of Panay. There he would join a group of American aviators who had been shot down and were being gathered by the Guerrillas for pick up by a U.S. submarine. This wasn't the end of his odyssey however. The schooner neared Panay as a typhoon gathered strength, and before harbor could be reached foundered in the wind whipped waves. Velle again was about to be tossed into the sea, but managed to board the only lifeboat as the schooner broke up and with the other survivors of the Filipino crew reached the shore. Rudy Velle later told his shipmates, that the following morning they found the beach littered with the wreckage of the schooner. In December 1944, the USS HAKE, LCmdr Frank Hayler, picked him up off Libertad, PANAY, along with a group of US Navy pilots, Philippine Air Force pilots, and several Filipino Guerillas needing medical care. After rest and recuperation, he was returned to the states as part of the crew to place the new submarine USS CUBERA in commission. We were sorry he didn't get back to the GUNNEL. He was a plank owner and we missed him."
1518(H): (SC#12) Sighted a PT boat heading towards us at a range of about 3,000 yards and a small angle on the bow, making at least 25 or 30 knots. I believe this boat was acting as an escort on the far side of the sea truck convoy as he couldn't have arrived this soon starting from the nearest land. He appeared identical to our own Higgins design of MTB's with the exception of the two machine gun turrets which he lacked. His screw noises sounded like a loud buzz, similar to underwater sound recordings I have heard of our own boats. Went to deep submergence.