La Vache and Aktungbby:
I accept your corrections. Clearly some unterseeboots were operating off the African coast.
My statements were off base and incorrect. But...
I still cannot understand why the sub command would divert critical, and limited number, of subs to this far southern arena when the coastal waters of the UK were so critical to control and that the necessary-to-exist materiel which was needed, had to end in UK ports. Anything coming from elsewhere still had to, must, clear the UK coast and end-up in its limited number of destination harbors for unloading. A balance, perhaps, between the hazard of UK aircraft up north and its density of shipping, and the safety of the south and fewer ships.
We know from Churchill's books that the situation was increasingly dire for the UK.
Obviously, I was not asked for my opinion by Doenitz!
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:Kaleun_Cheers:

<shrug> I too stand by my comment. Including in '41. As to Churchill, taking most anything he said about the Battle of the Atlantic as being accurate is rolling the dice. He had a flair for being melodramatic. I'd suggest Blair's books on the subject for a much more objective view, especially concerning the myth of the u-boat's effectiveness. In short, at no time did they come even close to shutting down the North Atlantic and any boats sent south wouldn't have changed that.

As to why some u-boats were sent south, a large part of that was because the hunting was easier, more successful and less dangerous than in the North Atlantic. A lot of Allied traffic went to west African ports and around the cape of south Africa to supply forces in both North Africa and the Far East. The Mediterranean was rightly considered too dangerous for this traffic.
At times too Doenitz was *told* where u-boats would be sent, regardless of other plans he wanted to do with them. This was especially true regarding the Mediterranean.

Pancoast:
I would not pretend to debate your accuracy, but I do think that the material I have read about N. Atlantic tonnage sunk in these earlier years (by both German and British historians) does indeed support Churchill's concerns in his many books and comments on the subject.
But all that is irrelevant.
U-subs did go south.
Some southern station orders from UBoat command would be valid.
Accepted.
But, I'll still hunt effectively in the northern waters. Since Doenitz can't touch me. And I can save fuel for long hunting periods and still get back to Lorient with more than just fumes left in the tank.
With respect,
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