Radio communications
 

Just some "historic" questions. Unlike the very well documented german side, I can't find a lot of informations about the radio communications procedures between U.S. submarines and their respective bases/commanders.

In Blair's Silent Victory, he mentioned the "Fox Schedule", a nightly radio broadcast from Pearl Harbor who transmitted orders and informations to all of the submarines at sea in the same long and fastidious flow of encrypted messages.

Pages 109 and 110 :
"If Withers had information or orders for his boats, he sent them messages over the nightly Fox schedules originating from Pearl Harbor. The submarine radio operators "guarded" (i.e., monitored) these boradcasts, watching for their own coded sign. When it appeared in the long string of messages, they would copy it. The message would then be decoded by the communications officer of by the other officers designated for this task. All messages were repeated three times. Very important messages were repeated on succesive nights. Messages were numbered serially. If an operator missed a message because he was submerged when it was transmitted or for other reasons, he had orders to "open up" (i.e., break radio silence) at the earlist opportunity and request that it be repeated"

It seems to be the main system of communication during the early years of the war for the Pacific Fleet.
Is the Asiatic Fleet used that same kind of "night schedule" system or everything came from Pearl's "Fox Schedule" ? And is that system used until the end of the war or evolded to a more "rafined" thing ?

Many thanks for your answer, Marco !

I found others informations about "Fox Schedule" and radio communication in Blair's book.

Page 309 :

"[...] nightly Fox schedules contained not only operational orders and informnation on Japanese movements but also personal messages to officers."

Pages 377 to 378, a very interesting part :

" Christie was not satisfied. He launched his opwn private investigation, studying the radio dispatches to the missing submarines. His conclusion was that Fife, like Doenitz, had been talking too much to his boats and requiring them to talk back too much and shifting them around too much. In a tough letter to Fife wich severely strained the thin "cooperation" existing between the two commands, Christie said in part :

Radio dispatches concerning Grampus and Amberjack totalled 106. Forty-six of these were reports of positions of submarines for higher command. Many of these dispatches gave specific names, locations and times.. We have in numerous instances intercepted enemy transmissions revealing the positions of our submarines and ordering counter measures. Submarine transmissions have been repeatedly and expertly DF-ed. The obvious solution is rigid adherence to the fundamentals of radio security, particularly the elimination of all but essential traffic. The amount of traffic put on the air should be a minimum for reasons of external security. The number of addresses should be a minimum for reasons of internal security."

That is an interesting part of Silent Victory, and could be a book unto itself. Character study. While Fife was a dedicated commander, when he first got the job, he probably "tried too hard" to be "the best", and ended up costing quite a few lives in the process, though there is little direct evidence of HF/DF being the cause - possibly destroyed in air attacks on Rabaul. You still have to like the guy for his dedication to duty though. Most of the commanders were rather self-serving (probably comes with the job), but Fife lived his job, fully immersing himself in it. He seemingly took what Christie wrote to heart. :salute:

O'Kane writes, that They radioed Perl "at the 100nm circle" when sailing back towards Perl from a mission. Meaning they called in to Pearl when they were 100nm away.

transmitting radio message
 

must i be on the surface to get off a message????

Usually between Periscope Depth and Radar Depth works. I depends upon where the radio antenna is set-up to be on the sub, but generally somewhere around 40 foot deep, give or take a few feet either side.

Typically can receive radio messages up to about 70 ft of depth, just below periscope depth.


Others went into detail so I'll not repeat this but will say in general, US commanders did not communicate with subs at sea the way the Germans did with their Uboats. Admiral Fife in Brisbane was "chatty" to degree, and
bit of a micromanager, unfortunately.

Even when US starting deploying wolfpacks, they had a on scene tactical commander to make decisions so HQ would not have to excessively communicate with them while at sea and exposing them to tracking.

The evening FOX traffic was the only regular communication and was sent in the evening, when subs were likely to be surfaced to receive it. Of course priority messages such as ULTRA regarding ship movements etc were sent, but it was often one way communication, no response required unless specified in the message.

Yes, that's the most disturbing thing when passing from Atlantic to the US subs Pacific theater. US skippers had more "liberty of action and manoeuvre" than the Kriegsmarine's Kaleuns who were micromanaged constantly by radio traffic from BDU. Also they had to report almost everything when BDU asked it : position, weather, traffic, success, fuel and torpedoes status, change of radio circuits, updating convoy positions etc...


Like Käpitänleutnant Kurt Baberg from U-618 said :

For the US skippers, it was the complete opposite as far I understand.
I've read that sometimes weather reports where asked from submarines patrolling along coasts of Japan (for exemple : before the Doolitle raid)

Question... would Sub skippers (radio operators) tap into regular Radio broadcasts for Entertainment purposes? How far/long would they be able to pick up said transmissions on average? Were there really gramaphones/record players on Boats as Standard equipment, like the Auto-Dog machines on US Boats?

Alan :salute: